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ABSTRACT 
This thesis delves into the agricultural past of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve which is part of the Bubi District in Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). The main purpose of this case study is to investigate 
whether or not there was a significan~ agricultural change in this 
Reserve, particularly in the colonial period 1923-1939. 
The Ntabazinduna area was sparsely populated before 1918. After the 
First World War the African population and number of livestock increased 
rapidly in the Reserve because of new immigrants from the Insiza 
District and natural accession. Then, the African cultivators were often 
faced with serious problems of congestion, poor harvests and 
-
overstocking. Oral and written sources do not suggest that there was 
tension between the new immigrants and the local population. 
I~ r~sponse to a general realisation that the Reserves generally were 
deteriorating alarmingly, the Colonial State intervened in the African 
agrarian sector between 1920 and 1939. 
The White Settler Government's chief agents of change in this area were 
Alvord, the_Agriculturalist for Natives, the NC of the Bubi District and 
-
a trained African Agricultural Demonstrator. These men went out to the 
Reserve where they carried out agricultural experiments in the inter-war 
period. It was hoped that after they had delivered lectures and 
conducted these experiments, then the African cultivators would abandon 
their old ways of farming and adopt new, scientific agricultural methods 
which were introduced into the Reserve by the Colonial State's agents of 
change. As African cultivators used these new agricultural techniques, 
it was assumed that they would probably be in a better position to grow 
i 
enough food for local consumption. In that way some of the above 
economic problems could be solved. 
This dissertation attempts to measure the responses of the African 
cultivators to the ·agri~ultural experiments conducted by Alvord and the 
demonstrators in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. In addition, this case-study 
will make use of new oral evidence collected by certain individuals and 
submitted to the National Archives of Zimbabwe. This new material will 
be checked against published and unpublished sources or vice versa. 
Oral evidence which I collected from some elderly people of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve between 1983 and 1988 will also be used to throw 
light on the subject of agricultural change. 
This dissertation does not use the term peasant in a technical sense. 
The word is used here to include all African cultivators in the 
Ntabazinduna area. 
Chapter 1 assesses African economic activities in the pre-Colonial and 
early Colonial era. Chapter 2 accounts for the growth of hostilities 
between the Ntabazinduna Reserve and neighbouring farms. The third 
chapter es~ab 1 i shes the indifference of the BSA government to Afri ca-n 
agriculture; while Chapter 4 explains the more interventionist policies 
-
of 'Responsible Government' after 1923. 
Chapters 5 and 6 outline Alvord's goals and methods and the work of the 
demonstrators. Chapter 7 assesses the response by African peasants to 
these activities. 
The thesis concludes that there were only limited responses by the 
majority of Ntabazinduna Reserve peasant producers to Alvord's efforts. 
ii 
The numbers of those who cooperated fully were very small, and they were 
drawn from a stratum of better-off families. Ndebele agriculture did 
not collapse as decisively in the inter-war years as the earlier 
'underdevelopment' theorists believed. In the Ntabazinduna Reserve, 
the overall picture was one of survival by the majority, with clear-cut 
responses by a small minority. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The land issue dominates Zimbabwe's colonial past as much as its 
present. A substantial body of literature, dealing with the subject of 
African agricultural history in Southern Rhodesia in the first half of 
the twentieth century has concentrated mainly on broad brush strokes. As 
a result, much of the published work is incapable of explaining 
variations in local situations. Several published works are studies too 
often characterised by half-truths and unwarranted over-generalisations 
based on inadequate oral and written data. Giovanni Arrighi, a member of 
the 'underdevelopment' school of thought concluded in his paper that 
there was a "progressive decrease in the overall productivity" of the 
African peasantry in Southern Rhodesia. 1 It could also be argued that 
Robin Palmer, also influenced by underdevelopment theories, argued too 
bluntly when he declared that by the end of the 1930's the "agricultural 
economy of the Shona and of the Ndebele, like that of the Kikuyu and 
most South African people had been destroyed 11 • 2 Such findings have been 
criticised by Ranger (among others) as "overmelodramatic in bringing 
down the curtain in the 1930 1 s 11 , and for failing to recognize the 
"resurrection' that took place between the 1930 1 s and the 1970's.3 
Arrighi and Palmer overstate the "destruction" of African peasant 
production. 
----------~---------
1. G Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia (The Hague: Mouton&.· 
Co N.V. Publishers, 1967), P.32:. cf. Paul Mosley, The Settler 
Economies: Studies in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia 1900 - 1963 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 
1983) p. 71. 
2. R Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London: 
Heineman, 1977) p. 241. 
·3. T Ranger, 'Growing from the Roots: Reflections on Peasant Research 
in Central and Southern Africa', Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 5 (1978), pp. 119, 120. 
1 
Paul Mosley criticised their, and similar, conclusions on the grounds 
that they were based on inadequate, statistical data: "Writers of the 
underdevelopment school have consistently maintained that in settler 
economies (i.e. economies to which colonists came to produce as well as 
administer, with the result that a significant amount of land had to be 
alienated for their own use) indigenous agriculture was in every case 
severely damaged by repressive policies designed to ensure the economic 
survival of European producers. 11 4 
In his view there are two groups of scholars who have made 
overstatements in connection with the history of African peasant economy 
in Southern Rhodesia during the first half of the twentieth century. One 
of the groups consisted of 'apologists for colonialism'. According to 
these scholars the introduction of foreign capital stimulated the 
indigenous economy. The other group is that of the 'underdevelopment 
school' that rejected the apologists' interpretation of the African 
peasant economy. According to these theorists, capitalist policies 
destroyed African agriculture.s 
But Mosley's findings argue that the "truth is more complex than either 
of these simple interpretations".& On one hand he alleges that most 
white producers needed African cheap labour, cattle and maize so much 
that they d~~ not want to destroy the peasant economy that sustained 
them. On the -other, African production "proved surprisingly resilient to 
4. P Mosley, 'Agricultural Development and Government Policy in 
Settler Economies: The Case of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900 -
60' Economic Sistory Review, 35, (1982) p 390. 
5. P. Mosley, The Settler Economies: Studies in the Economic History 
of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900 - 1963, from the blurb. 
6 • Ibid. 
2 
'the strains put upon it 11 .7 Table 3.1 in his book shows estimates of 
total productio~ of maize, millet, wheat, groundnuts, rice and cattle 
during the colonial period.a-_ This statist~cal evidence helps to shed 
light on developments that took place in the African agricultural 
economy during the colon.ial days. By his new interpretation, reinforced 
by statistical evidence, he has made a great contribution to the study 
of the history of the peasant economy in Africa. His conclusions, 
unlike those of the above scholars, are convincing. 
A further response to the sweeping and linear judgments of some of the 
scholarship of the 1960 1 s and 1970's, has been an academic acceptance of 
the need for case-studies in Zimbabwe today. These will permit the 
making of comparisons that could throw more light on the question of 
agricultural change in the African Reserves in Southern Rhodesia in the 
first forty years of the twentieth century. 
One of the pioneers in this field of study is Terence Ranger. He 
acknowledged the fact that few local historical studies had been 
conducted in Southern Rhodesia. Instead of dealing with the agricultural 
history of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, he concentrated on one colonial 
administrative district called Makoni, a part of Mashonaland. In that 
way he demonstrated clearly that a small area could easily be used as a 
unit for field re~earch~ He stressed that the agricultural history of 
Makoni district offered chances of comparisons with studies in other 
-1. Ibid. 
8 • Ibid, pp. 71 - 72. 
3 
parts of Southern Rhodesia. 9 Furthermore, he established the kind of 
relationship the Makoni peasants had with the State, white settler-
farmers and landlords during the colonial era. 
Another pioneer in th~ field of local study is Zachrisson. The main 
purpose of his detailed study of the Belingwe District was to assess the 
responses of the Africans of Belingwe to the agents and factors of 
change. 10 This work established that factors of change in studies of 
colonial society in Rhodesia were town, mission and farm.11 A few 
educated Africans were regarded as agents of change. The majority of the 
Africans who were illiterate were taken as agents of response.12 Using 
archival material, missionary records and local written materials he 
established that it was possible for scholars to follow interactions 
between the Administration, the mission and Africans. 13 These new lines 
of approach drawn up by Zachrisson, Ranger and other scholars show a 
more complex picture of the history of African peasant economy than that 
which Palmer and others originally outlined. Undoubtedly, the above 
scholars have made a great contribution to the study of the agricultural 
history of African peasant societies. But most of these case studies 
have focused their attention on rural, economic development in 
9. Conference on Zimbabwean History: Progress and Development: 
'Approaching Zimbabwe's Colonial History through a District study' 
by Terence Ranger, Manchester. April, 1981, pp. 1 - 2; T Ranger, 
Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative 
Study (Harare: Zimbabwe ~ublishing House, 1985) pp. ix, x, 
chapters 1 and 2. 
10. P Zachrisson, 'An African area in change: Belingwe 1894 - 1946', 
Bulletin of Department of History No. 17, University of 
Gothenburg, 1978, p. 3. 
11. Ibid, p. 4. 
12. Ibid, pp. 4 6. -
13. Ibid, p. 6. 
4 
_____ J 
Mashonaland during the colonial period. It could be argued that the 
totality of Southern Rhodesia 1 s African agricultural past might be 
understood better if scholars made a great effort to trace economic 
development in every reserve, and this study is a contribution towards 
such district-based enquiry. 
In the Bubi District, a part of Matabeleland, there are three African 
Reserves. The biggest of the three is the Shangani Reserve with an area 
of 1 126 000 acres. It was established for the Ndebele tribe in 1894. 
The smallest of them all is the Inyathi Reserve whose area is 7 090 
acres. 14 The third tribal trustland with an area of 26 220 acres was 
named after a small mountain where it is thought that several Ndebele 
chiefs including Gundwane Ndiweni, were executed by Mzilikazi Khumalo.15 
According to oral and a few written sources, these chiefs were killed on 
the grounds that they tried to instal Nkulumane Khumalo as the King of 
the Ndebele when his father was still alive. As a result the area around 
this mountain was called Ntabazinduna. 16 The compound noun iNtabazinduna 
is the short form of the term Intabayezinduna, meaning the "mountain of 
chiefs". 
Every scholar, delving into the history of African agriculutural economy 
in Southern Rhodesia, would undoubtedly be faced with the problem of 
14. E D Alvord, Department of Native Development, Southern Rhodesia, 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November 1930 'Agricultural Status of 
Reserve Natives,' Table No. 1. 
15. Ibid., Table No. 1. Titus Hlazo, 'The Naming of the Hill, Intaba 
Yezinduna, Matabeleland.' NADA The Southern Rhodesia Native 
Affairs Department Annual. 1934 No. 12 pp. 72 - 74. 
16. Ibid., pp. 72 - 73, See also T J Hemans, Notes for a Course on 
Ndebele Customs, p. 3. (Salisbury: Government Printer) p« 3 This 














































































































































inadequate, empirical evidence to support his assertions. In a review 
article surveying work of the 1970 1 s, Terence Ranger wrote, 11 In almost 
all African peasant historiography ..• none of the authors makes any use 
of field work or oral material 11 • 17 And indeed, many scholars who have 
done research on African peasant agricultural history have relied 
heavily on written archival data. But, of course, these archival 
collections contain their own biases and silences. For instance, in the 
reports of the white farmers• associations, Africans were often referred 
to as 'drunkards, thieves and natives•. These and other terms show 
clearly the prevail.ing racial stereotypes with which European farmers 
used to look down upon Africans during the Colonial period. It was not 
true that all Shona and Ndebele were thieves in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Racial prejudice was a strring force at work. 
Obviously, these farmers wanted to win Government support against the 
Africans whose lands were taken over by the white settlers. Similarly, 
European missionaries who did not understand the African culture fully 
also made sweeping judgments with regards to ~raditional customs. For 
instance, when Africans worshiped their ancestral spirits, missionaries 
called them heathen who were possessed by evil spirits. And, finally, 
many administrative reports and documents convey the preferences and 
prejudices (both conscious and unconscious) of the 11 official mind 11 • 
Reinforcing the hypothesis that scholars who base their works on written 
material only might arrive at wrong conclusions, Terence Ranger 
declared, 11 A book so dependent upon access to formal archival 
collections is very likely to bring its story of peasant collapse and 
17. Terence Ranger, 'Growing from the Roots: Reflections on Peasant 
Research in Central and Southern Africa', Journal of Southern 
African Studies, vol. 5. No. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
October, 1978) p. 99. 
6 
decline to a close in the 1930's, when archival access comes to an 
end.1118 
Wherever possible, scholars ought to check written evidence against oral 
data and vice versa. This case-study will use the above technique in 
order to minimize the selectivity and maximise the reliability of both 
oral and written data. Its main archival base will consist of: reports, 
returns and correspondence by colonial officials (especially the Chief 
Native Commissioner, Bubi District Commissioners, and the 
Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives), reports and letters by 
missionaries and other prominent personalities. 
In addition to that it will make use of new oral material collected by 
certain individuals.and submitted to the Zimbabwe National archives a 
few years ago. A distinction needs to be made between a view of oral 
evidence as essentially recording the past of an elite, and a more 
broadly-based assessment of its value. H W Langworthy exemplifies the 
former position: "The greatest detail of history is remembered by only 
those few people who have positions of power and prestige in a 
traditional society, such as chiefs, traditional councillors, keepers of 
royal graves and relics, and their families. 11 19 But such a conclusion 
is open to question. It equates power with memory in an arbitrary 
manner. It could be argued that apart from the members of the above 
classes there might be old people with retentive minds and valuable 
information. For instance, a descendant of a slave might be in a better 
18. Ibid., p. 107. See also H W Langworthy, Zambia Before 1890: 
Aspects of Pre-Colonial History (London: Longman Group Limited, 
1974) p. (v). 
19. Ibid., p. 3. 
7 
position to. tell the interviewer how his grandparents.worked for their 
master. As this dissertation will show, there is valuable historical 
information provided by representatives of almost all the classes of 
people living in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
The first Chapter will give an account of the economic activities of the 
Africans in Ntabazinduna during the pre-colonial period. It will also 
focus its attention on changes in the physical environment affected by 
the people in the years 1897 - 1925. In the second chapter the relations 
between the Ntabaz i nduna Reserve and .the neighbouring, white commerc i a 1 
farms in the periods 1897 - 1923 and 1924 - 1939 will be analysed. The 
third chapter will examine the attitude of the wielders of political 
power towards the African rural population in the period 1897 - 1923. 
The fourth chapter analyses the Responsible Government's policy towards 
the African areas with particular reference to the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
between 1923 and 1939. The purpose of the fifth chapter is to outline 
the aims and the economic activities of E D Alvord, the man who 
demonstrated his great determination to bring about a meaningful, 
agricultural change in the Ntabazinduna area and other African reserves 
between the two World Wars. The sixth chapter concentrates on the 
African demonstrators' agricultural experiments in the above Reserve in 
the years 1927 - 1939. The last chapter assesses the resporises of the 
African peasant farmers to the economic activities of the 
Agriculturalist, the demonstrators and the other agents of agricultural 
change in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the inter-war period. 
8 
CHAPTER. 1 
THE AFRICAN PEASANT FARMERS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 
In the nineteenth century Mzilikazi Khumalo, an ex-induna of Shaka Zulu 
estab)ished the Ndebele state between the Limpopo and the Zambezi 
Rivers. The Kingdom consisted of several districts. I~ the introduction 
of his thesis, Robin Palmer says, "The (Ndebele) state was divided into 
fout or fi~e districts, each containing large military Kraals." 1 
Earlier, Peter Mahlangu - on the basis of interviews with elderly people 
in Matebeleland - maintained that the Ndebele Kingdom consisted of four 
big districts, whose names were Amnyama, Igabha, Amhlope and Amakhanda. 2 
According to him the above districts were run by the Chief indunas, 
. . . 
Majijili Gwebu, Maqhekeni Sithole, G~abalanda Mathe and Dlundluluza 
Dlodlo respectively.3 . Mahlangu's conclusions concur with those of 
Maund. Writing aboot the affairs of the Transvaal and adjacent 
territories, Maund said,. 11 The country (Matebeleland) is divided into 
four divisions. These divisions constitute the four great territorial 
divisions of the army. 11 4 
1. R H Palmer, 'The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in 
Rhodesia, 1890 - 1936', University of London, published as: PhD 
Thesis, 1968, p. 13. · . 
2. P S Mahlangu, UMthwakazi : Izindaba ZamaNdebele Zemvelo (Cape 
Town: Longmans Southern Africa Pvt. Limited, 1962)·PP· 23 - 27. 
3. Ibid., pp 25 and 27. 
4. C 4643: Maund, .'Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of 
the Transvaal and Adjacent Territories', (London, Feb. 1886) by· 
Eyre and Spottiswoode; p. 114. 
9 
Demonstrating the value of oral evidence, Peter Mahlangu named the 
military stations that were established in the four major districts by 
Mzilikazi in the second quarter of the twentieth century. In addition to 
that he outlined the names of those military stations which were 
inherited by Lobhengula, the last King of the Ndebele. 5 Cobbing, who has 
made a great contribution·to the study of the rise and fall of the 
Ndebele state confirmed the existence of the above major districts and 
miliiary stations mentioned by Mahlangu.6 
According to one informant ENsingweni, which is now called 
Nhlambabaloyi, Wizard's pool, in the Ntabazinduna Reserve, was one of 
the military posts established in the district called Amnyama.7 But 
Mahlangu's book placed this military station in the area called 
Amakhanda, which was under the chief induna, Dlundluluza Dlodlo who was 
succeeded by Somabhulane, his son.8 Furthermore, the same informant 
alleged that ENsingweni was dismantled by the British South Africa 
Company's armed forces during the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 - 1894. 
According to him all the Africans living in the Ntabazinduna area were 
ordered to leave for the district of Amakhanda (Fort Rixon) by the 
Colonial Government.9 But there is no written, archival data that 
throws more light on the above conclusions. 
5. Mahlangu, UMthwakazi, pp. 25, 27, 28. 
6. JR D Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820 - 1896' 
University of Lancaster, unpub. PhD thesis, January, 1976, pp. 3, 
60 - 77' 102. 
7. M Nyathi was interviwed at Bhekeni Line, Ntabazinduna Reserve on 7 
January 1985. See also NAZ, NB 3 /1/9 Chief Native Commissioner 
Matabeleland-General Correspondence. Campbell to CNC, Sept 1908 
p. 77. 
8. Mahlangu, UMthwakazi, p. 25. 
9. Nyathi interviewed on 7 January 1985. 
10 
An alternative sequence was suggested by another informant: that there 
was a period when the Ntabazinduna region was not occupied by people. He 
alleged that this vacated area was re-occupied by some Zulu people who 
accompanied the British South Africa Company to Southern Rhodesia at the 
end of the nineteenth century. 10 This might have happened after the 
military post, ENsingweni had been dismantled by the Colonial 
Government. 
In his view the Ntabazinduna region was too dry to be inhabited by human 
beings; as a result the Zulu group returned to South Africa. There is 
neither oral nor written evidence that throws more light on this story. 
The same informant went on to say that his grandfather, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Imbizo Regiment, Lobhengula's crack force, 
tried to settle in the area. 11 Like the Zulu group this man and his 
relatives were said to have found the place too dry to be occupied by 
people with their livestock. For this reason these Ndebele settled in an 
area opposite to the Ntabazinduna Reserve before 1902. 
Although there are puzzling discrepancies as to the occupancy of the 
area before 1896, it is clear that by 1902 Thambo Ndiweni was the chief 
of the Ntabazinduna Reserve.12 
10. AM Khumalo, the Vice President of National Farmers' Association 
of Zimbabwe was interviewed at his home in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve on 27 February 1984. 
11. Ibid. The above informant's grandfather, Mtshana Khumalo was the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Imbizo Regiment. See also N Macglashan, 
Report by Mining Commissioner for the financial year ending on 
31 March 1898, p. 213. 
12. NAZ, NB 3 /1/9 Campbell to CNC Se.pt. 1908, p. 77, M. Nyathi, 7 
Jan. 1985; A.M. Khumalo, 27 Feb. 1984. 
11 
In his book P S Mahlangu listed the names of the Ch~efs of the 
·Ntabazinduna Reserve from 1900 to 1939. These men were Thambo, 
Mhlambezi, Mkhulunyelwa, Mhanqwa and Khayisa. All these people were 
members of the Ndiweni clan. 13 It is an oddity that he did not mention 
Mhanqwa's son and successor, Bhuloho Ndiweni, the Chief who played a 
significant role in the development of the history of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve as from 1922.14 
In his thesis Samkange emphasized that it was British Imperial 
Government's policy to reserve land suitable for the need~ of the 
African population in Southern Rhodesia. 15 This policy was formulated in 
response to the African uprising of 1896-1897 because so much land had 
already passed into European hands, and to restrain the Chartered 
Company during the early period of 11 speculation and violence 11 • This 
conclusion seemed to have been based on Article 81 of the Southern 
Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1898 which provided that, "The Company 
(British South Africa Company) shall from time to time assign to the 
natives inhabiting Southern Rhodesia land sufficient for their 
occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and suitable for 
their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including in all cases a 
13. Mahlangu, UMthwakazi, p. 27. See also NAZ, NB 3 /1/9 Campbell to 
CNC Sept. 1908, pp 66 - 71. 
14. NAZ, S 138/72 Agricultural Activitues within the Department of 
Development. Agriculturalist writing to the Chief Native 
Commissioner 22 August 1930, p. l; ED Alvord to the Director of 
Native Education Salisbury, 30 May 1929; NAZ,S 1561/10 'Meeting 
of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi", Report by the Native 
Commissioner, p. 1. 
15. S Samkange, 'The Establishment of African Reserves in Matabeleland 
1893 - 1898', Michiga~, unpub. PhD thesis, 1968, p. 204. 
12 
fair equitable proportion of springs or permanent water. 11 16 In the light 
of this consideration it could be argued that the wielders of political 
power were trying to implement imperial policy when they established the 
Gwaai and the Shangani Reserves after the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893 -
1894. According to the Land Commission's report the Shangani area was "a 
magnificent country abounding in game and having plenty of wood and 
water 11 .17 But oral testimony and other written evidence concur that the 
banks of the Gwaai and Shangani Rivers were not suitable for the 
Africans' needs on the grounds that they were sandy and dry.18 
Samkange emphasises the ungenerous quality of reserve land allocations 
11 In practice Africans were given leftovers which had been unclaimed by 
white men. u 19 He al so argued that II If these (leftovers r were good it was 
more by accident than by design. 1120 In agreement with Samkange's 
conclusion, Palmer, who has given a detailed account of the land issue 
in Colonial Southern Rhodesia, emphasized in his thesis that it was 
11 strange that not even one European was interested in the best grazing 
veldt in Matabeleland. 11 21 
16. NAZ, C. O., African (South) No. 1069: 'Position of the Natives in 
the Reserves in Southern Rhodesia', Memorandum April 1919, p. 1. 
17. The Bulawayo Chronicle, November 2 1894, p. 3. 
18. Chief K Ndiweni of the Ntabazinduna Reserve was interviewed at his 
home on 18 December 1983. R H Palmer, 'The Making and 
implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia 1890-1936, University of 
London, PhD thesis, 1968, p. 83. MC Steele', 'The Foundations of 
a Native Policy: Southern Rhodesia 1923-1933', Simon Fraser 
University, unpub, PhD thesis, 1972, p. 8. 
NAZ, N 3 /16/9 Land: Purchased by Natives 1914-1923 S/N Bulawayo 
to CNC 1 June, 1920, p.7. 
19. Samkange, PhD thesis, p. 207. 
20. Ibid. p. 36. 
21. R H Palmer, PhD thesis, 1968, p. 50. 
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Samkange and Palmer demonstrate that the banks of the Gwaai, Nata and 
Shangani Rivers were not at all conducive to human settlement. The Land 
Commission's report on these areas should not be taken seriously. It 
could be argued that this report was rather erratic. Those who compiled 
it were not so much interested in the welfare and fate of the Africans 
living on the banks of these rivers, as in serving the interests of the 
B.S.A.Co. and the white settlers who advocated the implementation of the 
policy of territorial separation of the two races after the Anglo-
Ndebele war of 1893 - 94. 
According to Palmer, certain portions of Southern Rhodesia could not be 
set aside for African occupation •. These areas included the Gold Belt, 
land alienated to Europeans, places near existing or projected railway 
lines and regions that could easily be defended during African revolt.22 
The creation of additional reserves in Matabeleland by wielders of 
political power before the turn of the nineteenth century confirms that 
the economic resources of the Gwaai and Shangani regions could not 
support the African people and their livestock. One of the new areas 
set aside for African occupation was the Ntabazinduna Reserve, 
surrounded by several landed properties. 
It was bounded to the north by the speculative landed properties 
11 Annalay and Gravesend 11 owned originally by the Whites Consolidated 
Company Limited and J W Colenbranders 1 Matabeleland Development Company 
22. R Palmer and N Parsons, (ed), The Roots of Rural Poverty in 




On the east the Ntabazinduna Reserve was bounded by the Battlefield 
Block.24 The original owner of this land was the White Consolidated 
Company Limited. Then, it was bought by the B.S.A.Co. and a portion of 
it was given to the amaMfengu who were recruited by Cecil John Rhodes.25 
According to Father Nyilika the Battlefield Block or Fingo Location was 
subdivided into 77 plots of 11 acres each and given to 77 men who came 
from Transkei in 1900. 26 One informant also confirmed that the 
amaMfengu came from the Cape Colony and were given this land by Rhodes, 
the Chairman of the B.S.A.Co •. 27 
On the west of the Reserve there were three landed properties namely 
Induba, Maldon and the Imbesu Block owned originally by Colenbrander's 
Matabeleland Company Limited, Matabeleland Gold Reefs Estates Company 
Limited and Crescens Matabeleland Mines and Land Company Limited 
respectively.28 To the south of the Ntabazinduna area there was a 
Government farm which was called Outspan No. 3. 29 Bounded as it was by 
23. DO(TB), Folio 275 Annalay. Reg. No. 2906, 3 September 1895; 
DO(TB), DD A 38/69 "Gravesend DO(RB), B 1774 Folio, 3 September 
1901. 
24. Father Nyilika, 'Mbembesi', The Parish Magazine; Focus, 
St Margaret's Church, North End, Bulawayo, January 1985, p. 7. 
25. NAZ, S 1087 /6 Register of B.S.A.Co.'s Farms, p 186. 
26. Father Nyilika, The Parish Magazine: Focus, p. 7. 
27. O. Somkence interviewed at the Fingo Location, Bembesi on 13 July 
1985. His father came from the Cape Colony in 1900. 
28. NAZ, L 2/2/117/10 Native Reserves 1898 - 1909: Secretary to 
Survey-General to the Chief Secretary, Salisbury, 29 December 
1909, pp. 1 - 3. 
29. Ibid. pp 1 - 3. 
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' Private property, there was no room for expansion of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve in the years 1897 - 1939. 
The Ntabazinduna Reserve is a part of the highveld whose height above 
sea level is 4 000 feet to 6 000 feet.30 The axis of the uplift forms 
the watershed from which rivers run north-westwards to the Zambezi and 
south-eastward to the Limpopo and Sabi valleys. One of these rivers with 
its tributaries dissects the northern part of the Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
This is the Ngwenya River which flows across the Battlefield Block and 
forms a part of the drainage system running north-westward. 31 This river 
was a blessing to the people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve ~nd the 
Battlefield Block. It supplied them with water for domestic and pastoral 
purposes. 
The Mbembesi River, lying due north-east of David Livingstone Memorial 
Mission was a further source of water for people and their livestock.32 
To the west of this mission station there is the Magotsha River, 
draining into the Imbesu Block. The Kenyani and the Mankabi Rivers which 
are a few kilometres due northwest of the mission station drain into the 
farm 1 Gravesend 1 .33 
30. Minister of Agriculture and Lands, Southern Rhodesia : Handbook 
for the use of Prospective Settler on the Lahd (Cape Town : The 
Rhodesian Chartered Agency, 1935) pp. 1 - 3. The lowest point 
where the Limpopo River leaves Southern Rhodesia is 660 feet above 
sea level. Inyangani Mountain with altitude of 8250 feet above sea 
level is the highest point in Zimbabwe. 
31. M Macpherson, (ed.) Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi: 
Missionary in Southern Rhodesia (Gisborne: The Gisborne Herald Co. 
Ltd., 1966) p. 91; Nyilika, The Parish Magazine, Focus, p. 7. 
32. Nyilika, The Parish Magazine: Focus p. 7; 0. Somkence, 13 July 
1985. 
33. See an attached sketch map, showing the drainage system in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve between pp 121 and 122 of this dissertation. 
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These rivers and streams also helped to influence the pattern(of the 
distribution of 'the African population and their fields in the 
Ntabazinduna area in the first half of the twentieth century. For 
instance, according to one informant, the early African peasant farmers 
built their homesteads on the banks of rivers because the soil was 
frequently more fertile there than in other parts of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve.34 He also pointed out that the majority of the African people 
lived there because they always wanted to be near sources of water and 
their fields.35 This implies that those areas which were far away from 
streams and rivers were thinly populated particularly before boreholes 
were sunk and dams were built by the Colonial Government. 
In the pre-colonial period the entire right to the land in Matabeleland 
was vested in the King.36 The King gave his subjects either collectively 
or individually the right to live on and cultivate various parts of it. 
When the land was given to the community as a whole by the King, the 
Chief divided it up among his headmen.37 The headmen distributed the 
land to kraalheads and commoners.38 According to African custom land 
could not be bought or sold by an individual. 
34. Khumalo interviewed, 27 February 1984; See also NAZ, N 24/1/2 Vol. 
2 Report on Native Reserves, May. 1913, p.2. 
35. Khumalo, 27 February 1984. 
36. T J Hemans, Notes For a Course on Ndebele Customs, p. 45; Ndiweni 
interviewed, 18 December 1983. 
37. Hemans, Notes for a Course on Ndebele Customs, pp. 45 - 46: See 
also NAZ, Oral/H03 HR G Howman, a member of the Native Department 
was interviewed by M C Steele in Salisbury on 10, 26 August 1971, 
pp. 47 48. 
38 .. MG Reid, 'The Early Agriculture of Matabeleland and Ma~honaland', 
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, vol. 73/74 (~976/77), p. 97; 
Hemans, Notes For A Course On Ndebele Customs, pp. 45 - 46. 
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The Ndebele, like the other Africans, practiced shifting cultivation. In 
the majority of cases the land was often worked for three or four years; 
after that it was left to lie fallow. This abandoned land was called 
ifusi and the original cultivator still kept his right over it.39 He 
lost this right when he shifted the kraal from this area to another 
place. These practices are reported in oral interviews as well as in 
the written records.40 
Both oral and written sources concur that for the Ndebele like the Shona 
the division of labour was on gender lines. 41 For instance it was men's 
duty to clear the land. Bushes and trees were usually cut down by men 
who used axes, amahloka. Bush fencing was also done by men. Women with 
short-handled iron hoes broke the ground. 42 According to one written 
source seeds were struck into the ground by women. 43 But other written 
and oral sources maintain that both men and women used to broadcast 
seeds in their gardens, ezivandeni or fields, emasimini whose areas 
varied from one to six acres. 44 When the seeds germinated, women were 
expected to weed. The crops they grew in 1890 - 1929 were mainly' 
39. Reid, pp. 97 - 101. 
40. M. Nyithi, K. Ndiweni, A.M. Khumalo. 
41. Ibid., p. 98, NAZ, S 1561/10 'Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at 
Inyathi, 22 June 1925' pp. 1 - 3; Elizabeth Schmidt, 'Women, 
Agriculture and Social Change in Southern Rhodesia, 1898 - 1934, 
with special reference to the Goromonzi District'. University of 
Zimbabwe, May 1986, pp. 6 - 7. Seminar Paper. 
42. MaMthethwa, an elderly woman was interviewed near the Ngwenya 
River on 19 August 1984; F Tshuma was interviewed in Bulawayo on 
25 May 198'7. 
43. Reid, 'The Early Agriculture of Matabeleland and Mashonaland,' p. 
98. 
44. Ibid. p. 98 Nyathi and Ndiweni interviewed at their homes, 7 
January 1985 and 18 December 1983 respectively. 
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inyawuti, sorghum, amabele, millet, uphoko, finger-millet; amazambane, 
peanuts; indumba, beans; ~makhabe, watermelons; amajodo, melons; 
' 
' 
amathanga, pumpkins; and umumbu, maize. But their staple crop was 
11 kaffir corn 11 ,or .millet, amabele. 45 These crops were harvested, 
collected and threshed by beating with sticks on flat rocks, amadwala. 
Then women's other task was ukwela winnowing by shaking grain from 
baskets. All the trash was blown away by wind. Then, the good grain was 
collected and kept in izilulu, grass baskets or iziphala, grain huts. 
When there was a surplus of grain, it was usually stored in pits dug in 
the cattle kraal, lining them with mud and sealing them in. 46 It is 
clear that women played a significant role in the development of the 
history of African agriculture. 
Oral and written sources indicate that the majority of the inhabitants 
of the Ntabazinduna Reserve did not grow enough food to eat, 
particularly in the 1920's.47 One of the causes of poor harvests 
particularly in the Ntabazinduna Reserve was scarcity of rainfall. In 
his handbook the Minister of Agriculture and Lands stated -that the mean 
annual rainfall over Southern Rhodesia was 28.3 inches during the 
colonial period 1923 - 1939. 48 An area with a rainfall of 25 inches or 
-
45. Reid, p. 98; Report of the Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, 
46. 
March 1904, p. 3. 
Ngele Nyathi who was born in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in 1916 was 
interviewed at his home on 25 December 1985. 
47. Ibid., See also The Bulawayo Native Mirror : Chiringiriro : 
Isibuko 25 December 1931, p. 9; Report of the Native Commissioner 
Bubi District For the Year Ended 31 December 1923, pp. 243 - 244; 
NAZ, S 235/504 District Annual Report for the year ended 
31 December 1926, p. 3. 
48. Bulawayo Experiment Station; Annual Report for the Year 1925 -
1926 by H W Hilliard, Assistant Agriculturalist, p. 286; Minister 
of Agriculture and Lands, So.uthern Rhodesia; Handbook for the use 
of Prospective Settlers on Land, p. 9. 
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over was regarded as a region which was 11 or~inarily free from serious 
droughts".49 The Bubi District was included in Zone A whose mean annual 
rainfall was 25.2 inches.so Since the Ntabazinduna Reserve was a part of 
this district it could be assumed that it was supposed to be free from 
severe droughts. But _this was not always the case with the Ntabazinduna· 
area or other parts of the Bubi District. For instance as early as 1905 
one missionary stationed at Ingwenya Mission stated in his letters that 
there had been a severe drought in the Ntabazinduna Reserve for ten 
months.51 Supporting this conclusion an informant said that this drought 
was followed by poor harvest in the area. 52 Again in his annual report 
the Assistant Agriculturalist pointed out that the mean rainfall in the 
Bubi District for the period 1921 - 1924 was 14.5 inches. 53 This implies 
that the amount of rainfall in the above period was 10.7 inches below 
the expected mean annual rainfall in areas falling under Zone A. 
But trre shortage of rainfall was not the only factor which led to a low 
agricultural production in the Ntabazinduna Reserve and other African 
areas. In Hunter's view, increased agricultural output depends to a very 
large degree, on "more intensive and efficient use of land and water 11 .54 
49. Minister of Agriculture and Lands, p. 9. 
50. Ibid., p. 9 See also Meteorological Report for the Year ended 30 
June 1929, p. 16. In this report the normal rainfall for the Bubi 
District was 23.32 inches. 
51. Macpherson, Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi 
Southern Rhodesia, pp. 18 - 20. 
52. M Nyathi, 7 January 1985. 
Missionary in 
53. Hilliard, Bulawayo Experiment Station Annual Report for the year 
1925 - 1926, p. 286. 
54. G. Hunter, et al, Policy and Practice in Rural Development (London 
: Croom Helm, 1976) p. 18. 
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Accounting for low agricultural production in African reserves in both 
M.ashonaland and Matabeleland, E D Alvord declared, 11 0n the most fertile 
soils Native crops are much lower than they should be, because of poor 
tillage, planting in mixture, too thick planting, lack of cultivation, 
overcrowding with weeds. 11 55 He went on to say that the failure of the 
Africans to use new; agricultural methods resulted in under-sized, 
slender plants which produced 11 small grain heads or none at all 11 .56 The 
majority of the Africans living in the Bubi District did not sow seeds 
' 
in rows before the arrival of the Demonstrator in the Ntabazinduna Area. 
They used traditional agricultural methods. It was alleged that these 
peasant farmers used to broadcast their seeds as late as 1926. 57 When 
the seeds germinated the young plants were often overcrowded. It became 
·difficult for the African people to weed and cultivate the soil. Sources 
make it obvious that as long as the African peasant farmers found out 
that there were no weeds in their fields they did not cultivate the 
soil.58 As a result, lack of cultivation retarded the rapid growth of 
their crops and led to poor harvests in the Ntabazinduna Reserve and 
other African areas. 
55. E D Alvord, Department of Native Development, Southern Rhodesia, 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November 1930, 'Agricultural Demonstration 
Work on Reserves', p. 6. 
56. Ibid., p. 6. 
57. A.M. Khumalo, M. Nyathi, MaMthethwa interviewed on 27 February 
1984, 7 January 1985, 19 August 1984 respectively. 
58. NAZ, S 1561/10 'Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi, 22 June 
1925'; NAZ, AOH/41 Chibvongodze interviewed at Farm No. 4 Muda 
Purchase Area by Daw~on Munjeri on 14 July 1978, pp. 17 - 22; 
Report of the Native Commissioner Bubi District for the year 
ending 31 December 1923 pp. 243 - 244; NAZ, S 235/503 N C's Annual 
Report for 1925, p. 3. 
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Apart from agriculture another main branch of African economy was 
pastoral farming. According to the Report of the British South Africa 
Company for the period 1892 - 1894 that Matabeleland was good for cattle 
was proved by the large herds which were owned by King Lobhengula.59 
However, this report did not state the number of cattle Lobhengula had. 
In his thesis Cobbing says that the Ndebele cattle numbers ranged from 
130 000 to 280 000 before 1893. This statistical evidence suggests that 
scholars do not know the exact number of cattle owned by the Ndebele 
during the reign of Lobhengula.60 E.A. Nobbs argued that the earliest 
visitors to the Ndebele made false reports when they alleged that the 
whole of Matabeleland was teeming with cattle. 61 In his view traders and 
missionaries were frequently detained at those places where cattle were 
chiefly concentrated, around Bulawayo, Inyathi, Umzingwane and at other 
cattle posts of the King, Lobhengula. 62 He went on to say that it was 
doubtful whether there were cattle in the other parts of Matabeleland.63 
His argument carries much we)ght on the grounds that the other parts of 
the country were often theatres of military operations before 1894, and 
many cattle could not be reared in areas of conflict. 
59. H Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890 - 1923 (Salisbury : University of Rhodesia, 1972) p. 
104. 
60. JR D Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820 - 1896.' 
University of Lancaster, unpub. PhD thesis, 1976, p. 9. 
61. E.A. Nobbs, 'The Native Cattle of Southern Rhodesia' South African 
Journal of Science vol XXIV, Dec 1927, p 331. 
62. Ibid p. 331 
63. Ibid p. 331 
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Nobbs also stated that 1 official 1 estimates at the time of European 
occupation put the number of Ndebele cattle at half a million.64 He 
alleged that this large number was reduced to 250,00 by rinderpest 
between 1896 and 1898.65 The Administrator of Southern Rhodesia seemed 
to confirm the above figure when he stated in his report that Africans 
in Matabeleland had 43 850 cattle, 48 600 sheep and 171 000 goats by 
1901.66 
But the Administrator•s report and the article written by Nobbs did not 
mention the fact that the B.S.A.Co. confiscated many Ndebele cattle soon 
after the downfall of Lobhengula. Phimister, summarising the findings 
of older and more recent scholarships, argues that the number of Ndebele 
cattle confiscated by armed Europeans ranged from 100 000 to 200 000 in 
the years 1893 - 1896.67 Clearly, the number of Ndebele cattle was not 
only reduced by rinderpest, but also by the B.S.A.Co.•s armed men who 
seized many beasts. 
However, it is evident that the exact number of the cattle owned by 
Lobhengula or his subjects towards the end of the pre-colonial era is 
not known by scholars. Most of the figures in connection with Ndebele 
cattle are estimates (Nobbs also pointed out that the king and his 
subjects were not always prepared in principle to allow white strangers 
to count the Ndebele cattle). Chiefs, headmen and men who demonstrated 
64. Ibid. p. 331. 
65. Ibid p. 331 
66. Report of the Administrator, Matabeleland, 1908 - 1909, p. 30. 
Sir William Milton was the Administrator. 
67. I. Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890 -
1948: Capital accumulation and class struggle (London: Longman, 
1988) p.16. 
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their valour in the battlefield were often given cattle by the King for 
their distinguished military service.68 As a result the above classes 
had more cattle than commoners. But according to Weinmann, all African 
cattle in Matabeleland were, theoretically the property of the King 
before 1893.69 
After the defeat of the Ndebele the Matabeleland Order-in-Council 
provided that: 11 The ownership of all cattle in the possession of natives 
in Matabeleland on or before 31 December 1893, as well as its offspring, 
was vested in the Company 11 .70 In that way most of the African cattle 
passed into the hands of the white settlers. Rinderpest also killed a 
good number of the remaining cattle. 
When the Ntabazinduna Reserve was established, one report stated that 
there were only 25 cattle.71 But by 1913 the Native Commissioner in 
charge of the Bubi District said that there were 1 000 cattle and 1 500 
head of small stock in the Ntabazinduna Reserve.72 The increase in the 
number of livestock was due to natural accession and immigration. In 
1913, the Native Commissioner reported that Ntabazinduna Reserve could 
no longer carry any additional livestock by 1914. He mentioned that 
3 000 acres of this place was rendered valueless on the grounds that it 
68. M, Nqamakazi and M Nyathi of Ntabazinduna Reserve interviewed in 
June 1984 and January 1985. 
69. Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890 - 1923, p. 104. 
70. Ibid, p. 104. 
71. NAZ, L 2/2/117/10 - Undated source p. 1; M Nyathi alleged that 
there was a time when the Ntabazinduna Reserve was inhabited by 
his grandfather Mgobo and family only. This period was 1894 - 97. 
Perhaps Mgobo had 25 cattle as stated by the above sou~ce. 
72. NAZ, N 24/1/2, Report o~ Native Reserves, May 1913, p. 2. 
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consisted of hills and stony ground, which could not be brought under 
cultivation.73 There is conflicting evidence as to the exact size of the 
Reserve, with estimates ranging from 22 000 to 26 220 acres.74 
In one of his reports E D Alvord mentioned that there were 2 900 cattle; 
2 900 goats, 990 sheep, 453 donkeys, mules, horses and 189 pigs in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve by 1930.75 Oral testimony also stressed that there 
were far too many donkeys and goats with their destructive grazing 
habits in the Reserve between the two World Wars.76 
To understand the contribution towards the growth in livestock numbers 
by immigration to the Reserve, it is necessary to mention the broad 
development of the Reserves policy in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. 
According to the Southern Rhodesia Orders-in-Council of 1898 and 1920 
Africans were allowed to buy land anywhere in the Colony.7 7 The 
European farmers in Mashonaland and Matabeleland resented the idea of 
Africans buying land in their midst.78 In response t~ these Orders in 
Council the European farmers supported and defended the policy of land 
73. Ibid., p. 2. 
74. Ibid. p. 2; Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 November 1930 p. 30 
Table No. 1. NAZ, L/2/2/17/10 Table 1. 
75. Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 November. 19·30 p. 30 Table No. 1. 
76. AM Khumalo and M Nyathi 27 February 1984; 7 January 1985. 
77. C 1042, Native Reserves in Southern Rhodesia, Despatch to High 
Commissioner for South Africa transmitting the order of His 
Majesty in Council, 9 November 1920. 
78. Palmer, op.cit. pp. 260 - 261. 
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segregation.79 The Colonial Government tried to protect the interests of 
the white farmers. For instance in 1925 the Land Commission was 
appointed. This Commission assigned 62 per cent of the area of Southern 
Rhodesia to Europeans while the Africans were granted 37% of the 
country.BO The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 that became the 
cornerstone of land segregation in Southern Rhodesia, embodied most of 
the recommendations of the above Commission.Bl In the light of these 
racial discriminatory measures many Africans were removed from earmarked 
European areas to the reserves in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The increase in the number of livestock in the inter-war years was due 
not only to natura·l accession but also to the arrival of many Africans 
in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. Most of these African peasant farmers with 
many domesticated animals came from the Insiza District.B2 Between 1904 
and 1929 one of the most significant developments in the changing 
economy of Southern Rhodesia was the growth of capitalist agriculture. 
The number of settlers involved in maize and tobacco production and the 
areas under cultivation increased sharply. B3 In many districts, this 
led to the displacement of Africans who had been living on the land now 
79. Zvobgo, 'Church and State in Colonial Zimbabwe 1921 - 1945': 
Conference on Zimbabwean History, University of Zimbabwe, vol. 2, 
Progress and Development, University of Zimbabwe, History 
Department, 23 - 27 August 1982, p. 4. 
80. Ibid. p. 7, Report of Land Commission, 1925, Salisbury, first 
paragraph. 
81. Zvobgo, p. 8. 
82. Ndiweni, 18 December 1983; Report of the Chief Native 
CoIIllllissioner, December 1921. pp. 1 - 2. 
83. Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948 
pp 57 - 61. 
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required for settler farming. Keen to turn land to profit, aware that 
Insiza District was fertile and good pasture ground particularly for 
cattle, Europeans turned the area into farms. The majority of the 
Africans who used to live in the District were forced to shift to the 
Bubi area by 1923. According to one of the reports of the Chief Native 
Commissioner, the Native Commissioner of the Insiza District accompanied 
chiefs, headmen and their people to the Ntabazinduna, Inyathi and the 
Shangani Reserves.84 But numbers of chiefs, headmen, commoners and 
livestock were not given, as a result the African populatio~ and the 
number of livestock in the above Reserves increased. The Chief Native 
Commissioner identified one of the main problems of the Bubi District 
when he said, "The congestion in the Ntabazinduna Reserve, has assumed 
serious proportions and must b~ relieved in some way 11 • 85 
The Ntabazinduna Reserve which was smaller than the Shangani area was 
.also faced with problems such as overpopulation, drought, scarcity of 
food and overstocking in the late 1920s.86 Grappling with som~ of these 
·.problems, the Africans cleared thick forests particularly in the area 
where Ntabazinduna Township is today. They built their homesteads there 
and brought the surrounding.area under cultivation.87 According to one 
of the reports of E D Alvord the area of the arable land was 75% whereas 
84. CNC's report, December 1921, p. 2. 
85. NAZ, S 607 Box 1928, the Chief Native Commissioner to the Native 
Commissioner of the Charter District, 20 January 1928, p. 1. 
86. Ibid. p. 1. 
87. Ndiweni, 18 December 1983. 
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that which was set aside as pasture ground was only 25%.88 This implies 
that grazing for people's livestock was limited and inadequate, 
particularly in summer when these animals were kept away from the 
fields. 
A tentative solution to the problem of the scarcity of grass could well 
have been de-stocking. But for various reasons the Africans in the 
Ntabazinduna area and other reserves did not want to part particularly 
with their cattle during the colonial era. They placed a premium on 
quantity because of the part played by cattle in the rural economy. A 
man with over fifty cattle was called indoda emadodeni, a man among men 
by the members of his community in those days.89 Since every man wanted 
to be respected by his community de-stocking was rejected as a solution 
to the above problem by the people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 
years 1897 - 1939. Moreover, cattle were used for paying lobola when a 
young man got married. The cows supplied them with milk which was often 
stored in amagula, calabashes or izingayi, clay pots. When the milk was 
left in these containers for at least two or more days, it became amasi, 
curdled milk that was frequently mixed together with some cooked, ground 
millet. The mixture of curdled milk and ground millet called umcaba was 
considered good food by the Ndebele. 
Cattle were slaughtered for meat which was used as relish. And whenever 
there was a wedding ceremony, a beast was killed for the guests. 
According to some informants the chief of the Ntabazinduna area had the 
largest number of cattle, the headmen had also more cattle than the rest 
88. Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 November, 1930, p. 30. 
89. M Nyathi, 7 January 1985. 
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L 
of the people. A few individuals who were favoured by fortune were rich 
on the grounds that they owned many cattle. But the majority of the 
people had 2 - 20 cattle per family.90 This implies that most occupants 
of the reserve were poor. For these and other related reasons the 
Africans did not want to reduce the number of their cattle. 
But at times circumstances forced the Africans to part with their 
cattle. All informants were agreed that Africans in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve sold a few cattle to white traders when they were desperately in 
need of money for buying ploughs, clothes and other items.91 But the 
prices for these cattle were lower than those of the beasts sold to the 
Bulawayo market by the white farmers. 
One of the main reasons why these African cattle did not fetch high 
prices was that they were often of very poor quality.92 The other reason 
was that the cattle dealers kept the prices low so that they could make 
some prof its when they sold the beasts to the Bulawayo market. 
It could be argued that education ought to have been used as a powerful 
instrument to bring about changes in African agriculture and animal 
husbandry in Southern Rhodesia before 1939. But a racially segregated, 
educational system that evolved was designed to sustain a domineering 
90. Ibid., Tshuma, Nqamakazi. 
91. Tshuma and Ndiweni interviewed on 25 May 1987, 18 December 1983 
respectively. 
92. I R Phimister, 'Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890 - 1938', Journal of African History, XIX, 3, 
(1978), p. 396; See also Native Mirror: Chiringiriro: Isibuko, 
Bulawayo, 25 December 1931, p. 9 V E M Machingaidze, 'The 
Development of Settler Capitalist Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia 
with particular reference to the role of the State, 1908 - 1939', 
University of London, unpub. PhD Thesis, 1980, pp. 284 - 301. 
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economic, political and social order over the black majority by the 
white minority_. The white settler community did not want to compete with 
the African population group particularly in the economic, 'Social and 
political sectors.93 The white commun.ity believed that it could surv'ive 
. as long as Africans were not given an opportunity to compete with their 
masters, the Europeans. For this reason the type of education that was 
given to the African children was inferior to that which the Europeans 
I 
were offered. Confirming this Sebetso wrote: 
nThere is a feeling among certain European educationists 
that the Natives shtiuld have a philosophy of education 
different from the education in the rest of the civilised 
world. 
Hence the outcry, Native education should be adapted to the 
mentality, aptitudes and traditions of the people. 
The educated Africans are·beginning to realise that such 
kind of education adapted to their environment and 
traditions, and at the same time divorced from the education 
of the rest of the world is an inferior education which only 
perpetuates racial ill-feeling.n94 
As early as 1903 the aim of the colonial Government education policy was 
to provide Africans with elementary industrial training that would 
93. Palmer, •The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia 
1890 - 1936', 1968, Chapter VIII. 
94. Foley, G., 'Learning in the struggle: The development of political 
consciousness among Zimbabweans in the 1930's', Zimbabwean 
History: The Journal of the Historical Association of Zimbabwe, 12 
(1981) p. 49 quoted from Sebetso, L.M., 'What.will be the future 
of Native education in this country?, The Bantu Mirror (5 
February), 1,10. 
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enable them to serve the white community.95 The policy did not put 
emphasis on African academic education, and the type of education given 
to the African child did not promote its mental development. 
African schools were run by missionaries whose main goal was to spread 
Christianity across Central Africa.96 Mission schools that implemented 
the above policy were given financial assistance by the Government. And 
those educational institutions, if any, that tried to undermine the 
stipulated policy were not given grants-in-aid. 
According to Zvobgo, enrolment in government aided schools rose from 265 
in 1909 to 43 094 in 1920 to 107 122 in 1930. 97 This corresponds closely 
with a retrospective estimate that 99 000 children were enrolled in 
schools throughout Southern Rhodesia in 1929 - although this informant 
went on to say that only 66 000 children actually attended school in 
1929.98 Since the estimated African population was 1 055 000 by 1931, 
probably a majority of children did not attend school in the 1920s and 
1930s.99 In the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve there were fewer than 
ten primary schools by 1929. The outstanding elementary schools were 
95. C N B Mahonde, 'The Role of Domboshawa Government Industrial 
School in African Development with particular reference to 
Agriculture 1920 - 1942', U Z, unpub. Honours, Dissertation, 1983, 
p. 3; See also Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 6, 1970 pp. 
197 - 234. 
96. Macpherson, Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi Missionary in 
Southern Rhodesia, pp. 8, 16, 127. 
97. R J Zvobgo, Transforming Education: The Zimbabwean Experience 
(Harare: The College Press, 1986), p. 17. 
98. NAZ, Oral.Fl, Harold Carsdale Finkle was interviewed at his home 
in Salisbury by J D McCarthy on 30 March 1973; 5 April 1973, p. 
45. 
99. Minister of Agriculture and Lands, Southern Rhodesia: Handbook for 
the use of Prospective Settler on the Land, p. 14. 
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Ngwenya, Libeni, Bembesi, Morven and Induba. 100 The total enrolment at 
these schools run by missionaries was 320 by 1925.101 When the estimated 
' 
population of the Ntabazinduna Reserve was 1 070, there wete 
approximately 500 children. By 1930 the population of the Reserve was 
3 449.102 The number o~ children must have been over 1 000 by 1925. It 
thus appears that the majority of the African children did not attend 
school in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the inter-war period. Several 
informants were agreed that in the majority of cases children who 
attended school were those whose parents were rich in the 1920s and 
1930s.103 Children of the headmen, chief and other people with many 
cattle, sheep and goats were often sent to school because their parents 
were in a better position to finance their education.104 
But those parents who were poor were unable to send their children to 
schoo 1. Some rich parents did not send their children to schoo 1 because 
they wanted them to look after their livestock particularly in summer.105. 
·Children were also expected to drive away birds from millet fields the 
whole day long.106 As far as such parents were concerned, education was 
not all that important. Education for girls was considered a luxury. 107 
100. Macpherson, Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi, Missionary in 
Southern Rhodesia, p. 112. 
101. Ibid., pp. 113 - 117. 
102. Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 p. 30. 
103. Khumalo, Ndiweni, Tshuma interviewed, 27 November 1984, 18 
December 1983, 25 May 1987, respectively. 
104. AM Khumalo, 27 February 1984. 
105. M Nyathi 7 January 1985; NAZ, Oral/Fl 5, Finkle, 30 March 1973; 5 
April 1973, pp. 45 - 46. 
106. M. Nyathi 
107. M. Nyathi; NAZ, Oral/Fl 5 p. 46. 
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It was not geared to their socio-economic needs. This argument was 
strengthened by the fact that teachers and missionaries who ran African 
schools put more emphasis on Christian Education rather than on the 
acquisition of vocational and academic skills. 108 Apart from scriptures 
pupils could have been taught agriculture, forestry, woodwork, cookery, 
husbandry, poultry and other vocational subjects. Such an ed~cation 
geared to production would have helped them solve some of their socio-
economic problems in the area in which they lived. For instance as 
pupils studied agriculture or gardening, their teachers could 
demonstrate clearly how the disadvantages of the use of the method of 
broadcasting seeds outweighed the advantages. Since some of these 
teachers were missionaries, they could even kill two birds with one 
stone. They could teach both new agricultural techniques and religion 
simultaneously, for example, by relating the Parable of the Sower. 109 
Apart from missionaries and teachers another source of authority - and 
hence of potential influence over practices and beliefs of peasants in 
Ntabazinduna - was that of chiefs and headmen. Chiefs and headmen by 
the 1920's occupied ambiguous and frequently difficult positions in 
Ndebele reserves. The reconstituted 'traditionalism' and 'tribalism'" 
of the 1920's "bore only passing resemblance to pre-colonial forms." 110 
Chiefs were simultan~ously having to exercise new powers and 
responsibilities and. to contain threats to social and political order 
posed by socio-economic changes. 
108. Macpherson, Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi : Missionary in 
Southern Rhodesia, p. 127. 
109. New Testament : New International Version (New York : American 
Bible Society, 1982) Matthew 8: 1 - 15, p. 80. 
110, IR Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890 -
1948, p. 149. 
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This meant that some chiefs and headmen were unable to exercise the 
stabilising and legitimating role that the Native Department intended. 
In the same way, colonial opinions as to the political value of chiefs 
and headmen varied quite sharply. When Dorothy Candy was interviewed in 
connection with the work of her father, the NC of the Matobo District, 
she overemphasized the significance of the role played by the chiefs and 
headmen in African reserves in the period 1900 - 1939. In her view 
chiefs were the recognised leaders of the African people in the rural 
areas.111 But Henry Howman, an officer in the Native Department argued 
that not all chiefs were an effective link between the African rural 
population and the white Colonial Government. For instance he alleged 
that, while some District Commissioners worked entirely through the 
chiefs, others considered these tribal leaders 'useless•. 112 Howman•s 
account seems more likely. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that whether or not successive chiefs 
and headmen in Ntabazinduna would prove effective modernizers in the 
interwar period would depend very much on whether they perceived their 
own interests in terms of whole-hearted implementation of Native 
Department policies, or of deflecting such policies in the pursuit of 
popular support. · 
Formally, the Chief and his headmen owed allegiance to the Bubi District 
Native Commissioner who was stationed at Inyathi. The Native 
Commissioner, an agent of agricultural change in the Bubi District, 
111. NAZ, Oral /Co/ p.6 Mrs Dorothy Condy was interviewed at her home 
in Salisbury by D Hartridge on 18 and 28 Feb 1969. 
112. NAZ, Oral I H03, p. 46 Henry Howman was interviewed in his office, 
Coghlan Building, Salisbury on 10 and 26 August, 1971. 
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delegated his authority to the traditional leaders of the Africans. In 
one of his annual reports the Chief Native Commissioner stated that the 
population of the Bubi District was 23 800 in 1904.113 This was 
approximately 13% of the African population of Matabeleland. By the end 
of 1939 the population of the Bubi District was 3S 929.114 The area of 
the whole district was 10 200 square miles. Obviously, this district 
was too big to be governed by one man, and this necessitated a degree of 
indirect rule. 
But the Native Commissioner had limited power and authority. His 
activities were monitored by the Chief Native Commissioner and the 
Agriculturalist. He was expected to abide by the African policy designed 
by the Government. Since he was associated with the wielders of 
political power, Africans were often suspicious of his intentions and 
economic reforms. 
This introductory chapter has tried to highlight those forces at work 
which helped to shape the agricultural history of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve in the inter-war years. These forces could be divided up into 
two-groups. On one hand there were technological and natural obstacles 
that impeded progress in the field of African peasant agriculture in the 
Reserve. For instance African cultivators used agricultural methods 
that were of limited value when resources were scarce - and most had 
small lands to work on, 1 - 6 acres. In some areas the soil was 
infertile. At times there were droughts in the Reserve. As a result 
113. Report of the Chief Native Connnissioner, Matabeleland for the year 
ended March 1904, p. 10. 
114. Report of the Native Commissioner, Bubi District for the year 
ended in December 1939, p. 1. 
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harvests were often poor. On the other hand, there were broader 
economic pressures deriving from the colonial context that retarded 
progress in this Reserve. For instance males were forced to work on 
European farms as well as in the mines. They had to work in order to 
obtain money for a growing range of levies, dues and taxes. During their 
absence from home, there were no strong people to promote economic 
progress. 
On the other hand the African peasant farmers had to increase their 
agricultural production so that they could have enough food to eat. 
Some grew crops so that they could sell the surplus to storeowners and 
other traders so that they could raise school fees for their children or 
buy certain essential items such as clothes, salt, ploughs, soap and so 
forth. 
Economic success in the above Reserve depended on the new patterns of 
socio-economic behaviour and the ability as well as willingness of the 
African cultivators to adopt the new agricultural methods i.ntroduced to 
them by the agents of change between the two World Wars. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NEIGHBOURING FARMS AND THE NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the relations between the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve and the surrounding white commercial farms, 
particularly in the inter-war period. In the previous chapter it was 
mentioned that the Ntabazinduna Reserve shared its frontiers with five 
European farms and the Battlefield Block occupied by the amaMfengu. 
The lands surrounding the above Reserve were surveyed and granted to 
various mining companies by the British South African Company 
Administration in the period 1894 - 1904. 1 For instance in 1894 the 
areas called Maldon, Gravesend, the Battlefield Block and Outspan No. 3 
were surveyed. Annaly was surveyed in 1895. 2 These lands were not 
occupied effectively by the Europeans in the years 1894 - 1908. The 
landed properties Maldon, Gravesend, Annaly and the Imbesu Block were 
given to the Matabele Gold Reefs Estates Company Limited, Colenbrander•s 
Matabeleland Development Company Limited, Whites Consolidated Company 
Limited and the Crescens Matabele Mines and Land Company Limited 
respectively between 1894 and 1905.3 
1. NAZ, S 1087t6 Register of B.S.A. Co's Farms, pp. 160, 186; DO(TB), 
B 1774 Folio Farm "Graves End"; DO(TB) Folio B 1752: Maldon Farm; 
DO(TB) Folio B 275: Farm Annaly; DO(TB) Folio B 2042: Imbesu 
Block; 'Whites Run Estate C.C.T. 2265/80. 
2. DO(TB) Folio B275; Farm Annaly. 
3. DO(TB) Map 65/00, B1774 Folio, Folio 2042, Folio 1991, Folio 1752, 
Folio 275. 
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From 1908 onwards these properties were'transferred to certain 
individuals. For instance Reginald Heberden bought Maldon Farm with an 
area of 6339.6057 acres from Matabele Reefs Estates Company for 750 
pounds on 10 April 1908. 4 The Gravesend Farm that had become a property 
of the Rhodesia Consolidated Limited in 1906 was transferred to 
Steward Richardson·for 467 pounds on 19 February 1909.5 In a similar 
manner Annaly was bought by John Sly from Trust and Agency Limited for 
600 pounds in May 1913. 6 The above examples indicate clearly that only 
after 1908 did white settlers in the Bubi District and other parts of 
Southern Rhodesia put the land they occupied effectively into 
production. Confirming this conclusion, Palmer stated that there was a 
rapid expansion in the field of European farming between 1908 and 1914. 
He pointed out that this activity ultimately, led to the growth of 
competition and tension between European farmers and African producers. 
Using statistical evidence, he argued that as European and African 
cattle increased in number in the above period, there was a 11 tremendous 
competition for grazing lands 11 particularly in Matabeleland where the 
land was drier than in Mashonaland.7 
In an attempt to prevent large scale 11 squatting 11 , an early law of 
Southern Rhodesia limited the number of adult male Africans on each farm 
4. DO(TB) Folio 1752: Malden Farm. 
5. DO(TB) Folio B. 1774 ; D.D.A. 38/69; Gravesend Farm. 
6. DO(TB) Folio 275 Reg. No. 1906: Annaly Farm. 
7. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia p. 94. 
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of 3 175 acres to forty.a This law was violated by those absentee 
landholders who were attracted by the rent collected from African 
tenants and this pattern prevailed before 1914 in the Insiza District. 
Apart from that, poor European farmers living in the Melsetter District 
were tempted to undermine the law since they depended on African tenants 
1
"as a source of ultra-cheap wage labour". 9 But if settler interests 
altered from rents as a source of income to agricultural production as a 
source of profit, the vulnerability of African tenants would be exposed. 
Ntabazinduna Reserve men provided labour to the surrounding farms - on a 
casual or seasonal basis being paid low wages, resulting in minimal 
overheads for the farmer. In the majority of cases a new worker was, 
paid 10 shillings per month. A boy who looked after calves was given 5 
shillings per month by the farmer. Or each worker from the Reserve was 
given a bag of mealie meal per month. 10 Since the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
was a major source of cheap labour, it could be assumed that there was 
no need for each white farmer to keep a large number of Africans on his 
land. The Inspector of Lands was confirming this conclusion when he 





Paul Mosley, The Settler Economies : Studies in the Economic 
History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900 - 1963, p. 20, See 
also The Rhodesian Agricultural Union: Report of Congress held on 
30 January - 1 February 1924, at Salisbury, p. 15. K Rennie, 
'White Farmers, Black Tenants and Landlord Legislation: Southern 
Rhodesia 1890 - 1930' Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 5, 
No. 1 (October 1978) p. 94. 
Paul Mosley, The Settler Economies: Studies in Economic History of 
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Farisi Tshuma, 25 May 1987. See also G. Foley, "Learning in the 
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. 
In these circumstances which prevailed in most of the areas owned by the 
white men, the dccupants of the Ntabazinduna R~serve, who were faced 
with the problems of over-population, congestion, and overstocking were 
tempted to violate the boundaries of the neighbouring farms. 
White farmers pursued their interests through the Colonial State. 
Although tn begin with as far as the Company Administration was 
concerned, mining interests transcended all other considerations, this 
state of affairs changed over time. After the Legislative Council was 
infiltrated by the representatives of the white settler community, the 
Government showed a keen interest in issues, affecting, for example, the 
farmers.12 However, the white farmers still felt that the government did 
not give adequate attention to their problems in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. As a result of this thinking, they formed several 
associations in Southern Rhodesia. These Farmers• Associations were 
welded together to form a powerful organisation called "The Rhodesia 
Agricultural Union" in 1904.13 
It was hoped that the Government would listen to the voice of the Union 
and act accordingly. This Union held at least one meeting annually. The 
annual reports compiled by the Union from time to time throw some light 
on the relations between the white farmers and the inhabitants of the 
-
African reserves. · 
For instance, a representative of the Lalapansi Farmers• Association 
declared: 
12. M E Lee, 'The Origins of the Rhodesian Responsible Government 
Movement', pp. 40 - 41. 
13. Ibid. p. 36. 
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"In all countries where the white and black races come 
in contact, the white man's problem and burden is how best 
to rescue the black races from barbarism and to make them 
useful citizens of the states of which they have become 
members.• 14 
Members of the settler community considered themselves superior to the 
African population. It was not only the white farmers who looked down 
upon the African way of life but also the w{elders of political power. 
For instance as early as 1908 the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia 
stated in one of his annual reports that "The transition of the native 
from barbarism to civilisation is becoming more rapid every year. 11 15 
Since in those days there were no highly educated Africans who were 
brave enough to challenge these and other related overstatements, the 
critics of the black population continued to denounce the African way of 
life. In his paper which was highly rated by the members of the 
audience, MacAllister said, "Twenty-five years ago the dominant type of 
the native was a man physically fit, courageous, cruel and rapacious to 
those outside his social circle, but within his social circle obedient 
to authority, honest and highly moral".16 
' 
To demonstrate how wide the gap was between an African and a white man 
MacAllister~declared: 
14. The Rhodesia Agricultural Union: Report of Proceedings at the 
Eleventh Annual Congress held at Salisbury on 24 - 27 February 
1914 p. 19. 
15. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Administrator. 1908 - 1909, 
p. 37. The Aqministrator of Southern Rhodesia was Sir William 
Milton_ in the period 1898 - 1914. His successor was Francis 
Chaplin. 
16. The Rhodesia Agricultural Union: Report of Proceedings at the 




"Now look at the same native today. He is weedy, a drunkard, 
immoral and rapidly becoming a thief."17 
This is clearly a racist and class-based judgment, typical of colonial 
white supremacist rhetoric. It was an allegation justifying racial and 
political oppression, and cannot be taken seriously in historical 
analysis. However, a socio-economic context of conquest, land loss and 
sharply, imbalanced resources opened the way to various forms of crime. 
For instance a few years later a representative of the Midlands Farmers• 
Association moved, seconded by a member of Gatooma Farmers• Association: 
"that this Congress urges upon the Government the need 
for strong measures being taken to check the continual theft 
of crops, small stock, etc. by natives by increasing the 
penalty imposed on those convicted and by securing greater 
vigilance in the detection of the offenses."18 · 
That thefts by Africans were on the increase on white farms was 
supported by other delegates in 1919. One representative of the Midlands 
Farmers• Association alleged that 200 bags of mealies were stolen from 
his farm at night in 1918. 19 A member of the Nyamandlovu Farmers• 
Association supported the resolution. He alleged that he 11 traced the 
thieves to the kraal and got there a scotch-cart full of mealies and 
pumpkins that had been stolen."20 
17. Ibid. p. 20. 
18. The Rhodesia Agricultural Union: Report of Proceedings of Congress 
held at Salisbury on 17 - 20 March 1919, p. 63. 
19. Ibid. p. 63. 
20. Ibid. p. 63. 
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But none of these white farmers tried to explain why Africans stole 
livestock and crops in those days. The thefts of food indicate that 
some Africans stole in order to solve the problem of hunger brought 
about by loss of land, colonial dues, and low agricultural production. 
Since there is neither oral nor written evidence to substantiate the 
white farmers• stories, modern historians are still left with the task 
of establishing the truth. 
The resolution put forward to the delegates by the representatives of 
the Midlands Farmers• Association also suggests that the culprits were 
not severely punished by the courts of law and that was perhaps the 
reason why these thefts were said to be on the increase. To reinforce 
this argument one white farmer said that 11 a boy who stole 64 fowls sold 
them at 2 shillings a time pure-bred leghorn birds".21 After that he 
said that the boy was arrested and "he admitted his guilt and got three 
months' imprisonment on the second prosecution".22 
Supporting the allegation that such a punishment inflicted upon the 
culprit was not severe enough to be a deterrent to the potential 
offenders of the law, another European farmer said that the African 
women and men who stole his mealies and pumpkins were arrested. But to 
his surprise: all women were set free while men were sentenced to one 
month's imprisonment.23 
21. The Rhodesian Agricultural Union: Report of Congress held at 
Salisbury on 17 - 20 March 1919, p. 63. 
22. Ibid, p. 63. 
23. Ibid, p. 63. 
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According to official reports and oral evidence the African population 
and the number of animals increased in the Ntabazinduna Reserve as well 
as in the other parts of the Bubi District in the 1920s. The main factor 
that led to the growth of population was an African influx in the above 
area from the Insiza District and the neighbouring farms. 24 Population 
and livestock increases had been very evident even before the 1920 1 s. 
For instance in one of his annual reports the Chief Native Commissioner 
of Matabeleland stated that there were 1 600 cattle, 9 100 sheep, and 17 
000 goats in the Bubi District by 1904.25 Again it was recorded that 
there were 36 341 cattle, 9 487 sheep, 21 275 goats, 1 110 donkeys, 20 
mules and 6 horses in the same district by the end of 1920. 26 
In his report the Bubi Native Commissioner pointed out that the 
population of the above Reserve was over a thousand by May 1913. 27 These 
African peasants owned approximately 3 000 livestock. But by 1930 the 
African population had trebled itself . 28 The number of cattle, goats, 
sheep, horses, mules, donkeys and pigs had also more than trebled 
itself. As a result the Ntabazinduna Reserve seemed to have been 
overcrowded by 1930. 
24. AM Khumalo was interviewed at his home on 27 February 1984. N 
Ndiweni, the Vice-President of the Senate was interviewed at his 
home an 18 December 1983. 
25. Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland for the 
year 1904, p. 10. The Chief Native Commissioner was Sir Herbert 
Taylor, "who had at his disposal someone who knew all about each 
Province". See also NAZ, Oral/Fe2. Leslie Benjamin Fareday was 
interviewed in his office, York House, Salisbury by D Hartridge on 
19 May 1971, 23 July 1971, 28 July 1971, 3 August 1971, 9 August 
1971, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14. 
26. Report of the.Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1920, p. 17. 
27. NAZ, N24/•l/2, Vol 2. Report on Native Reserves: May 1913, p. 2. 
28. Ibid, p. 2. 
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The pressure on resources in the Reserve was aggravated when 75 per cent 
o~ the. area was brought undei ~ultivation. 29 It meant that only 25 per 
cent of the communal land was set aside for grazing purposes. Both oral 
testimony and written evidence concur that people's livestock did not 
have enough grass to eat in the 1920s and the 1930s.30 
To alleviate the problem of scarcity of grass some occupants of the 
Reserve found the temptation to drive their livestock into neighbouring, 
white commercial farms too great to resist. For instance, according to 
one informant who was a herdboy in the 1920s and the 1930s, the 
inhabitants of the Reserve used to cut off the fence between the 
Ntabazinduna area and the surrounding farms.3 1 After that they drove 
their cattle into these tempting, sparsely populated farms. 
Confessing as one of the culprits, he said that he used to drive his 
father's cattle into the Heany Junction Farm early in the morning in the 
1920s. He went on to say that his father's cattle were confiscated by 
the owner of the farm one day in 1924. His father was ordered to pay a 
fine of four pounds and 2 heifers before the owner ·could return the 
confiscated cattle. The informant's father paid the stip~lated fine.32 
The Senior Land Inspector was confirming the above and other similar 
incidents when he stated in his report that the 11 whole area (the Heany 
Junction Farm and the Government Outspan No. 3) had been grazed down by 
29. E D Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 1 November 1930, p. 30. 
30. Nyathi, Ndiweni, NAZ, 8235/522 NC's report 1928, p. 76, NAZ, 
8235/511 NC's report 1933, pp. 1 - 2. 




cattle belonging to the natives on Ntabazinduna Reserve 11 • 33 Incidents of 
this nature contributed to the growth of tension between the African and 
European communities in the Bubi District in the inter-war years. 
There were sever a 1 reaso.ns why the white community resented the presence 
of the livestock from the Reserve on their farms. They feared that these 
African beasts would probably eat up all the grass, shrubs and other 
forms of vegetation. 34 Then the white men's cattle were going to run 
short of grass and die. 
The Bubi white community also feared that the quality of their cattle 
would be undermined if they allowed the livestock from the Reserve to 
invade their farms.35 They believed that their cattle were superior to 
those owned by the Africans. Both oral a~d written sources concur that 
African cattle were poorer in quality than those of the white farmers. 
For instance in his article Phimister noted the 'poor beef qualities of 
indigenous cattle' and explained clearly how the quality of African 
cattle could be improved for the local overseas market.36 Nobbs, too, 
acknowledged the fact that African cattle were of poor quality.37 
- 33. NAZ, S 2111/4 Bubi District: Inspection Report, 20 October 1923, 
p. 1 
34. Ibid. p. 1 
35. Ibid. F Tshuma, 25 May 1987. 
36. I Phimister, "Meat and monopolies: Beef cattle in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890 - 1938", Journal of African History, XiX._ 3 (1978) 
p. 396. See a~so V.E.M. Machingaidze, 'The Development of Settler 
Capitalist Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular 
reference to the Role of the State, 1908 - 1939', p. 284. 
37. EA Nobbs, 'The Native Cattle of Southern Rhodesia', South African· 
Journal of science, XIXV, December, 1927 pp. 328 - 342. 
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Addr.essing chiefs and headmen from the Inyathi, Shangani and the 
Ntabazinduna Reserves, the Bubi Native District Commissioner said that 
Africans ought to "buy better bulls and breed better cattle as the 
' 
European farmers did."38 But according to one informant it was not an 
easy task to state the type of cattle owned by the Africans, living in 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve.39 This oral evidence is supported by No~bs, 
·who seemed to be contradicting himself when he alleged that the Ndebele 
captured amabula, the red cattle and imofu, red beasts with small horns 
from the Dutch in the Transvaal. 40 These European cattle were brought 
into Matabeleland in the 1830's. 
Although on the whole reliable oral and written sources are agreed that 
the African cattle were inferior to those possessed by Europeans, it 
·could be argued, that they played a significant role in the development 
of the livestock industry in Southern Rhodesia during the colonial days. 
Reinforcing this argument the Editor of The Rhodesian Agricultural 
Journal wrote: 
"The foundation of most of the troops of cattle in the 
past in Rhodesia, and the ancestors of existing heads, were 
the indigenous cattle of Matabeleland, Mashoniland and 
Northern Rhodesia, and bulls of various breeds were 
introduced with success in proportion to the discrimination 
shown in their selection.n41 . 
38. NAZ, 51561/10 Native Commissioner's Report on Meeting of Chiefs 
and Headmen at Inyathi on 22 June 1925 pp. 2 - 4. 
39. M Nyathi, on 7 January 1985. 
40. NAZ, 51561/10 NC's report of 22 June 1925, p. 2. 
41. Edmonds, TA, 'Cattle farming in Rhodesia', The Rhodesia 
Agricultural Journal, vol. 3, 1905 - 1906, p. 182 • 
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This quotation implies that to begin with the white farmers reared the 
11 Matabele 11 and 11 Shona 11 type of cattle. In his paper Weinmann supported 
the argument that the white settlers purchased cattle from the Africans 
when he said, 11 but, in addition, considerable numbers of native cattle 
were acquired by the European settlers as a result of the defeat of King 
Lobengula in 1893. 1142 
Furthermore, he argued that on the recommendations of the Land 
Commission established by the Matabele Order-in-Counci 1, 1894, 11 The 
ownership of all cattle in the possession of natives in Matabeleland on 
or before 31 December 1893, was vested in the Company. 1143 
According to a Government Notice of 10 December 1895 the cattle under 
discussion were sold to the settlers at the price of 50 shillings per 
head. Adding weight to the above conclusions, the Reports of Civil 
Commissioners for 1894 - 1895 emphasized 11 that in the Bulawayo District 
most of the cattle on European farms were all Mashona and Matabele 
stock. 11 44 Writing later Stigger acknowledged the fact that the 
Chartered Company stripped the Ndebele of their cattle between 1893 and 
1896. 45 But the exact number of cattle belonging to Lobhengula and his 
subjects seized by the Company is still unknown. Research on thi~ vexed 
question needs to be done. 
42. H Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890 - 1923, Occasional Paper No. 4 p. 104. (Salisbury: 
University of Rhodesia, 1972) 
43. Ibid. p. 104. 
44. Ibid. p. 104. 
45. Stigger, P, 'The Land Commissioµ of 1894 and cattle', Zimbabwean 
History; The Journal of the Historical Association of Zimbabwe, 11 
(1980) pp 40 - 43. 
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But in 1896 Rinderpest swept across Southern Rhodesia, 11 decimating the 
cattle herds of Europeans and Africans alike 11 • After this disaster the 
white settlers 11 imported large numbers of cattle for breeding, transport 
and slaughter purposes from Southern Africa 11 • 46 
With the importation of pedigreed bulls from Great Britain and other 
countries, the European farmers demonstrated clearly that their 
intention was to improve the quality of the cattle they had. It could be 
argued that the white farmers did not want their cattle to mix with 
those of the Africans living in the Ntabazinduna area and other reserves 
since this would probably undermine the quality of their (white's) 
livestock. 
Another reason why the white farmers tried to keep out from their areas, 
the scrub cattle from the Ntabazinduna Reserve was of poor health. It 
was reported that several cattle died of Anthrax in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve in the 1920s.47 The European settlers, feared that the affected 
African cattle would probably transmit this fatal disease across the 
farms, surrounding the Ntabazinduna Reserve. To contain the spread of 
this disease it was decided that the Reserve should be fenced. It was 
suggested that the subdivision C Gravesend Farm should be fenced in 
1927.48 
46. Weimann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890.- 1923, (1972) p. 105. 
4Z. NAZ, S607 Box 1926 First Report on Anthrax Outbreak in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve, 1926, p. 1. 
48. NAZ, S138/21 Accountant Department of Lands to the Chief Native 
Commissioner, Salisbury, 31 May 19_27, p. 1. 
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Supporting this move, the Chief Native Commissioner emphasized that 
"such a measure was desirable in view of the outbreak of Anthrax in the 
Reserve. 1149 
Apart from the African cattle, the inhabitants of the Reserve also 
trespassed. For instance the Bubi Native Commissioner stated in one of 
his letters that he had received ''complaints of natives trespassing" 
from the Bubi Farmers' Association in 1924.50 He alleged that some of 
the culprits were arrested by the British South Africa Police. But one 
defect of these official records is that the Chief Native Commissioner 
did not cite figures and names of the Africans from the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve, who were arrested for trespassing in the 1920s. 
A representative of the Umvukwe Farmers' Association proposed, seconded 
by that of the Midlands Farmers' Association at the meeting held at 
Gwelo now Gweru by the Rhodesian Agricultural Union 11 that the Government 
' be urged to take drastic measures to suppress stock thefts, which are on 
the steady increase".51. 
He also said that Africans had started to use ploughs in his district 
and as a result, 11 The amount of stealing in trek gear and plough parts 
was tremendous. 11 52 Thefts were not only said to be on the increase in 
-
the Umvukwe District but also in other parts of Southern Rhodesia in the 
49. Ibid. p. 1. 
50. NAZ, 8607 Box 1924, the Native Commissioner, Inyathi writing to 
the Secretary of Bubi Farmers' Association, 27 February 1924, 
p. 2. 
51. The Rhodesian Agricultural Union: Report of Congress held at Gwelo 
on 3 - 5 May 1920, p. 58. 
52. Ibid. p. 49. 
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1920s. For instance, Bazaley alleged that Africans stole plough shares 
from the Gravesend Far~ in 1923.53 It was frequently assumed that the 
culprits were Africans, living in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. While these 
farm implements might instead have been stolen by African tenants, these 
and other allegations contributed to the growth of hostilities between 
the occupants of the Reserve and the white farmers in the Bubi area in 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
In the light of strained relations between these two communities, the 
Bubi Farmers' Association passed a resolution asking the Colonial 
Government to remove the Ntabazinduna Reserve to "some less populated 
district. 11 54 
The white farmers thought that this was a sound solution to the problem 
of border violation by the Ntabazinduna people in the inter-war years. 
Their underlying motive was perhaps to drive out the African population 
from this region so that they could occupy the fertile parts of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
The above resolution was rejected by the newly elected Responsible 
Government on the grounds that it had no power to alter the existing 
African res~rves as fixed by the Order-in-Council of 1920.55 If the 
-
Government had listened to the crying voice of the Bubi Farmers' 
Association and implemented the resolution under discussion, the rift 
between the white commercial farms and the Ntabazinduna Reserve would 
53. NAZ, s 607 N.C., Inyathi writing t6 the secretary of Bubi Farmers' 
association, 27 February 1924. p. 1. 
54. Ibid. p. 1. 
55. Ibid. p.· 1. 
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undoubtedly have been widened. According to oral testimony the people of 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve like those of other African areas were attached 
to the land where their ancestors were buried.56 Any attempt by the 
settler Government to force the Africans to shift to a new region was 
likely to be met with resistance. After the rejection of the above 
resolution by.the Colonial Government, the Chief Veterinary Surgeon 
provided a tentative solution to the problems of the frontier facing the 
two communities. In his letter to the District Veterinary Surgeon he 
mentioned that the northern, eastern, and western boundari~s of the 
Reserve were all fenced. This preceding statement implies that the 
southern boundary was not fenced. There is neither written nor oral 
source, stating the reason why this boundary was not fenced for some 
time. According to the Chief Veteri·nary Surgeon's letter of April 1927 
the gap that was not fenced was "about two miles", in length.57 In his 
view fencing "would give more effective control over the cattle in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve and was des~rable because of the existence of 
Anthrax infection".58 
Supporting the above recommendation, the Accountant in the Department of 
Lands authorised the fencing of the gap between subdivision C Gravesend 
and the Ntabazinduna Reserve. The Chief Native Commissioner also 
advocated t~at the settler Government ought to pay half the cost, for 
erecting the fence on the grounds that "such a measure was desirable in 
56. Chief K Ndiwe~i, 27 February, 1984. 
57. NAZ, S2136/58779(6) Ntabazinduna Reserve and Fingo Location: Chief 
Veterinary Surgeon, Bulawayo writing to district Veterinary 
Surgeon, Bulawayo, March 1927, p. 1~ 
58. Ibid. p. 1. 
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view of the outbreak of Anthrax in the Reserve 11 .59 The other half of the 
cost was to be met by the owner of Gravesend Farm. According to the 
Accountant 1 s calculations, the cost for erecting the fence was 
63 pounds 6s.4d. The .owner of the farm was expected to pay 31 pounds 
13s. 2d. in equal installments of 3 pounds 4s. Od.60 By fencing the 
Reserve the settler Government assumed that the friction between the 
African peasants and the white farmers would automatically disappear. 
The fence, consisting of four barbed wires helped to keep the peasants• 
cattle and donkeys within th~ frontiers of the Reserve. But this fence 
could not stop goats, sheep and people from going across the above 
frontiers into European farms. According to oral evidence, goats and 
sheep frequently went underneath the fence.6 1 And this contributed to 
the growth of tension between the occupants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
and the white farmers in the Bubi District. It is also recorded that 
relations between African cultivators and European farmers were often 
bad in the Insiza District in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. When African cattle trespassed on European farms, they were 
captured. The owners of these cattle were usually_charged at least 
4 pounds per beast.62 In the light of such incidents Palmer concludes 
that most Africans felt that "the white Rhodesian farmer ... represented 
the worst in European racial feelings He was harsh, domineering, 
unfair, inhuman and took the law into his own hands when dealing with 
59. NAZ, S138/2 Native and European Administration 1923 - 1933: The 
Chief Native Commissioner, writing to the Secretary to Premier 
(Native Affairs), May 1927. 
60. NAZ, S2/36/58779 (6) Ntabazinduna Native Reserve, Bubi District; 
Accountant Department Lands, writing to Mr Richardson; Cape, Town, 
15 February 1928. Richardson was the owner of the Gravesend Farm. 
61. F Tshuma, 25 May 1987. Mr Nyathi, 7 January 1985. 
62. R Palmer and N Parsons (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in 
Central and Southern Africa p. 237. 
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Africans, some of whom felt that they were placed in the same class as 
I 
cattle or even lower."63 Oral testimony also confirms that the 
occupants of the Ntabazinduna area adopted a hostile attitude towards 
neighbouring white farms when they were forced to pay fines for 
trespassing on European land.64 
Although the relations between the Bubi European farmers and the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve were sometimes strain~d in the above period, it 
could be argued that the two communities were often interdependent. 
Several informants recounted that certain African men, living in the 
Reserve used to work on the neighbouring farms. In their view these were 
the African people who were often faced with the problem of the scarcity 
of food. They went to work for food for their families.65 After a man 
had worked for a month he was given a bag of maize or mealie meal, then 
he returned to his home in the Reserve. But at times even those African 
men who had enough food to eat went to work on the surrounding farms. 
These were people who wanted to raise money for their children's school 
fees. Others worked so that they could be able to pay taxes. For 
instance every grown African male was expected to pay a poll tax, 
umthelo wekhanda of one pound per year by the Colonial Government. The 
dog tax was five shillings whereas dipping fee per beast was two 
shillings per year.66 
63. Ibid pp 237, 251 
64. M Nyathi, 7 January 1985. 
65. F Tshuma, 25 May 1981. 
66. Report of the Native Conunissioner Bubi District for the year ended 
31 December 1923, p. 249. 
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That some Africans living in the Ntabazinduna Reserve were often 
employed by neighbouring white farmers is confirmed by official reports. 
For instance when addressing Chiefs and Headmen from the Ntabazinduna, 
Inyathi and the Shangani Reserves, the Native Commissioner of the Bubi 
District said, 11 All work on the farms in Rhodesia is performed by your 
people. 1167 
This extract implies that African people gained experience in the fields 
of agriculture and animal husbandry. Adding weight to this conclusion, 
he said, "The white farmer had taught the blacks how to do it. The 
natives knew how to do it. 11 Furthermore, he argued, "They know that a 
white man cultivates his land even when there were no weeds.68 
But the African peasant farmers did not put into practice the skills 
they acquired from the European farmers because that would undermine, 
for example, their pre-colonial social relationships and the existing 
division of labour. The N C also alleged that African men "left their 
ploughing to their women and children who had not learned from the white 
man how to do it properly .... 11 69 But in his annual report the 
Administrator of Southern Rhodesia said, "That the cultivation of the 
land is done entirely by the women is a misleading idea; 50 per cent of 
67. NAZ, Sl561/10, Vol 7, Report of the Native Commissioner on 
Meetings of Chiefs and Headmen held at Inyathi on 22 June 1925, 
p. 1. 
68. Ibid. p. 2; See also NAZ, S138/72Agricultural Activities within 
the Department of Development: E D Alvord to the Chief Native 
Commissioner, 7 February 1928; NAZ, AOH/41 Mr S Chibvongodze was 
interviewed by Dawson Munjeri at Farm No. 4, Muda Purchase area, 
14 July 1978, pp. 17 - 22. Circular Letter No. D C/3. E D Alvord, 
Salisbury, to the C NC Salisbury, 21 December 1927. 
69. Ibid. p. 2. 
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the adult males worked in Bubi for four months".70 This argument which 
is supported by various reports compiled by the Chamber of Mines from 
time to time suggests that African men worked for a short period of time 
every year so that they could return home and plough their fields. 
Trevor Ncube who acknowledges lack of research on agricultural labour in 
Matabeleland concludes that "indigenous labour supplies were seasonal 11 .71 
Throwing more light on the above argument, the N C of Umzingwane stated 
in his report, 11 The supply was adequate except during the last quarter 
of the year, when local natives were busy with their lands 11 .72 Oral 
sources emphasize that African men ploughed the fields. Cattle were 
still considered men 1 s possession even during the inter-war years. Since 
oxen pulled ploughs, men with ploughs were directly involved in this· 
form of seasonal labour. 
Although oral testimony and written evidence concur that the occupants 
of the Ntabazinduna Reserve worked on the surrounding farms from time to 
time, they did not try to improve the quality of their cattle in the 
1920s and 1930s. In the view of Chief Tshugulu, Africans did not adopt 
and implement new ways of breeding their livestock on the grounds that 
their cattle 11 had no value 11 .73 
---------~----------
70. Report -of the Administrator for the year 1908 - 1909, p. 38. 
71. T V Ncube "Aspects of Agrarian Labour in Matabeleland South from 
1899 - 1948", University of Zimbabwe, Harare, unpub. Honours B.A., 
dissertation, 1985, p. 9. 
72. Annual Report of the Native CoIIllllissioner, Umzingwane District for 
the year 1927: 
73. NAZ, S 1561/10, vol 7, Report of the NC on meeting of Chiefs and 
Headmen held at Inyathi on 22 June 1925, p. 7. The Native 
Commissioner of the Bubi District was WE Farrer. See also H 
Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1924 - 1950, p. 211. 
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Supporting Tshugulu's argument, Chief Sikobokobo said, "Traders did not 
make any difference between a big ox and a sma 11 one. n74 
One informant recalled that the price for a big ox was one pound five 
shillings in the inter-war period. He went on to say that Greenspan 
brothers who lived in Bulawayo used to buy cattle from the people of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve.75 
The above statements imply that Africans deemed it unnecessary for them 
to improve the quality of their livestock. They probably thought that 
whites wanted to cheat them by buying these cattle for little money. 
Written and oral sources concur that relations between the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve and the white neighbouring farms were often strained. But these 
two communities were also inter-dependent. For instance on one hand, the 
African peasants who ran short of money and food, sold themselves to the 
labour market established by the white farmers. On the other the 
European farmers looked upon the Ntabazinduna Reserve as their main 
'pool of cheap labour•. In conclusion it could be argued that this 
nature of inter-dependence led ultimately to clashes between the two 
communities. 
74. NAZ, S 1561/10, vol. 7 Report of the NC, 1925, p. 7. 
75. F z Tshuma 25 May 1987. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHARTERED BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA GOVERNMENT 1·s 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE IN THE PERIOD 1897 - 1923 
The year 1890 was a landmark in the development of the history of the 
region lying between the Limpopo and the Zambezi Rivers. Before 1890 
this area was divided into two main parts, namely Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland. In his paper Palmer concluded that 11 gold was the prime 
motive behind the occupation of 1890, both for its own sake and for its 
potential, political significance as a counterweight to the Transvaal 11 • 1 
He reinforced his conclusipn by stating that 11 although each pioneer was 
entitl~d to a free farm of 500 morgen (3 175 acres), in fa~t many of 
them disposed of these rights to speculators such as Johnson Willoughby 
White en route to Salisbury 11 .2 
The above quotation suggests that gold mining remained the most 
important industry in Southern Rhodesia in the period 1890 - 1923. Lee 
argues that the B.S.A.Co. and the settlers in the 1890's hoped that the 
future of Southern Rhodesia would be based on the gold mining industry. 
. . 
1. R H Palmer, Aspects of Rhodesia Land Policy 1890 - 1936 
(Salisbury: The Central Africa Historical Association, Local 
Series 22. 1968) p. 7. 
2. Ibid. p. 7. 
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In the light of this consideration the mining sector 11 was favoured by 
legislation and other benefits at the expense of the rest of the 
community. 11 3 This statement implies that the Company Administration 
neglected the interests of both the white farmers and the African 
cultivators across Southern Rhodesia. But Lee argues further that at a 
later stage 11 gold resources of the country were proving inadequate for a 
foundation for a permanent policy of favouring mining capitalist 
companies in order to promote general development and settlement. 4 When 
it was realised that the premise on which this policy was based was 
false, the B.S.A.Co. Administration began to encourage the growth of the 
white farming industry from 1904. Statistical data quoted from various 
sources by Lee confirm that there was a great expansion in the field of 
white farming industry. For instance the number of white farms being 
worked went up from 317 in 1903 to 948 in 1905. The number of whites 
~ngaged in agriculture also went up from 879 in 1904 to 2067 by 1911.5 -
Despite this expansion in the agrarian sector, the white commercial 
farmers appear to have been unable to grow enough food for local 
consumption. Supporting this conclusion, Lee alleges that as late as 
1906 Southern Rhodesia 11 was st i 11 importing maize to the value of 
20 221 pounds. 11 6 The word still in this context suggests that this 
country used to import maize for local consumption even before 1906. A 
few authorities concur that African peasant producers played a 
-
significant role in the food-producing sector. According to Phimister 
this sector was 11 primarily in the hands of peasant producers until 
3. E.M. Lee, 'The Origin of the Responsible Government Movement' 
p. 36. 
4. !bid p. 37. 
5. Ibid. p. 39. 
6. Ibid. P· 40. 
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shortly after the First World War. 11 7 Elizabeth Schmidt was echoing 
, 
Phimister's concl~sion when she wrote: 
"They (the Europeans) found it cheaper to buy their 
supplies from African producers whom, in any event, were 
more knowledgeable about local conditions and suitable 
practices.•8 
Ranger, writing earlier than Schmidt and Phimister, argued that 11 African 
cultivators .. for decades .. could out-produce and out-perform European 
farming. 11 9 In view of the above quotations it is possible to conclude 
that the white population was fe~ mainly by the African peasant 
producers in Southern Rhodesia in the first phase of the colonial rule. 
But oral testimony and written evidence indicate that this was not true 
in the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve and other areas in 
Matabeleland,particularly in the period 1897 - 1923. The Native 
Commissioner in charge of the Province of Matabeleland stated in one of 
his reports that "irrigation and other methods of improvement were not 
yet applied to the native lands by 1904. 1110 Nineteen years later the 
Bubi Native Commissioner's annual reports emphasized that "No 
7. R Palmer and N Parsons, (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in 
Central and Southern Africa, p. 255. 
8. Elizabeth Schmidt, 'Women, Agriculture and Social Change in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1898 - 1934 with special reference to the 
Goromonzi Dis~rict', Seminar Paper, U.Z., May 1986, p. 2. 
9. Terence Ranger, 'Growing from the Roots: Reflections on Peasant 
Research in Central and Southern Africa', Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 5 (1978) p. 99. 
lo.Report of the Native Commissioner Matabeleland. 1904, P~ 3. 
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improvements were noticeable in the methods of agriculture".ll As a 
result the African agricultural production was very low in the 
Ntabazinduna, Shangani and the Inyathi Reserves in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. According to several informants African peasants 
got less than a bag· of grain from an acre. 12 Even the local newspaper 
printed during the colonial days declared: "The yields from ordinary 
native farming are very low. Most natives who follow the methods of 
their fathers reap only one or two bags per acre."13 This quotation 
suggests that as late as 1931 that there were many Africans who still 
used their old agricultural methods. Between 1910 and 1930 the number of 
ploughs which were in use in African areas increased from 2 794 to 
10 189 in Southern Rhodesia. 14 It could be assumed that African crop 
production increased during the above period. But according to one 
scholar the yields in bags of maize per acre-decreased in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century.15 The Morris Carter Commission's 
report confirmed the conclusion of Weinmann when it said, "Although a 
larger area of land was being cultivated with the aid of the plough, the 
yield per acre was often less than it was in the old days when women 
11. Report of the Native Commissioner Bubi District for the year ended 
31 December 1923, pp. 244 - 246. See also S235/502 District Annual 
Report 1925 p. 3; S235/504 District Annual Report for the year 
ended 31 December 1926 p. 3; NAZ, S235/505 District Annual Report 
for the year ended 31 December 1927, p. 4. 
12. M Nyathi was interviewed on 7 January 1985; MaMthethwa was 
interviewed on 19 August 1984; F Tshuma was interviewed in May 
1987. 
13. Native Mirror: Chiringiriro : Isibuko Bulawayo, 25 December 1931 
No. 5 p. 9. This paper was written in three main languages of 
Rhodesia namely English, Shona and Ndebele. 
14. H Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1924 - 1950 p. 214. 
15. Ibid. p. 214. 
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. cultivated the land with the hoe".16 
Adding more weight to this argument, the Native Commissioner of the 
Mazoe District declared in his report: 
"Ploughs are being purchased to an increasing extent 
but it is doubtful whether their use is really beneficial 
and not a curse to the native farmer, large areas are just 
scratched and no improvement in the yield is observable, nor 
is the quality of the grain .17 
According to some informants the majority of African peasant producers 
did not have ploughs in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. 18 In one of his papers Alvord stated that there 
were fewer than three hundred ploughs in this area as late as 1930. 19 
African cultivators were poor and could not buy ploughs, harrows, 
cultivators and other new agricultural implements during the reign of 
the B.S.A.Co •• It could be argued that since these peasant producers 
did not know how to use these new agricultural implements properly it 
would probably have not made any difference, even if the African 
possessed the above equipment, between 1900 and 1926. The African 
cultivators needed guidance in the field of farming in order for them to 
increase their agricultural production. Keigwin was confirming this 
conclusion when he wrote sixty years ago: 
"Thousands of ploughs were bought. But the 
acquisition of a plough had not brought much improvement in 
16. Ibid. p. 202. 
17. Ibid. p. 202. 
18. MaMthethwa, Tshuma. 
19. Alvord. E D , Occasional Paper No. 3, November 1930, Table 1. 
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cultivation. Instances of faulty handling of ploughs, 
ignorance of the construction and setting of, mis-
application of methods of cultivation could be seen near any 
kraal. 1120 
In 1914 the CNC wrote, 11 The natives of this Province ,(Matabeleland) are 
essentially an agricultural and pastoral people and do not take kindly 
to mining. 1121 Confirming the preceding conclusion Charles van Onselen 
stated in his book later,• •.. the Ndebele and Shona remained relatively 
aloof from the unpopular (mining) industry which had transformed their 
country, and would consider only short periods of service on the mines 
during the agricultural off-season. 11 22 
The above quotation indicates that the CNC wanted the Company Government 
to give African cultivators necessary training in the fields of 
agriculture and animal husbandry. But the CNC's statement was unlikely 
to make a great impact on the minds of the wielders of political power, 
who were not prepared to clash with the white mining and farming 
sectors. The mining community could not support a policy that promoted 
African progress in the province of agriculture at that time. For 
instance, even before the CNC made the statement under discussion 
Bulawayo's mining commissioner declared: 
:~It is beyond doubt that the local native is getting 
rich, and he sees the day not far distant when he need not 
work at all. Many have already reached it .. One can hardly 
20. Keigwin, 'Native Development', NADA: The Southern Rhodesia Native 
Affairs Departmental Annual 1923, p. 11. 
21. Report of the Proceedings; Rhodesian Agricultural Union, 24 - 27 
February, 1914, p. 2. 
22. C, van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 
1900 - 1933 (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1976) p. 92. 
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see the smallest kraal without its accompaniment of a herd 
of 20 to 50 head of cattle, plus sheep and goats, and I -am 
told that some kraals possess hundreds - up to 600 head of 
cattle - a good sign so far as the welfare of the native is 
concerned, but not encouraging from a labour point of 
view. •23 
It is clear that the mining companies looked upon the African reserves 
as their chief source of cheap labour. They feared that if economic 
progress was promoted in these reserves African cultivators would 
probably be reluctant to work in the mines. In that way the mining 
sector would always be faced with the problem of the scarcity of cheap 
labour~ 
The white farmers could not also endorse such a liberal policy because 
they did not want to compete with African cultivators at the local 
market. MacAllister was unveiling this fear to the white commercial 
farmers when he commented: 
~At present the native is a stock-breeder, he will 
continue for some time in producing foundation stock for the 
settler and rancher, but as an agriculturalist, his business 
is nearly finished. The settler, with improved methods of 
culture, will squeeze the native out of putting better 
quality of produce on the market .• 24 
Four years after the above statement was made Herbert Taylor, the CNC 
stated in his report that: 
23. I, Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890 -
1948, pp. 64, 65; MB 6/1/3, Mining Connnissioner, Bulawayo, report 
for year ended 31 December 1907. 
24. Report on the Proceedings at the Eleventh Congress, 24 - 27 
February 1914, Rhodesian Agricultural Union, p. 21. 
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"The native should be trained not so much as a 
competitor with the white man in the business of life, but 
as a useful auxiliary to help in the progress of the 
country.• 25 
Again the CNC, showing a consistent attitude towards the African peasant 
producers, was cautious about what he wrote. As shown by his statement 
he did not want the white farmers to clash with the Administrators over 
African agricultural policy. Then it is clear that in the years 1900 -
1918 the government did not intervene in African agrarian sector in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve and other black areas. 
In the light of these and other related considerations Weinmann 
concluded that "the policy of the administration was to allow the 
Africans to live their traditional life and its attitude towards African 
land use was therefore rather indifferent 11 during the Company period. 26 
The First World War impeded economic progress in the African reserves 
and the white areas. As an integral part of the British Empire Southern 
Rhodesia participated in the Great War against the Central Powers. The 
manpower and financial resources which could have been utilised to 
promote economic and social development in the African areas, including 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve, were drained by this bloody conflict. 
After the war the Government demonstrated its first intentions of 
bringing about an agricultural change in the reserves by participating 
directly in African education. For instance in 1920 the Government voted 
25. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner 1918, p. 4. 
26. Weinmann, H, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1924 - 1950, p. 201. 
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a sum of 3 250 pounds for economic development in the African 
reserves.27 This was a small sum of money when one takes i~to account the 
area of each reserve to be developed. However, it reflected a new level 
of concern in the administration about ·1onger-term developments in 
Reserve areas. 
This move was soon followed by the appointment of Keigwin to the post of 
Director of the Native Development. The creation of this new office 
shows that the wielders of political power were concerned about the 
chaotic socio-economic conditions that prevailed in some of the African 
reserves after 1918. Keigwin is often associated with the establishment 
of the first African Industrial and Agricultural Training Centres, 
namely Domboshawa and Tjolotjo. 28 Domboshawa and Tjolotjo (Tsholotsho), 
which were directly controlled by the Government, were opened in 1921 
and 1922 respectively. 
According to Harold Finkle these two government schools were established 
specifically for the purpose of educating Africans for reserve work. 29 
That these industrial and agricultural institutions were to produce men 
that would serve their own people in the reserves in Southern Rhodesia 
in the interwar years is supported.by Keigwin 1 s long statement. In his 
report Keigwin declared that Domboshawa and Tjolotjo were expected to 
deal with: 
27. NAZ, S 138/10 African Advancement. S T Taylor to the Chief Native 
Commissioner, 13 May 1924, p. 1. 
28. NAZ, 5138/206 Training of Native Agricultural Demonstrators. CNC 
to secretary.to the Premier 18 November 1926, p. 2. 
29. NAZ, Oral /Fl 5, p. 29 Harold Carsdale Finkle was interviewed at 
his home, Hatfield, in Salisbury by J D McCarthy on 30 March 1973 
and 5 April 1973. 
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"the simplest and humblest vocation of the people, 
building them up in amongst their own people in their own 
villages instead of taking individuals away from their home 
surroundings and collecting them in central institutes where 
they are properly trained on European lines and in European 
directions .... we are concerned primarily with the natives 
who live in a more or less COimnunal way in the reserves ... 
they cannot be allowed to drift as they are without any 
organised system of guidance and instruction. Use of 
ploughs is a sign of progress .. it is evident that on the 
one hand native conservatism has to be broken down, and on 
the other it is d~sirable that some means should be devised 
whereby the progressive native may be instructed in the 
proper use of his new implements."30 
This paternalist and self-consciously 11 progressive 11 approach clearly. 
envisaged that reserve-based trainees would go back to the·ir home areas 
and show their people how to use new agricultural methods. The new 
educational institutions - in line with renewed attempts in the 1920's 
to bolster 11 tradition 11 tended to reinforce ethnicity. The song that was 
often sung in Shona at Domboshawa seemed to foster the growth of the 
spirit of regionalism and tribalism among the Shona people. The song 
was divided into the following 4 stanzas: 
"We are the people of Domboshawa, 
We have come from many villages, 
We have come so that we may learn, 
We are looking for the way of knowledge. 
Chorus 
Dembo, Dembo, Domboshawa, 
Our place, our mother, 
Praise ye all the name of 
Domboshawa. 
30. E Punt, 'The Development of African Agriculture in Southern 
Rhodesia with particular reference to the interwar years' unpub. 
M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 1979, pp. 65 - 66, quoted from 
H S Keigwin, Report on the suggested Industrial Development of 
Natives, 1920, pp. 3 - 4. 
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We learn to plough and plant;' 
We learn to build and plane; 
We learn with book and pen; 
We learn to play and sing. 
In our work here day by day 
We learn to help each other, 
So little by little my brothers, 
We are building this school of ours. 
In the days when you have gone away 
Strengthen then your hearts,my friends, 
Domboshawa shall give you the 3ower 
To bring right on to the end." 1 
The male students activities at Domboshawa mentioned in the song were 
confirmed by the Director of the Native Education Department during the 
Colonial era when he said, "Fellow Africans were trained in building, 
carpentry, blacksmithing, welding and agriculture. 11 32 
The Shona establishment of Domboshawa had its Ndebele counterpart at 
Tjolotjo, seventy miles north west of Bulawayo. 
A graduate of this school was connected with agricultural demonstration 
work in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The 
type of education offered at both institutions seemed to have been 
geared to the socio-economic needs of the Africans in the reserves. 
But one of the critics of the Government African agricultural policy 
argued that the African problem could not be solved 11 by training natives 
31. Alvord, E D, 'Agricultural Demonstration work on Native Reserves; 
Native Mirror: Chiringiriro: Isibuko,· Bulawayo, 25 December 1935, 
p. 13 
32~ NAZ, Oral /Fl 5 Finkle, p. 29. 
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on European lines 11 • 33 He asserted, 11 The problem before us is not tha.t of 
educating the native, it is to know what to do with him when we have 
educated him. 11 34 _ 
This extract suggests that Africans who completed their studies at these 
institutions often failed to find suitable jobs. One interviewee, 
confirming this said "With the economic position in the Reserves they 
(the African demonstrators) just didn't make any money. 11 35 
As their expectations and ambitions were frustrated by lack of suitable 
employment and low pay in the rural areas, the above informant alleged 
that 11 they (the demonstrators) went on to farms, small towns to look for 
work to pra~tice their trade."36 But this was not true in the case of 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve. The two African demonstrators who were 
trained at Tjolotjo worked in the above area for a relatively long 
period of time. For instance, Mbuso Ndiweni and Mabhada Maphosa·served 
as agricultural demonstrators in this Reserve for 7 and 5 years 
respectively. 37 
To make economic progress the Africans were supposed to adopt and 
implement new agricultural methods. In that way their survival in the 
capitalist state would be guaranteed. However, if they rejected the new 
33. ~ H Wilson, 'The Development'of Native Reserves', NADA. the 
Southern Rhodesia Native Department Annual 1923, p. 87. 
34. Ibid. p. 87. 
35. NAZ, Oral/Fl 5 Harold Carsdale Finkle was interviewed by 
JD Maccarthy.on 30 March 1973 and 5 April 1973, p. 29. 
36 •. Ibid. p. 29. 
37. NAZ, 8235/505 - 517 NC's District Annual Reports from the years 




ways of life, it was thought the African population would disintegrate. 
Although it was Government's policy to help the Africans increase their 
crop production in order to make the reserves capable of sustaining the 
steadily increasing number of occupants, the Director of Native 
Development observed that there was little sign of improvement in their 
(African) home life by 1923.38 The annual reports of the Native 
Commissioner of the Bubi District stressed that no improvements were 
"noticeable in the methods of agriculture'' in the Ntabazinduna, Inyathi 
and the Shangani Reserves as late as 1926.39 
Accounting for this economic stagnation in the reserves E D Alvord said, 
"A white man could not teach Agriculture to the superstitious, stooped 
African who attributed high crop yields to 1muti 1 witchcraft and favour 
of the ancestral spirits".40 
Radasi also wrote that Africans believed very much in witchcraft.41 
Adding more weight to the above conclusions the Director of the Native 
Development Department asserted, "The native nature is conservative, 
38. HS Keigwin, 'Native Development', NADA the Southern Rhodesian 
Native Affairs Department Annual. 1923, . p. 11. 
39. Report -of the· Native Commissioner Bubi District for the year ended 
December 1923, pp. 244 - 246; See also NAZ, S235/502 District 
Annual Report. 1925, p. 3. NAZ, S 235/504 District Annual Report 
for the year enden 31 December 1927, p. 4. 
40. NAZ, ED Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow or A guided destiny' M FC 
53 copied Departmentally from typescript original in the 
possession of Mrs E D Alvord, p. 1. A useful source throwing more 
light on E D ~lvord's findings with regard to obstacles, standing 
in the way to economic progress in the African reserves in 
Southern Rhodesia. 
41. M Macpherson, (ed), Life and Labours of Rev. J B Radasi Missionary 
in Rhodesia. p. 19. 
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averse to innovations, ignorant of any such thing as the force of 
economic pressure." 42 The above extracts ought to be taken seriously 
since they have far reaching implications. 
Thirty-nine years later kona declared, "The Ndebele are more resistant 
suspicious of new ideas that cut across their-mode of 1 ife. "43 A 11 these 
quotations concurred that conservatism was a strong force at work in 
African areas including the Ntabazinduna Reserve during the colonial 
era. Conservatism appeared to have been part and parcel of African 
culture and religion. But conservatism was not the only factor that 
impeded economic progress in the reserves. Yudelman argues, "If 
producers are to increase their output and move up the marketing ladder, 
they must have the incentive to increase their input of effort."44 
Oral testimony and written evidence concur that there were no strong 
incentives for the Africans to increase their agricultural production 
and improve the quality of their livestock. For instance one informant 
alleged that stores were rather few in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Items sold.at these stores included 
clothes, soap, blankets, plates, ploughs· and hoes. 45 This list of items 
42. HS Keigwin, 'Native Department', NADA: The Southern Rhodesia 
Native Affairs Department Annual, 1923, p. 12. 
43. W H Kona, 'The Human Factor in Rural Development in the 
Federation. The Impact of Historical Events on the African Peoples 
of Southern Rhodes.~a', Salisbury, 1962, p. 2. 
44. M Yudelman, Africans on the Land: Economic Problems of Africans 
Agricultural Development in Southern, Central and East Africa, 
with special reference to Southern Rhodesia (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), p. 174. 
45. K Ndiweni, 18 December, 1983; M Nyathi, 7 January 1985; See also M 
Yudelman, Africans on the Land; Economic Problems on Africans' 
Agricultural Development in Southern Central and East Africa with 
special Reference to Southern Rhodesia, p. 175. 
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implies that these stores offered a narrow range of attractive goods. 
Even if the Africans sold their agricultural produce and got a lot of 
money from their transactions, they would not have found a variety of 
articles to buy. Wilson said, 11 But unless the life of the reserve is 
vitalised, the great bulk of the educated and progressive natives will 
congregate in towns. I want to make reserve life a satisfying and 
satisfactory substitute. 11 46 
But as early as 1898 some Africans had. already found life in Bulawayo 
more attractive than in the rural areas. According to the Native 
Commissioner•s reports some of these Africans were from the 
Ntabazinduna, Inyathi and Shangani Reserves. To reduce the numbers of 
these people who went to stay in Bulawayo, it was thought that 
agricultural and other economic changes were to be effected in the 
reserves. Again, Wilson, supporting this idea, declared: 11 they must be 
in the reserves ample opportunity for all economic, social and political 
wants of the advancing and progressive native ..•• "47 
It was not the intention of the colonial Government to create a 
situation that could easily lead to the growth of tension between the 
African population and the white community. According to Wilson the aim 
of the Native policy was segregationist; it sought to develop an African 
"in such a way that he will come as little as possible in conflict or 
competition with the white man socially, economically and politically. 1148 
46. HS Keigwin, 'The Development of Native Reserves', NADA. The 
Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual. 1923, p. 88. 
47. Ibid. p. 88. 
48. Ibid., p. 88; See also S 138/72 ,ED Alvord writing Annual Report 
of 1928 to the Chief Native Connnissioner, 4 January 1925. 
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In conclusion, then, it has been seen that the earliest attempts to 
develop and conserve the reserves were also segregatory. Previously, 
prior to 1923, the Chartered Company Government paid lip service only 
to the subject of African advancement. Oral and written sources concur 
that the B.$.A. Government did not try to effect an agricultural change 




THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND THE NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE IN THE 
YEARS 1923 - 1939 
The year 1923 was a milestone in the political history of Southern 
Rhodesia. It marked the end of the Chartered B.S A. Co. rule in the 
region between the Limpopo and the Zambezi Rivers. Simultaneously, it 
ushered in a new colonial e~a that was dominated by a government 
apparently more responsive to the white settler community. There were 
several strong reasons why the Company rule was terminated and replaced 
by a white settler Government in 1923. White settlers' expectations, 
am b i t i on s and asp i rat i on s were fr u st rated by the Company 
Administration's failure to solve certain ~ocio - economic problems, 
facing Southern Rhodesia in the years 1890 - 1923. As Lee argued: 
"Typically, the sequence of events in (Southern) Rhodesia had been seen 
as a purely natural political development of a British colony~ from 
gaining the franchise to achievirig self - rule: ~ut this simplifies the 
issues involved, and ignores the vital factor of the demands of the 
settlers themselves. For their dissatisfaction with existing 
conditions and the rule of the B.S.A. Company was not merely the 
expression of "British" instincts, but rather the result of internal 
conflicts over economic conditions." 1 
Increasingly, settlers complained that their interests were subordinated 
to those of Company shareholders. They demanded political and financial 




Wills, also remarked, "Discontent was felt among many settlers that the 
mines had benefited to a greater extent than farming and other 
interests, which bore less direct to the Company. 11 3 
In Lee's study of the origins of the Rhodesian Responsible Government 
Movement concluded: 
"The more enduring conflict that arose between miners and 
farmers after the emergence of a powerful farming 
organisation in 1904 resulted in a more deep - rooted 
political discontent which found expression first in the 
Rhodesian League and later in the Responsible Government 
Association. •4 
Both Mackenzie and Lee concur that the Privy Council disclosed in 1918 
that the B.S.A. Co administered Southern Rhodesia on behalf of the 
British Crown.5 In v i.ew of the Privy Counc i1 judgment Ge 11 announced 
that 11 it is obvious that since the land is not yours (for Company's 
shareholders), capital for its further development must be sought 
elsewhere than from you. 11 6 
2. Lee, pp. 36 - 37. 
3. A.J. Wills' An Introduction to the History of Central Africa 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967) p 243. 
4. Lee, " The Origins of the Rhodesian Responsible Government" p. 44. 
5. J.M, Mackenzie, " Southern Rhodesia and Responsible Government,' 
Rhodesian History, 9, (1978) p.24 See also Lee, p.49 
6. Lee, p.49 Lyttelton Gell was Director and later Acting President 
of the B.S.A. co: 
75 
Gell's statement indicates that the Company was no longer prepared to 
raise money for the purpose of governing this Crown colony. In fact it 
is commonly agreed that the Chartered Company was faced with the problem 
of deficits. According to Mackenzie the successive British Secretaries 
of State, the Directors ·and the ,Administrator of the B.S.A. Co believed 
that Southern Rhodesia would be run better as a part of the Union of 
South Africa. 7 Botha and Smuts would certainly have liked to see 
Southern Rhodesia made a part of the Union. Then it remained to be 
seen whether or not the white settlers would be happy to endorse 
amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Lord Buxton's 
Commission made a thorough study of the issue of union. The Commission 
recommended that the white Rhodesians be given opportunity to voice at a 
referendum whether they wanted their country to be incorporated into the 
Union of South Africa or to be granted responsible government. 
Rejecting amalgamation Coghlan, the leader of the Responsible Government 
Party declared: 
"Liberty in rags is better than well fed tutelage .•. We have 
souls to be saved as well as bodies to be kicked."8 
When the referendum was held in Southern Rhodesia in October 1922, the 
majority of the white settlers chose Responsible Government. In that 
way they brought about the end of the Company rule in Southern Rhodesia. 
Accounting for the outcome of the referendum, Wills concluded that 11 most 
Rhodesians owned a common political creed compounded of a desire for 
self-government, a dislike of Crown Colony status, and a feeling that 
7. Mackenzie, p.24 
8. Wills, p.244 
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. Union with the South would mean loss of individuality. 11 9 
Mackenzie explained clearly why various sections of the white settler 
community preferred Responsible Government to Union with South Africa. 
For instance he argues that the white workers who earned wages 10 per 
cent higher than their counterparts in South Africa would not be able to 
maintain their privileged position after Southern Rhodesia had joined 
the projected Union.10 They feared that there would be an ''Influx of 
Poor Whites 11 from the South particularly after the 11 Rand troubles of 
February - March 1922 11 .11 
Civil Servants appeared to have been concerned about taxation. 
According to Mackenzie, a. Responsible Government Association poster 
11 gave figures showing that there were 855 individual income tax payers 
in Southern Rhodesia, but that under Union there would be over 4000. 11 12 
It will also be remembered that white women were enfranchised in 
Britain, Southern Rhodesia and other parts of the world after the Great 
War. But women in South Africa were not allowed to vote. It meant 
then, that the Rhodesian white women would lose their vote after their 
country had been incorporated into the Union. For this reason it would 
appear the~majority of the white women supported the Responsible 
Government Party. 
9. 
10. Mackenzie. pp 35 - 36. 
ll. Ibid p. 36 
12 • Ibid p. 36 
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Mackenzie argues that despite the fact that the early leaders of the 
Responsible Government Association were farmers the majority of these 
~ettlers probably preferred Union to self - government. Cattle ranchers 
and tobacco farmers saw access to South African markets as crucial. 13 
Maize farmers were pro-Responsible Government because they feared that 
after joining the Union 11 thei~ lucrative Matabeleland market 11 would 
probably be flooded with South African maize. If that happened, it was 
evident that the price of maize would fall and the Rhodesian commercial 
farmers would not probably make profits out of their transattions. 
After the referendum and the termination of Chartered Company rule there 
was a change of government in Southern Rhodesia. The Responsible 
Government under the leadership of Charles Coghlan was established. 
But this newly formed colonial settler government was faced with 
several, challenging, major issues. One of its formidable tasks was to 
formulate and implement an African agricultural policy that would not 
clash with the interests of the white settlers. 
According to one prominent agriculturalist the African population of 
Southern Rhodesia was 932 842 by 1929. 14 Lee's figure of the African 
population was not very different from that of the Agriculturalist. 
Lee's article stated that Southern Rhodesia had a population of 11 33 000 
whites and approximately 1 000 000 Africans 11 when the Responsible 
Government was formed. 15 Alvord and Palmer concur that the majority of 
the Afri~an people lived in the reserves scattered throughout Southern 
13. Phimister, I, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890 -
1948 p. 116 
14. E.D. Alvord, Occasional Paper No.3 Nov. 1930, p.5 
15. Lee, p. ·33 
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Rhodesia after the First World War.16 There is overwhelming evidence 
stating that these African cultivators were faced with serious problems. 
For. instance in his letter to the NC of the Charter District the CNC 
wrote, 11 The congestion in the Ntabazinduna Reserve has assumed serious 
proportions and must be relieved in some way. 11 17 
A few years later the CNC'S report stated 11 They (the Africans) have 
worn out lands, poverty - stricken cattle, poorly constructed huts and' 
under nourished children." 18 
The Colonial Government had to respond to this crisis in the Reserves 
between the two World Wars. While they grappled with these problems, 
they had to make sure that the African policy they framed and 
implemented did not undermine the interests of the white settler 
community. There was a 'conservationist' dimension to state thinking. 
They wanted to increase the carrying capacity of the Ntabazinduna area 
and other Reserves because of the visible deterioration. The white 
producers and the Settler Administration who still needed African cheap 
labour had no choice but to try and rescue the perishing, rural 
population. In addition to that, the Rhodesian politicians were still 
expected by the United Kingdom Government and Parliament to honour the 
terms of the Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, the main instrument 
relating to-the administration of this colony. Article 81 of this 
Order-in-Council provided that "The Company (Chartered British South 




E.D. Alvord, Occasional Paper No.3 Nov. 1930, p.5. Palmer, Land 
and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, p. 149. 
NAZ, S607 Box 1928 The CNC to the NC, Charter, 20 January 1928. 
Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3 Nov. 1930, p.6. 
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Southern Rhodesia land sufficient for their occupation, whether as 
tribes or portions of tribes and suitable for their agricultural and 
pastoral requirements including in all cases a fair and equitable 
proportion of springs or permanent water."19 After taking office in 
October 1923, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia unveiled to the 
Legislative Council the course the African policy would follow in the 
1920s and 1930s. He declared that it was going to be the policy 
bequeathed them as a legacy by the Chartered Administration.20 
The Government stated that continuity in this policy would ensure 
stability in every sector of life in Southern Rhodesia.21 The Prime 
Minister went on to say that it was the state policy to assist .the 
African population in every way possible.22 This statement should not be 
taken at face value. It could be interpreted to mean that only as long 
as the settlers' interests were not threatened the Government was 
prepared to help Africans survive in the Reserves. These Reserves were 
considered sources of cheap labour by the Colonial Administration as 
well as the white producers. The Prime Minister confirmed this 
conclusion when he said that the Government ''should care for the African 
progress on right lines" so that they could become useful citizens of 
Southern Rhodesia. 23 But he did not explain what he meant by the term 
'African pr~gress on right lines'. Officials on the spot frequently paid 
19. NAZ, N 3 24/1/4 vol. 2 Memorandum drawn up by the Colonial Office 
on Position of the Natives in the Reserves in Southern Rhodesia, 
April 1919, p. 1. See also C 9138 Proclamation Promulgating Native 
Regulations for Southern Rhodesia, 25 November 1898. 
20. The Bulawayo Chronicle, Saturday 13 October 1923, p. 9. 
21. Ibid., p. 9. 
22. Ibid., p. 9. 
23. Ibid., p. 9. 
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a lip service to the policy of development, but with the tones of. 
paternalism. 
For instance, when addressing chiefs and headmen from the Ntabazinduna, 
Inyathi and Shangan·i Reserves, the Native Commissioner voiced that the 
Colonial Government was 11 a good Father 11 who would always help them to 
improve their position. 24 One informant also said that the 11 Native 
Commissioners were really the 'fathers' of the people.25 
To show a gesture of father-child relationship, he alleged that the 
Government, for example, gave four bulls to Magola and Somvubu so that 
the Africans, living in the Inyathi Reserve, could improve the quality 
of thei~ livestock. 26 In addition to that he also stated that the 
Government gave the above African men and the occupants of the 
Ntabazi~duna area cuttings of cass~va as well as cotton seeds. 27 But 
Machingaidze argues in his thesis that 11 it was not state policy to 
promote African agriculture; to say the least. 1128 He maintains this 
view on the grounds that no financial assistance was given to African 
producers before the terms of the Native Development Act of 1929 were 
24. NAZ, S 1561/10 vol. 7 Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 
22 June 1925 Report by the_Native Conunissioner, p. 3. 
25. NAZ, Oral/FLl, Sir Patrick Fletcher was interviewed in the Sinoia 
area by D Hartridge in June 1971. This new, oral archival 
material, throwing more light on the Government policy towards the 
African Reserves, was published in April 1979. He was Native 
Affairs Minister in the late 1920s. His father, R A Fletcher, was 




NAZ, S 1561/10 vol. 7 Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 
22 June 1925, Report by the Native Conunissioner, p. 3. 
Machingaidze, p. 56 
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implemented by the Company Governmerit.29 This conclusion is not 
convincing on the grounds that, for example, the Government voted a sum 
6f 3 250 pounds to be set aside for African Education in 1920.30 
Rejecting this argument, a member of the Native Development Department 
who was interviewed in 1971 said it was the state policy to create "a 
fairly prosperous peasantry in the reserves" between the two World 
Wars.31 Furthermore, it could be argued that the state attitude toward 
the African peasant producers was g6verned by economic and, to a lesser 
degree, humanitarian considerations. Working on European farms, in mines 
and other industries Africans contributed to economic development of 
Southern Rhodesia as a whole and hence the survival of the capitalist 
political system. In the light of these considerations the Director of 
the Native Development Department stated in his report that "The sacred 
trust of civilization was a ~lain duty of self-preservation. 11 32 As far 
as he was concerned it was the task of the European community to see to 
it that Africans were taught without delay to make the best use of the 
land on which they lived.33 If Reserves supported the African 
population, the •conservationists• thought that the blacks would not 
clamour for more land which was occupied by the Europeans. Above that, 
it was believed that Africans would not probably violate frqntiers 
29. Ibid pp. 15 - 16. 
30. NAZ, Sl38/10 African Advancement. S.T. Taylor to CNC 13 May 1924. 
31. NAZ, Oral/H03 H.R.G. Howman, a member of the Native Department was 
interviewed on 10 and 24 August 1971, p. 43. See also NAZ, ~ 
138/10 S.T. Taylor, writing to the Chief Native Commissioner, 13 
May 1924, p. 1 - 2. 
32. HS Keigwin, 'Native Development', NADA, The Southern Rhodesia 
Native Affairs Department Annual, 1923, p. 12. 
33. Ibid., p. 12. 
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between the Reserves and the European farms. Stability in these Reserves 
meant the survival of the white settler community. According to the 
Chief Native Commissioner the aim of the African Demonstrators, working 
under the umbrella of the Native Development Department, was "to teach 
them (Africans) how to grow on one acre the quantity of crops they then 
grew on 10 acres. In that way more lands for grazing purposes could be 
set free and thus add to the resources of the reserve (Ntabazinduna 
area). 34 
Both oral and written sources are agreed that the State wanted Africans 
to grow food to eat. But it was also equally true that the Settler 
Government did not want to create a situation whereby the African 
cultivators would be tempted to compete with white farmers. According to 
one pessimist, 2 000 white farmers were going to be 11 driven out of the 
country within the next two years because of competition with native 
farmers. 11 35 In his report, the Agriculturalist made it clear that those 
"white farmers who could not stand possible competition would do the 
most good for Rhodesia by moving out."36 But he was reflecting the 
State's attitude towards the issue of competition when he said that "it 
was not their aim to encourage the n~tive to compete with the white 
farmer. 1137 
In the years 1929 - 1933 the wielders of political and economic power 
were faced with problems that were brought about by the Great 
34. NAZ, 5138/72 Alvord writing Chief Native Commissioner, 4 January 
1929, p. 1. 
35. Ibid., p. 1. 
36. Ibid., P· 1. 
37. Ibid., P· 1. 
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De p re s s i o n . 0 n e of t h e c a u s e s of t h i s e co no m i c c r i s i s w a s 
overproduction. It will be remembered that after the First World War 
capitalist states adopted and implemented programmes of social 
rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. Agricultural production was 
increased in the United States of America and other capitalist states. 
The World Market was flooded with agricultural produce and other 
commodities. As a result, prices of these commodities fell. Keyter 
argued forcefully that in the case of Southern Rhodesia "the plight of 
European agriculture ought to be attributed to the international 
collapse of prices, first for cotton, secondly for tobacco and thirdly 
for maize, a cumulation of events that almost ruined the white farming 
I 
industry. 11 38 
In his report the Acting Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and 
Lands stated that the external market bought Rhodesia maize for five 
shillings and six pence a bag whereas the previous year the price was 
seven shillings a bag.39 This implies that white farmers made very 
little profit out of their transactions particularly in the period 1929 
- 1933. They found it difficult to live on the. maize and other crops 
they grew. The small and big farmers put their heads together and tried 
to hammer out a solution to the problem of low commodity prices. It was 
proposed th~t the white farmers who grew maize ought to be granted some 
38. C F Keyter, Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia 1931 - 1941. The 
African Contribution to White Survival (Salisbury; The Central 
Africa Historical Association, 1978) p. 1. This booklet unlike 
most of the published material making only passing mention of the 
subject of maize control unveils "the inner workings of the 
Scheme." See also L H Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early 
Days to 1934 (Oxford: Chatto and Windus, 1965) pp. 297 - 299. · 
39. NAZ, S1216/SC1/100/1 The Acting Secretary, Department of 
Agriculture and Lands: Suggested Assistance to Maize Farmers, 1 
April 1933, p. 1. 
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loan without interest by the colonial Government. But no similar 
financial assistance was to be given to the African peasant farmers. 
Furthermore, the Government pas~ed a measure to protect the white 
farmers against the black cultivators in 1931. This measure was called 
the Maize Control Act. It was a controversial and discriminatory 
legislation. Barber, an economist, argued that this Act was designed to 
exclude Africans from the market.40 Supporting Barber's argument, 
Arrighi stressed that Maize Control Act was 11 a formal check, placed on 
African competition in the produce market." 41 Murray saw this Act as 
"severely limiting African producers• share of the domestic market. 11 42 
P~imister made it abundantly clear in his paper that" •••. ,·the general 
impact of the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934 depressed prices paid 
to Africans in order to subsidise the return received by white 
farmers."43 He reinforced his argume~t by statistical evidence. For 
instance he stated that "whereas the average price per bag to black 
producers between 1934 and 1939 fluctuated from ls. 6d. to 6s. ,6d.,, 
white growers over the same period received an average of over 8 
shillings per bag." 44 
--------------------
40. W J Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961) pp. 1 and 26. 
41. G Arrighi, "Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of 
the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia", 
Journal of the Development Studies, VI (1970) p. 220. 
42. D J Murray, The Governmental System of Rhodesia (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1970) p. 90. 
43. I R Phimister, "Peasant Differentiation in Southern Rhodesia, 1898 
- 1938" p. 16. 
44. Ibid., p. 16. 
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In Palmer's view the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934 ''discriminated 
against large-scale white producers as we'll as black farmers. 1145 This 
quotation suggests that these Acts were in favour of small-scale white 
farmers. Their main purpose was to save this group, that was hit hard by 
the Great Depression, from sliding into unemployment. Supporting the Act 
and rejecting the idea that it was a discriminatory legislation, the 
Secretary for Native Affairs stated in his letter, 11 The Maize Control 
Act applies equally to Europeans and Africans. Nobody is compelled to 
sell their maize. Every grower may keep whatever quantity he desires for 
his own consumption. 1146 But the terms of the Act were discriminatory. 
For instance it was stipulated that certain parts of Matabeleland were 
exempted under the Maize Control Act. It was deemed that it would be 
unfair for all areas in Matabeleland to be brought under control on the 
grounds that some parts of this province were affected by drought. 47 
Germany and other Parliamentarians argued that for the sake of justice 
it was essential for control to be applied throughout Southern 
Rhodesia. 48 In that way the Act divided the Rhodesian white 
Parliamentarians into two camps. Furthermore, the weaknesses of this Act 
were unfolded when the Solicitor General pointed out that it was 
difficult to enforce this legislation. This could well be illustrated by 
45. Robin Palmer, "White Farmers in Central Africa: A study in 
Brevity", Oxford, 1978, p. 5. 'Robin Palmer presented this paper 
to the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom 
Conference in Oxford in September 1978. See also R H Palmer, "The 
Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia, 1890 -
1936"' p. 443. 
46. NAZ, S1542/M2 Maize Control 1933 - 1939: Secretary for Native 
Affairs, to Minister of Native Affairs, 5 June 1935, p. 2. 
47. The Herald, Salisbury, 10 and 17 March 1933, p. 10. See also NAZ, 
S1216/SC1/100/1 "Debate on Maize Control", p. 10. 
48. Ibid. p. 10 
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one of its provisions that stated that an African was prohibited from 
selling maize to Europeans except prospectors and trader producers. A 
trader producer was defined in the Act as a person buying from Africans 
with the intention of re-sale. 49 These trader producers would buy maize 
from the Africans at approximately four shillings a bag and resell this 
grain to the Maize Control Board.50 .For instance, in 1933 the Bubi 
District Commissioner stated in his report that maize ought to be sold 
to the people of Ntabazinduna Reserve for not more than thirteen 
shillings and six pence a bag.51 This implies that the Maize Control 
Board could buy maize from the African peasant farmers at four shillings 
per bag and re-sell it at thirteen shillings and six pence per bag. In 
that way the Board could make a profit of 475% out of its transactions. 
Above that, the Africans living in the Ntabazinduna area and other 
reserves must have found it extremely difficult to distinguish white 
trader producers from other Europeans. Any white man exploiting these 
black people's ignorance could present himself to them as a trader 
producer. The other weakness of the Maize Control Act was voiced by the 
Solicitor General. Criticising the Act, he said there was no penalty 
provided for any breach of the regulations.52 
According to one critic of the Government African agricultural policy, 
the wielders of political power pursued repressive policies in order to 
49. Ibid., pp. 1 - 3. 
50. NAZ, S1542/M2 Secretary to the Treasury to the Prime Minister, 13 
June 1934, p. 1. 
51. NAZ, 1085/104/33 Food Situation in Ntabazinduna: The Native 
Commissioner Mr Johnstone, Inyathi to the Chief Native 
Commissioner, 10· October 1933. 
52. NAZ, S1216/SC1/100/1 A E Speight, Solicitor General, 14 June 1932, 
p. 1. 
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eliminate competition between the black cultivators and white farmers. 
He argued that these black cultivators in the reserves were not in a 
position to compete with the white commercial farmers at either·the 
internal or external market, because of several restrictions imposed on 
the former by the government.53 But there was perhaps no need to i~pose 
such restrictions on the Ntabazinduna Reserve. According to several 
informants, the African cultivators in this Reserve grew crops to eat 
and not to sell to the trader producers.54 For instance, Alvord stated 
that they harvested 4 050 bags of grain in this area in 1929 - 1930.55 
The average yield per acre was 2.02 bags. Since the acreage under 
cultivation for Africans was deemed 1.4 acres per capita, it could be 
argued that each family reaped approximately 3 to 6 bags of grain per 
year.56 This was hardly enough for domestic consumption. According to 
the agriculturalist•s report, Africans were not producing enough grain 
with which to feed themselves. He pointed out that 11 during a period of 
2 - 3 months each year they were forced to either purchase grain or 
substitute other foods. 11 57 This conclusion is reinforced by oral 
testimony.SB 
According to several official reports the settler Government wanted 
Africans to improve the quality of their livestock. For instance one of 
53. G Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia p. 33 
54. Chief K Ndiw~ni and M Nyathi 2 July 1984 and 7 January 1985. 
respectively. 
55. E D Alvord, Department of Native Development Southern Rhodesia, 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November, 1930, "Agricultural Demonstration 
Work on Native Reserves", p. Table No. 1 Appendix. 
56. v!bid. t P• 9. 
57. Ibid., p. 9. 
58. M Nyathi 7 January 1985. 
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the Native Commis~ioners reported in 1-930: 11 Interest given by the 
natives generally to the improvement 1 or even care of their cattle, i~ 
disappointing. Their one object is t~ own numbers. 11 59 Obviously, 
Africans were not prepared to de-stock for various reasons. There were 
no incentives for the Africans to breed better cattle as late as 1925. 
Moreover, Africans resisted change in the field of Animal husbandry 
because they were suspicious of the intentions of the Colonial 
Government and its agents.60 Chiefs and their subjects were still bitter 
about their land and cattle that were taken away from them by the 
Europeans in the period 1893 - 1914. They thought that the Government 
was trying to rob them again of their wealth. 
In the light of the above considerations, the Government African 
agricultural policy had a slim chance of success. In the next chapters 
it will be shown how the Government's agents tried to effect changes in 
the field of agriculture in the Ntabazinduna area in spite of all these 
obstacles retarding economic progress between the two World Wars. 
59. G van Vulpen, 'The Political Economy of the African Peasant 
Agriculture in Marondera District, 1930 - 1950.' p. 11. See also 
NAZ, 5235/508 N.C. Annual, 1930. 
60. NAZ, 51561/10 vol. 7 Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 
22 June 1925. Report by the Native Connnissioner, p. 7. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE AGRICULTURALIST FOR INSTRUCTION OF NATIVES AND THE 
NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
The previous chapter outlined the intentions and main elements of 
Government agricultural policy towards the Ntabazinduna Reserve and 
other African tribal trust lands between the two World Wars. 
The goals of this African agricultural policy with its uneasy balance 
between conservationist and labour needs - placed acute demands upon 
those responsible for implementing it. Ideally, each reserve needed to 
be directed and controlled by a man with clarity of thought, the gift of 
imagination, as well as great interest in African progress, particularly 
in the province of agriculture. 
Fortunately, one official met these demands to a considerable degree. 
Emory Alvord was the first Agriculturist for Instruction of Natives, who 
demonstrated a substantial measure of determination in trying to bring 
about an agricultural change in the African reserves in Southern 
Rhodesia inc the 1920s and 1930s. Alvord, a married American missionary, 
was a holder of a· degree of Master of Science in Agriculture. He was 
first stationed at Mount Selinda Mission where he did excellent work 
according to oral testimony. 1 His work was commended by white 
1. NAZ, AOH/41 pp. 15 - 23. Munyukwi Samson Chibvongodze was 
interviewed at Farm No. 4 Muda Purchase Area by Dawson Munjeri on 
14 July 1978. Chibvongodze,. who was born in 1903, was trained as 
agricultural demonstrator at Domboshawa Industrial School as from 
1929. See also NAZ, Oral/ALl, pp. 1 - 7 Mapes Alvord, the 
Agriculturist's wife, was interviewed at her home, Mount Pleasant 
in Salisbury by J D McCarthy on 25 October 1973. 
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contemporaries and black informants, who nicknamed him Murimi Mukuru; 
Shona term meaning the big farmer. 
However, Murimi Mukuru did not stay long at Mount Selinda Mission. The 
Board in the Unite~ St~tes that used to finance the running of the 
mission station was faced with the problem of the shortage of funds. As 
a result, the mission station was closed down. In 1926 the 
agriculturalist, who was obsessed with the idea of showing the Africans 
how to increase their food production, left Mount Selinda for Salisbury 
(Harare). While he was in Salisbury, he approached the Head of the 
-
Agricultural Department. He was offered a salaried job. To begin with, 
he was attached to the European Department of Agriculture. But since he 
was more interested in unveiling new, agricultural technology to the 
African community, he was transferred to the Department of Native 
Affairs. 2 
When Alvord became a member of this Department, he hoped that the 
African tribal authorities and the Native Commissioners would welcome 
his agricultural experiments carried out in the reserves between the two 
World Wars.3 He assumed that these local political leaders would 
cooperate to get the African peasant producers to change their 
prevailing agricultural methods.4 
2. NAZ, Oral/ALl, pp. 1 - 7 Mapes Alvord, 25 October 1973. See also E 
D Alvord, Department of Native Department, Southern Rhodesia, 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November 1930, p. 4. 
3. NAZ, Oral/ALl. p. 6. See also NAZ, Oral/BR2 Noel Brent who was 
born on 5 May 1902 and served as Native Commissioner in 
Mashonaland was interviewed by J D McCarthy at Highlands in 
Salisbury on 8 November 1973. 
4. Ibid., pp. 6 - 7. 
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African cultivators were frequently able to provide enough food for 
themselves in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland before the arrival of 
Europeans in the region lying between the Limpopo and the Zambezi 
Rivers.5 This argument is supported by the fact that Africans occupied 
fertile lands in the pre-colonial period. For instance the region around 
Bulawayo in Matabeleland was productive and occupied by Africans before 
1899. Supporting the above conclusion Mackenzie emphasizes in his 
article that "since the Ndebele were also cultivators, there can be 
little doubt that they were utilising the red and black loams of 
Matabeleland in the nineteenth century. 11 6 
Chengeta Zvobgo was confirming these conclusions in his paper when he 
remarked, 
"Most of the early settlers in Matabeleland selected their 
allotments on the gold belt - on land which is locally known 
as 'formation'. This type of country contains the heavy red 
and black loams - which were favoured by the Matabele •... 
It followed that the Matabele began to feel the pressure of 
European settlement within a few months after the 
occupation. By the middle of 1894 practically the whole of 
the gold belt areas of Matabeleland had been alienated to 
companies or individuals."7 
Palmer and other modern scholars referred to this attractive, fertile 
heart of Mitabel~land a~ 11 nga pakati kwe lizwe 11 (the midst of the 
5. T J Hemans, Notes for a Course on Ndebele Customs, pp. 44 - 47; 
See also Elizabeth Schmidt, p. 2. 
6. J.P. Mackenzie, "Red Soils in Mashonaland", Rhodesian History, 5 
(1974) pp. 82-83. 
7. Chengeta Zvobgo, 'Church and State in Colonial Zimbabwe 1921 -
1945', Conference on Zimbabwean History Vol. 2, Progress and 
Development, University of Zimbabwe, 23 - 27 August 1982, p. 3. 
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land).·8 The majority of the African peasant farmers were removed from 
this best land and resettled on the banks of the Gwaai, Shangani Rivers 
and other remote areas. These newly occupied areas were almost barren. 
The Ndebe le often called them amangcwaba, "cemeteries 11 • 9 
Some parts of the Ntabazinduna Reserve were also 11 cemeteries 11 on the 
grounds that they were unproductive and henceforth unsuitable for human 
settlement. Infertile soil was obviously one of the chief factors that 
led to poor harvests in this area in the years 1897 - 1926. It could 
equally be argued that low crop-production in this Reserve was also due 
to the fact that, as late as 1926, the majority of the peasant farmers 
were still using old agricultural methods. 10 As a result, they were 
sometimes faced with the problem of poor harvests. 11 The economic 
situation worsened when many Africans from Insiza and other parts of 
Matabeleland were resettled in the Ntabazinduna Reserve- in the 1920s; as 
a result of increased competition for resources. 
8. Palmer, "The Making and Implementation of Land Policy in Rhodesia 
1890 - 1936", p. 64. The term "nga pakati kwe lizwe" has been 
written disjunctively by Palmer. Using the new Ndebele Practical 
orthography, scholars would find that this term under discussion 
consists of two instead of four words which are "ngaphakathi 
kwelizwe". 
9. Ibid. pp. 204 - 207; See also Phimister, "Peasant Differentiation 
in Southern Rhodesia, 1898 - 1938" p. 2. 
10. P Mosley, "Agricultural Development and Government Policy in· 
Settler Economies: The Case of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900 -
60", Economic History Review, 35, 1982, p. 397; NAZ, Oral/FL!, p. 
19. Patrick Fletcher was interviewed by D Hartridge in June 1971. 
Fletcher was the_Minister of Native Affairs in the inter-war 
years, MaMthethwa, 27 February 1984; See also the annual reports 
of the Native Commissioner of the Bubi District, covering th~ 
period 1923 - 1926. 
11. K Ndiweni, M Nyathi, NAZ, S235/502 Report of the NC, Bubi District 
for the year 31 December 1924, p. 2 NAZ, S235/506 Report of the 
NC, Bubi District for the year, 1928, p. 4 
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In response to this serious grave food situation prevailing in the 
Ntabazinduna area and other reserves, Emory Alyord made the following 
remarkable statement: 
"I made the discovery that an African must see things 
demonstrated on his own level, within his reach, by 
Demonstrators of his own black colour and kinky wool, and, 
before we could successfully preach to him the Gospel of 
Christ, we must first preach to him the Gospel of t~e 
Plow. •12 
This strongly instrumentalist approach to conversion, assumed that 
Africans would accept the Christian message only after they had 
witnessed economic development in the areas in which they lived. It also 
suggests that African producers would understand the new agricultural 
techniques better if the new methods were introduced to the people by 
black demonstrators. The same extract implies that Alvord believed that 
Europeans were more intellige_nt than Africans. Therefore he felt that it 
was his duty to share the experiences he had with African peasant 
producers. Alvord wanted the African cultivators to use new ways of 
farming so that they could increase their agricultural production in the 
reserves. With this aim in mind, he drew up systematically a course of 
study pursued by African demonstrators at Tsholotsho and Domboshawa 
industrial schools.13 
Alvord did not so much devise this plan as adapt it. He acknowledged 
that he recommended the system of demonstration which was carried out 
I 
12. ED Alvord, "The Gospel of the Plow, or a Guided Destiny". Pages 
of this pictorial collection have not been numbered. 
13. NAZ, Oral/AL! Mapes Alvord interviewed by McCarthy, 
25 October 1973, p. 7; NAZ, 8138/206 p. 12 Alvord writing to the 
Chief Agriculturalist, 25 February 1927. 
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successfully in the Transkei for the past eleven years.14 The training 
of African demonstrators also took place in other areas such as Ciskei, 
Nat a l , Basu to l and , the 0 range Free St ate , the Trans v a a l and 
Bechuanaland. 15 
But Alvord ought to be given credit for modifying this scheme in order 
to meet Rhodesian conditions. It was his duty to decide where the 
agricultural demonstrator should be located after the completion of his 
two-year course. Before making a decision in connection with the place 
where the demonstrator should be stationed, he was expected to consult 
the Native Commissioner in charge of the district.16 
For instance, in the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve, he approached the 
Native Commissioner of the Bubi District before telling the demonstrator 
where he would be staying as he worked among African cultivators. The 
Agriculturalist wanted the District Commissioner to identify himself 
with demonstration work.17 
The' Minister of Native Affairs was not satisfied with dual control 
exercised between the Agriculturalist and the local District 
Commissioner.18 Hbwever, he understood the necessity of the 
14. NAZ, S138/206 E D Alvord writing to the Chief Agriculturalist, 25 
February 1927: Scheme for work of Native Demonstration, p. 2. See 
also NAZ, S138/206 Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary to 
the Premier, 18 November 1926, Report on training of Native 
Demonstrators at Tsholotsho, pp. 2 - 3. 
15. Ibid., p. 3. 
16. Ibid., pp. 2 - 3, 
17. NAZ, S138/72 Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary to the 
Premier, 23 February 1928, p. 1. 
18. Ibid., p. 1. 
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demonstrators being directly under the control of local Native 
Department in the absence of the Agriculturalist. He believed that 
Native Commissioners were not trained as agriculturalists and hence they 
were not in a better position to monitor these agricultura~ 
experiments. 19 
Furthermore, the Minister of Native Affairs voiced that the essence of 
good management was to fix responsibility, control and hold the 
individual liable for failure. 20 This meant that since Alvord was a 
trained agriculturalist, the success or failure of demonstration work in 
either the Ntabazinduna Reserve or other African areas would be 
attributed to him. 
It was his task to assess the achievements of the Native Commissioner, 
agricultural demonstrator and the African peasant farmers. To get a 
clear picture of the Africans• responses to his programme, he could 
analyse and synthesize those reports, which dealt with the subject of 
agricultural change compiled by the Native Commissioner and the 
demonstrator from time to time. But these reports could be misleading. 
The reliability of each of such reports depended by and large on the 
ability and willingness of the Native.Commissioner or Demonstrator to 
tell the trtith. It was necessary for the Agriculturalist to check these 
reports against his own observation or oral data. 
For this and other related reasons Alvord visited the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve several times in the 1920s and 1930s. On one of these trips in 
--------------------' 
19. Ibid., p. 1. 
20. Ibid., p. 2. 
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May 1927, he held a meeting in this Reserve. It was atterided by sixty 
men. 21 Since the.population of the Reserve was over two thousand by that 
_time, this appears to have been a poor attendance. In the same report 
(making a point which is supported by other written sources), Alvord 
stated that the Ntabazinduna Reserve was more densely populated than any 
other reserve he visited.22 
The report is a somewhat frustrating source. It lacks certain essential 
information which is mentioned by other sources. For instance in May 
1927 Green stated in his report that: 
"Grazing and water are scarce. Arrangements are being made 
for the removal of cattle from the Ntabazinduna Reserve and 
Fingo Location where the position is becoming serious to the 
Lower Bembesi. 1123 
It is surprising that Alvord did not even comment on the above 
conditions that affected the African peasant producers and their 
livestock in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. That these and other African 
cultivators were faced with the problems of scarcity of water and grass 
for their livestock was confirmed by the report of the Department of 
Agriculture which said: 
"In Matabeleland generally the conditions were 
particularly severe for cattle during winter as 
grazing was poor and water supply deficient."24 
21. Ibid., pp. 6 - 7. E D Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 17 
May 1927. 
22. Ibid., pp. 6 - 7; NAZ, See also S607 Box 1928, p. 1; 8235/511 
District Annual Report, 1933, p. 1. 
23. NAZ, 8235/521 Report of the NC of the Bubi District, May 1927, p. 
58 
24. Meteorological Report for the year ended 30 June 1927 together 
with Hydrographic Report for the two years ended 30 September 1927 ' 
by the Department of Agriculture, p. 2 
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Alvord visited the Ntabazinduna Reserve for the second time in October 
1927. He compiled a report in which he mentioned that grazing was poor 
because of overstocking. 25 These conditions seemed to impede the 
Demonstrators• progress in the agrarian sector. For instance, arguing 
in support of this conclusion Alvord said that the Demonstrator found it 
extremely difficult in getting kraalheads for whom he (Mbuso) wished to 
demonstrate in early winter-ploughing because African cultivators• oxen 
were 11 too weak to pu 11 ploughs 11 • 26 
. This report does not also mention that another factor, making the 
grazing in the Ntabazinduna Reserve poor, was drought. According to the 
Hydrographic report for the year that ended on 30 June 1927, the average 
rainfall for 8 weather stations in the Bubi District was 14.2 inches. 27 
The normal annual rainfall in the same district was 23.31 inches, 
suggesting that there was a deficiency of 39.88%. 28 
These figures indicate that the drought in the Ntabazinduna Reserve was 
severe in that year. In confirmation, the report the Agriculturalist 
wrote in March 1928 stated that the Blue gum plants near the 
Ntabazinduna Mission (David Livingstone Memorial Mission) were not 
successful because of the excessive drought. 29 
25. NAZ, $138/72, E Alvord to the CNC 24 October 1927, p. 71 
26. Ibid. p. 1 
27. Department of Agriculture, Meteorological Report for the year 
ended 30 June 1927 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1927) Schedule 
11 - Table 2 (a), p. 14. 
28. Ibid., p. 14. 
29. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the CNC on Farming Demonstration work 
19 March 1928, p. 1. 
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The report also mentioned that the Agriculturalist inspected the 
demonstration plot for Madhlelonyeni and adjacent lands. After the 
inspection, he convened a meeting which was attended by forty men 
underneath a big tree. In his lectures he compared the demonstration 
plot with the adjacent fields.30 
It is not difficult to imagine the impact of such a lesson, with its 
forceful comparison. The peasant farmers could also actually see the 
' main differences between the fields whose owners used the new 
agricultural technology and those of men who adhered to the traditional 
methods. Alvord emphasized that adjacent plots planted by ordinary 
African broadcast methods indicated a complete failure. According to his 
report, very few maize stalks developed cobs in African fields. 
He went on to say that even those maize stalks developed cobs which were 
rather sma 11. 3l 
In his view the crop failure in the Ntabazinduna Reserve was mainly due 
to improper planting and tillage.32 His explanation is essentially 
corroborated by oral testimony33 and by statistical evidence. For 
instance, according to chart A (4) the average yield in bags of maize 
per acre on the lands in which the peasant farmers used their methods 
30. Ibid., p. 1. 
31. Ibid., p. 1. 
32. Ibid., p. 1. 
33. MaMthethwa, an old woman was interviewed on one of the banks of 
the Ngwenya River on 25 March 1984. M Nyathi 7 January 1985. 
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was 0.8 for the season 1927 - 1928.34 The average yield in bags of maize 
per acte on demonstration plots during the same period was 3.7.35 
Such figures demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the use of new 
scientific ways of farming was the main factor that contributed to the 
growth of agricultural output in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
In his lengthy report the Agriculturalist pointed out that African 
cultivators in this Reserve were not used to seed selection, a method 
that could help to improve the quality of their crops.36 Others stressed 
the same point. In 1925 the Native Commissioner of the Bubi District 
voiced the opinion that the African occupants of the Shangani, Inyathi 
and the Ntabazinduna Reserves ought to learn to select their s~eds every 
year in order to improve the quality of the maize they grew. Lecturing 
to an audience consisting of chiefs and headmen, he suggested that their 
people should pick out the large cobs with straight rows and break off 
both ends of the cob ·and use the centre of the cob for seed.37 In that 
way it was hoped tha.t the quality of their crops would be improved. 
To make his lectures more meaningful, the Agriculturalist led his 
audience to a nearby demonstration plot on 19 March 1928. In his report 
34. NAZ, Sl38/72 Record of Native Farming Demonstration Work, Season 
1927 - 28, Chart A (4) p. 1. 
35. Ibid., p. 1. 
36., NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord the Chief Native Commissioner on Farming 
Demonstration Work, Ntabazinduna Reserve Meeting, 19 March 1928 
p. 1. 
37. NAZ, S1561/10 vol. 7 "Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 
22 June 1925" Report by the Native Commissioner, p. 5. 
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he alleged that few Africans knew about these demonstration plots.38 
This conclusion is dubious. Madhlelonyeni's plot was right on a path 
used frequently by the occupants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve. Many 
Africans must have seen this demonstration plot. Moreover, in one of his 
reports he stated that the inhabitants of the Reserve showed a keen 
interest in the coming of the Demonstrator.39 This short report does not 
state the number and the classes of African people who cordially 
welcomed the first Agricultural Demonstrator. It does not even tell the 
reader about the role played by women cultivators in the development of 
the history of the Ntabazinduna Reserve. The fact that women and 
children like African men used to cultivate the fields in this area and 
other reserves is acknowledged by various sources. For instance, Farrer 
argued that African males "left their ploughing and cultivating to their 
women and children who had not learned from_the white man how to do it 
properly. 1140 Oral testimony confirmed that African women used to break 
the ground, sow the seeds and cultivate the crops in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve during the colonial days.41 
It sounds naive that a few months later the same people failed to take 
note of the progress made by those who adopted and implemented new 
agricultural methods introduced to the Reserve by this popular African 
Demonstrator. Although some of the statements contained in Alvord's 
38. NAZ, 5138/72 ED Alvord the Chief Native Commissioner on Farming 
Demonstration Work, Ntabazinduna Reserve Meeting, 19 March 1928, 
P• 1. 
39. NAZ, 5138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 17 May 
1927, p. 7. 
40. NAZ, 51561/7 Report of the NC of the Bubi District, 22 June 1925, 
pp. 2, 5. 
41. MaMthethwa, M Nyathi. 
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reports are subject to criticism, it could be argued that the meetings 
the Agriculturalist held in the Ntabazinduna Reserve before the 
traditional fields and demonstration plots were harvested, were always 
significant in the sense that the African peasant farmers were placed in 
a better position in which they could find it easier to evaluate the new 
agricultural technology. 
Acceptance or rejection of this technology revolved around each 
cultivator's subjective evaluation but also was affected by collective 
beliefs and customs. Not only individual peasants, but also a peasant 
community had to be persuaded. As the cultivator internalised what he 
saw on the demonstration plots, it was assumed that he would be in a 
position to choose the better of the two agricultural technologies. The 
point is that Alvord assumed that individuals would make 1rational 1 
choices; he seemed to have overlooked the resistance to change inherent 
in communal peasant consciousness. Alvord and his agents of agricultural 
change always, of course, thought beyond question that their methods 
were superior to the African ways of farming. This conclusion is 
supported by oral evidence.42 
One can observe the increasing appeal made by Alvord 1s lectures through 
statistical existence. For instance his first meeting was attended by 
sixty men,43 while the next meeting was slightly bigger. According to his 
record the meeting that was convened at the Chief 1s residence on 28 
42. Ndiweni; 0 Somkence; Tshuma. 
43. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 17 May 
1927, p. 7. 
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December 1928 was attended by over two hundred people. 44 This big turn-
out was a clear demonstration of African cultivators• determination and 
desire to learn the new agricultural technology from the famous master 
farmer, Alvord. 
Apparently, apart from the Agriculturalist's reports, there are no other 
' 
written or oral sources that throw more light on Alvord's audiences in 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve. But his 'gospel of the plow' seemed to have 
been heard even by people living beyond the frontiers of the above 
Reserve. 
For instance, one of his reports states that the meeting which was held 
at Madhlelonyeni's Kraal was not only attended by people of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve but also by the Chief of the amaMfengu (Fingoes). 
In his report he pointed out that the amaMfengu made a very urgent 
request for demonstration work to be done for them·on the Battlefield 
Block.45 This implies that they had probably witnessed good progress in 
the province of agriculture made by those people of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve, who emulated Alvord's agricultural experiments. 
According to one informant the amaMfengu were better farmers than the 
people of the above Reserve. He went on to say that they taught the 
occupants of the Reserve new ways of farming. 46 This is certainly 
44. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 28 
December 1928, p. 1. 
45. NAZ, 8138/72 Agriculturalist to the Director of Native 
Development, 22 August 1930, p. 1. 
46. Rev O 8omkence was interviewed at his home, Fingo Location, 
Bembesi, 13 July 1984. 
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consistent with appraisals made by historians of South Africa, 
discussing the eagerness of the amaMfengu there to innovate and diversify 
their farming methods.47 
This oral testimony suggests that the amaMfengu were already interested 
in agriculture and therefore responsive to Alvord's experiments. Alvord 
paid the Ntabazinduna Reserve a visit again on 17 April 1929. As his 
custom was, he conducted a meeting near Mbayi's plot. 48 The venue for 
the meeting was well chosen on the grounds that the people who attended 
it could compare the results of the agricultural experiments on the. 
demonstration plots with those of the adjacent fields whose owners used 
old methods of farming. This meeting was made official in the sense that 
it was attended by the Native Commissioner of the Bubi District. Another 
important official who was present was the Superintendent of Natives 
stationed in Bulawayo. 
Although this meeting was significant on the grounds that it was 
attended by over three hundred people including several members of the 
Department of Native Affairs, Alvord's report mentioned that some plot 
owners were absent from the above gathering. Unfortunately, it does not 
state the names or the number of absentees. T~e Agriculturalist believed 
that the main reason why certain unnamed plot owners did not attend his 
lecture was that ·they thought that he would still go to their plots; but 
we are left uninformed as to how he arrived at the conclusion. However, 
47. Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African 
Peasantry" Contemporary Southern African Studies: Research Papers, 
vol. II, Faculty of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1978, pp. 38 - 40. 
48. NAZ, S138/72 E D Alvord to the Director of Native Education 
Salisbury, 30 May 1929, p. 1. 
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it could still. be argued that this big turn-out was a clear 
demonstration of the African cultivators• awakened interest in the' 
message the Agriculturalist and his Demonstrator transmitted across the 
Reserve. As a result of his visits and lectures delivered during the 
-daytime or at night, there was a small agricultural change in the 
Reserve in the period 1927 - 1939. Reinforcirlg this conclusion, Alvord 
made it abundantly clear in his report that he noticed "a marked 
improvement in the way natives were farming".49 
Alvord 1 s claim was upheld by other officials. The Native Commissioner 1 s 
District Annual Reports stressed that improved methods of cultivation 
were noticeable in the Ntabaziriduna area in the above period. 50 
Although Alvord and his Demonstrator contributed a great deal to the 
success of the agricultural experiments carried out in this area, the 
Agriculturalist gave much credit to the Native Commissioner stationed at 
Inyathi. In his view the Native Commissioner showed a keen interest in 
the work which was done by the African cultivators. Checking his view 
against annual reports of the Native Commissioner, it seems clear that 
his Demonstrator promoted African progress in the field of agriculture 
in the Inyathi, Ntabazinduna and the Shangani Reserves in the inter-war 
years. 
49. NAZ, S138 f7 2 E D Alvord to the Chief -Na ti ve Cammi s s ioner, 14 
January 1929. See also NAZ, S138/72 E D Alvord to the Director of 
Native Education, Salisbury, 30 May 1929, p. 1. 
50. NAZ, S235[505 District Annual Re12ort 1 1929, PP· 3 4 
NAZ, 8235[506 District Annual Re12ort 1 1928, pp. 4 - 5 
NAZ, 8235[508 District Annual Re12ort 1 1930, p. 3 
NAZ, S235[509 District Annual Re12ort 1 1932, p. 2 
NAZ, 8235l510 District Annual Re12ort 1 1932, p. 3 
NAZ, 8235£511 District Annual Re12ort 1 1933, p. 2 
NAZ, 8235[513 District Annual Re12ort 1 1935, pp. 3 - 4 
NAZ, 8235l515 District Annual Re12ort 1 1936, PP· 4 - 5 
NAZ, 8235[517 Distric't Annual Re12ort 1 1939, pp. 3 4 
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Alvord did not only deliver lectures to the inhabitants of these 
reserves but he also assessed the achievements of his Demonstrators and 
made specific recommendations. For instance, as early as October 1927, 
the Agriculturalist wrote that "consequently the demonstration work on 
this Reserv~ (the Ntabazinduna area) had not made the progress they 
would like. 1151 He outlined the work to be done by the Demonstrator in 
order to help the African peasant farmers increase their agricultural 
production. For example, the Agriculturalist instructed the Demonstrator 
to manure and cross-plough Ntongana's plot 11 to show the value of such 
methods 11 . 52 
Analysing the Agriculturalist's reports on the Ntabazinduna Reserves, 
any critical historian would discover that they concentrated mainly on 
crop-production. They tell us very little about pastoral farming. For 
instance, in one of his early reports he stated that the Demonstrator 
11 had been doing considerable work in castrating scrub bulls by hand and 
with budizzo Castrators".53 
I 
This report does not state the reasons why the African scrub bulls were 
castrated. It failed even to cite the number of bulls that the 
Demon st rat or ca s tr ate d i n that ye a r . I n , o t her reports the 
Agriculturalist mentioned that the occupants of the Reserve were faced 
with the problems of overstocking and drought.54 · 
51. NAZ, 8138/72 Ntabazinduna Reserve: Progress of Native Farming 
Demonstrator, 24 October 1927, p. 1. 
52. Ibid., pp. 2 - 3. 
53. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 3 
October 1927. "Ntabazinduna Reserve: Inspection N~tive Farming 
Demonstration Work", p. 2. 
54. NAZ, 8138/72 Ntabazinduna Reserve, 24 October 1927, p. 1. 
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Supporting this conclusion, the Chief Native Commissioner wrote, "The 
congestion in the Ntabazinduna Reserve has assumed serious proportions 
and must be relieved in some way: The losses in stock last year were 
heavy and the prospects for the present dry season are bad 11 .55 Oral 
evidence also confirmed that there were far too many cattle, goats, 
sheep and dogs in the Ntabazinduna Reserve between the two World Wars.56 
But very little was said to the people of the Reserve about the remedy 
for the above problem. For instance, in 1933 the Agriculturalist said 
that "the remedy would appear to be limitation of herds and better 
methods of cultivation".57 Since crop-production and pastoral farming 
were interrelated, Alvord ought perhaps to have unveiled to the African 
cultivators for example, the evils of overstocking when he visited and 
delivered his lectures to the people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve. He 
could even instruct the Demonstrator to find means and ways of 
encouraging the African peasant farmers to de-stock. Obviously, one of 
these evils was soil erosion. Describing the outcome of soil erosion in 
East Africa, Professor Hukley says 11 in consequence, you see patches of 
more sand where once was rich grass, ugly runnels and miniature gorges 
cutting back and back into what was rolling downland. That is erosion 
and will continue at an ever growing speed unless the vicious circle be 
broken".58 
55. NAZ, S607 Box 1928 The Chief Native Commissioner to the Native 
Commissioner of the Charter District, 10 January 1928, p. 1. 
56. Chief K Ndiweni and M Nyathi 2 July 1984 and 7 January 1985 
respectively. 
57. NAZ, S235/515 District Annual Report, 1936, p. 6. 
58. Ibid., p. 6. 
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In the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve and other parts of the Bubi 
District the Native Commis~ioner emphasized in his report that there was 
soil erosion like in East Africa. He argued that ploughing the wrong way 
was one of the causes of soil erosion.59 According to one informant the 
African peasants used to plough up· and down the slopes in the inter-war 
period.60 Obviously, this oral evidence concu~s with the above report 
that this method of farming accelerated the rate of soil erosion in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve and other African areas. Beyond that, the Native 
Commissioner_ stated in his report that another cause of soil erosion was 
overstocking. Supporting this conclusion one scholar declared, 11 Natives 
and animals have a tendency of walking in single file, producing 
erodable tracks 11 .6l 
In the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, 
mules including horses kept the grass short and made many paths.62 In 
that way they caused soil erosion. The Native Commissioner of the Bubi 
District pointed out in one of his reports that concentrating large 
numbers of cattle at dipping tanks was another cause of soil erosion.63 
In the Ntabazinduna Reserve the situation was even worse than in the 
other parts of the Bubi District on the grounds that there was only one 
59. NAZ, S235/513 District Annual Report, 1935, pp. 5 - 6, See also· 
NAZ, S235/511 District Annual Report, 1935, p. 5. 
60. M Khumalo, one of the teachers of David Livingstone Memorial 
Mission, was interviewed at his home, Bhekeni Line, Ntabazinduna 
Reserve, 25 December 1985. 
61. W Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about 
Development: a Southern African Exploration, 1900 - 1960", Journal 
of Southern African Studies, vol. 11 No. 1, (October 1984), p. 61. 
62 .. K Ndiweni, 2 July 1984; M Nyathi, 7 January 1985. 
63. NAZ, S235/513 Report of the Native Commissioner of the Bubi 
District, 1935, p. 6. 1 
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dipping tank in the years 1897 - 1939. In the Shangani Reserve there 
were 16 dipping tanks by 1933.64 
During his visits to the Ntabazinduna Reserve the Agriculturalist ought 
to have taken his listeners to runnels, gorges and other geographical 
, 
features which were an outcome of soil erosion. As his listeners gazed 
at these features, he could have explained to them why it was necessary 
for the people of this Reserve and other parts of the Bubi District to 
de-stock in the 1920s and 1930s. In that way perhaps the African 
cultivators would probably have understood better the reasons why t~ey 
should reduce the number of their livestock. Although Alvord did not 
show a keen interest in the subject of African animal husbandry, both 
oral testimony and written data concur that as agriculturalist he did a 
splendid piece of work ~articularly in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 
inter-war years. His frequent visits to the Reserve were a source of 
inspiration to the African cultivators 'under the guidance of the 
Agricultural Demonstrator. The historical records indicate that by his 
speeches and actions he was a devoted master farmer who was obsessed 
with the idea of helping the Africans effect an agricultural change not 
only in the Ntabazinduna area but also in other reserves scattered all 
over Southern Rhodesia. All my informants consider him as one of the 
greatest pioneers in the development of the agricultural history of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve between the two World Wars. 
64. Naz, $235/511 District Annual Report. 1933, p. 5. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE AGRICULTURAL DEMONSTRATOR IN ACTION IN THE 
NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE BETWEEN 1926 AND 1939 
Before the turn of the nineteenth century there were no accurate and 
reliable statistical records of population in Southern Rhodesia. 
Contemporary and subsequent scholarly estimates of nineteenth century 
African population of Matabeleland vary widely, ranging from 14 000 to 
126 491. 1 Although these figures were unreliable, all written sources 
and oral testimony that have been consulted by me concur that the 
inhabitants of Matabeleland were always outnumbered by those of 
Mashonaland in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to one 
of the reports written by the Directors of the British South Africa 
Company, the acreage cultivated in Matabeleland increased from 121 961 
to 134 803 in the years 1898 - 1901. 2 In Mashonaland the acreage under 
.cultivation also increased from 410 581 to 499 011 between 1898 and 
1901.3 And twenty-five years later 1881 square miles could be brought 
under cultivation by Africans in both provinces. 4 These figures, 
1. JR Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 1820 - 1896, p. 466; 
NAZ, Hist. MSS MO 1/1/5/2 Moffat writing to Bruce, 3 December 
1888; Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for 
30 September 1898, pp. 222 and 184; The BS A Co., Directors' 
Report and Accounts, 1901, Table p. 16, The BS A Co., Reports on 
the Administration of Rhodesia, 1897, 1898, 1899, pp. 222. 
2. The BS A Co., Directors' Report and Accounts 1897 - 1898, p. 16. 
3. Ibid., p. 16. 
4. Meade, E, 'Memorandum on the Cattle Indus try of Southern 
Rhodesia', The Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, vol. 18, No. 3, 
1921, p. 243. 
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showing an increase in acreage under cultivation in Southern Rhodes~a in 
the years 1898 - 1926, suggest that some African peasant farmers used 
the plough instead of the traditional hoe as their main agricultural 
implement. An African family with a plough could easily bring 10 - 20 
acres of land under.cultivation. 
But according to Reid's paper an African family, using the short-handled 
traditional hoe could only bring 1 - 6 acres under cultivation.s Reid 
arg~ed that Africans neither possessed nor used ploughs in Matabeleland 
in the pre-colonial times. Explaining why Africans had no ploughs he 
said, "Lobengula prohibited his people from owning wagons, ploughs, 
spades from traders".6 He did not give the reason(s) why the King 
always refused his subjects permission to purchase these goods from 
white traders. Reid went on to say that the 11 use of a plough by a tribal 
farmer was after European settlement".7 This extract meant that the 
Ndebele were free to buy ploughs and other goods from the white traders 
after the downfall and disappearance of Lobhengula. Reid's paper could 
be criticised on the grounds that it did not state the exact year when 
the African producers began to purchase and use ploughs in Matabeleland. 
His conclusion that this agricultural technological innovation occurred 
after the occupation of both Matabeleland and Mashonaland, is confirmed 
by som~ rel=iable written sources. For instance, in one of his papers 
Palmer emph~sized that "by the beginning of the present century 
(twentieth century) many Rhodesian Africans had learned how to use the 
5. MG Reid, "The Early Agriculture of Matabeleland and Mashonaland", 
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 73 - 74 (1977), pp. 98 - 99. Reid 
used to be a Provincial Agricultural Officer stationed in Gwelo 
now called 'Gweru'. 
6. Ibid. , p. 99. 
7. Ibid., p. 100. 
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bullock as a beast of burden",8 and had trained their oxen or bullocks 
to pull ploughs, wagons and scotch-carts. Palmer also pointed out that 
"other cultivators began to use ploughs instead of the traditional 
hoes."9 Adding weight to the conclusion that African peasant farmers 
were in possession of ploughs by 1900, the Chief Native Commissioner 1 s 
report of 31 March 1901 stated that "Natives purchased a small plough 
called America .75".10 
One of the chief weaknesses of these reports, papers and other related 
sources lies in the fact that 'they are incapable of giving the 
re a de r ( s ) ad e q u ate , e s s e n t i a l , s tat i s t i c a l de t a i l s , co v er i n g 
particularly the period 1894 - 1901. Only a minority of more well-to-do 
African peasants owned ploughs during the early years of the century. 
Wallace 1 s paper was confirming this conclusion when it said, "Natives in 
Matabeleland had 1 000 ploughs by 1908 11 .ll Since the African population 
of Matabeleland by that time was approximately 217 000, it is right to 
assume that less than 1% of the African producers had ploughs by 1908.12 
Weinmann also stated that there were only 2 794 ploughs in Southern 
--------------------
8. Robin Palmer, 'White Farmers in Central Africa: A study in. 
Brevfty', Oxford, 1978, p. 10. This paper was presented to the 
African Studies Association of the United Kingdom Conference, 
Oxford, in September 1978. 
9. Ibid., p. 10. 
10. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland for the year 
ended 31 March 1901, Salisbury, p. 4. 
11. Wallace, R, 'Rhodesia and its Agricultural possibilities'. The 
Rhodesian Agricultural Journal 1908 - 1909 Vol. 6, p. 378. This 
paper was read by Professor Robert Wallace to the Royal Colonial 
Institute. 
12. Ibid., p. 363. 
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Rhodesia by 1910.13 This statistical evidence indicates clearly that the 
majority of the African peasant producers were too porir to buy ploughs, 
harrows and cultivators. As a result they continued using their 
traditional hoes in Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the f i~st quarter of 
the twentieth century. 
Supporting this conclusion Alvord emphasised: 
"Our work of preaching the gospel of the plow is fully as 
important as that of preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom. 
The African will have a better chance of afte~ life in the 
Kingdom if he is taught by the gospel of the plow how to 
live a better life here on earth. By it (the gospel of the 
plow) poverty will be alleviated and the people will be 
raised to a higher plane of home life."14 
Adding weight to the above conclusion, Phimister declared that "most 
rural blacks, however, neither owned significant numbers of cattle nor 
possessed ploughs, and it was this broad class of cultivators who 
increasingly found the economic balance tipped against them, initially 
by the land and fiscal policies of the colonial state ... 11 .15 
Apart from crop-production the other main economic activity of the 
Rhodesian Africans was animal husbandry. 
13. H Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1924 - 1950, p. 214. 
14. NAZ, ED Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow or a guided Destiny', 
Pages not numbered on the microfish. 
15. I Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890 -
1948, pp. 79 - 80 
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According to the report of the Directors of the British South Africa 
Company the black population in Matabeleland had 13 673 cattle, 21 596 
sheep and 68 058 goats by 1901.16 The Shona people owned 30 853 cattle, 
26 336 sheep and 109 112 goats in 1901. 17 Weinmann alleges that the 
white commercial farmers had 11 948 cattle by 1900. 18 But ten years 
later these white farmers had 164 167 cattle whereas the number of 
beasts possessed by Africans was 300 000.19 According to E D Alvord 
there were 1 495 803 cattle, 771 001 goats, 269 251 sheep, 37 019 
horses, mules, donkeys and 37 889 pigs in Southern Rhodesia by 1934. 20 
Although the reliability of the above figures is open to question, it is 
plausible to conclude that the number of livestock and acres under 
cultivation increased at an alarming rate particularly in the African 
reserves that were scattered all over Southern Rhodesia between 1900 and 
1939. Since according to African custom, quantity rather than quality 
transcended all other considerations, the black population welcomed the 
new trend of events. 
The Agriculturalist for Instruction of Natives was reflecting the 
colonial state policy when he said, "These lands (African reserves) must 
support the people and the livestock of the Gommunity and no individual 
16. The BSA Co., Directors' Reports and Accounts 1900 - 1901, p. 16. 
17. Ibid., p. 16. 
18. H Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia 1890 - 1923. Occasional Paper No. 4 (Salisbury: 
University of Rhodesia, 1972) p. 109. 
19. Ibid., pp. 109 and 110. 
20. Alvord, ED, 'Agricultural Life of Rhodesian Natives 1929 - 1934', 
NADA The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual, 7, 
(1929) p. 11. 
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could be permitted to go into farming for himself on a large scale. 1121 
The Agriculturalist and the colonial state were concerned with problems 
facing the African population, particularly between the two World Wars 
and they brought certain assumptions to bear on the issue. To help the 
Africans solve the problems of overpopulation, overstocking, congestion 
and shortage of food the Agriculturalist urged centralisation of arable 
lands and intensive farming on small areas. 22 By doing that, it was 
hoped that the natural resources of Southern Rhodesia would be 
conserved. The Agriculturalist was always obsessed with the idea of 
promoting economic progress in the 89 reserves scattered all over the 
country. He sent out agricultural demonstrators to these reserves. 
There seems to be a strong case for arguing that the African peasant 
farmers would be in a better position to comprehend the new agricultural 
techniques when concrete examples of the above methods were unveiled to 
them by their fellow men. ·But there were also other sources and means of 
transmission for new skills. African peasants could also grasp the 
message through direct experience when working for white farmers. 
Written and oral sources concur that African 1 men who picked up new 
methods of farming while employed by white men on the latter 1 s farms did 
a good job. 
Since the majority of the African peasants were illiterate during the 
colonial days, every lesson dealing with these new agricultural 
techniques ought to have been prepared in such a manner that it appealed 
21. NAZ, 8138/72 Alvord Annual Report of 1928, to the Chief Native 
Commissioner 4 January 1929; "Policy with regard to farming 
demonstration among the Natives", p. 1. 
22. Hemans, p. 47. 
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to a man's five senses including sight, taste, smell, touch, and hearing 
in order for people to master it. The important role played by every 
agricultural demonstrator is further illustrated by a case study of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
The population density of the Ntabazinduna Reserve was approximately 
6.846 people per square mile in 1897. 23 This implies that the Reserve 
was sparsely populated before the turn of the nineteenth century. But 
this was not the only African area that was thinly populated towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. For instance both the Inyathi and 
Shangani Reserves were also sparsely populated. The population density 
of the Inyathi Reserve was roughly 1.243 people per square mile whereas 
that of the Shangani area was approximately 0.772 people per square 
mile.24 According to the Bubi N~tive Commissioner's report there were 
31.47 people living in every square mile in the Ntabazinduna Reserve by 
1913.25 By November 1930, the population density of the Ntabazinduna 
area was 84.1856 people per square mile. 26 This figure indicates that 
there were far too many people living within a small area. Since it is 
commonly agreed that colonial statistics were often unreliable before 
1914, the above calculations should be taken as estimates whose purpose 
is to throw light on the socio-economic conditions in the Ntabazinduna 
area and other African Reserves in the first quarter of the twentieth 
23. NAZ, L 2/2/117/10 Table. The population density of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve has been calculated by me. 
24. Ibid. 
25. NAZ, N.3 24/1/2 Report on Native Reserves: Ntabazinduna Reserve, 
May 1913, p. 2. 
26. E D Alvord, Department of Native Development, Southern Rhodesia, 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November, 1930: "Agricultural Demonstration 
Work on Native Reserves", Table No. 1. 
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century. According to oral sources many Africans were removed from the 
Insiza District to the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the period 1920 - 1928. 27 
This happened when whites infiltrated and turned the Insiza area into 
commercial farms. As a result of this removal and natural accession, the 
population of the Ntabazinduna Reserve increased in the 1920s. 
According to Alvord these African peasant farmers had only 230 ploughs 
in use by 1930.28 This statistical evidence implies that the majority of 
the inhabitants of this Reserve used iron hoes in the inter-war period. 
The above conclusion is also supported by oral testimony. 29 As a result 
harvests were often very poor in this Reserve in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century. According to one informant, some African families 
used to reap an average of 3 buckets per acre before the arrival of an 
agricultural demonstrator in the Ntabazinduna area.30 
Grappling with the problems of low agricultural production and scarcity 
of food in the Ntabazinduna and other African areas, Alvord gave his 
demonstrators specific tasks to do. These agricultural demonstrators 
were fre~uently sons of traditional leaders. For instance one of these 
young men was Mbuso, the son of Mhanqwa Ndiweni who was the Chief of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 1920s and early 1930s. 31 This implies that 
Mhanqwa and other chiefs were rich and that was why they were in a 
better position than their subjects to send their children to big 
27. K Ndiweni; M Nyathi; Rev. Ndebele. 
28. Ibid., Table No. 1. 
29. MaMthethwa, 19 August 1984. 
30. Nyathi 7 January 19~5. 
31. Ndiweni, 27 February 1984. 
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educational institutions. Mbuso Ndiweni completed Standard IV and was 
admitted to the course of Demonstrators at Tsholotsho Training Centre in 
the Nyamandlovu District on 1 February 1924.32 Commenting on his work, 
the Principal of this Industrial school wrote that Mbuso was good in the 
field.33 The Agriculturalist also mentioned in one of his reports that 
good practical training was given to six students including Mbuso at 
Tsholotsho. 
Despite much evidence of Mbuso 1s prowess and practical preparation, his 
reception by the peasants was not straightforward. According to 
Phimister 1 s paper 11 the overwhelming majority of rural dwellers turned 
their backs on agricultural demonstration. 11 34 Mahonde agreed : 11 The 
Africans were hostile to the demonstrators generally because they had 
not forgotten how the white man had treated them when he expropriated 
their land and took away their cattle from 1893 ... and then moved them 
32. NAZ, Sl38/206 Principal of Tjolotjo Native School to the Chief 
Native Commissioner, 4 February 1927 p. 1. See also NAZ, Report on 
Training of Demonstrators at Tjolotjo by Agriculturalist, 13 
November 1926, p. 2. According to this report Mbuso's classmates 
were John from the Selukwe Reserve, Gavonu from the Samokwe 
Reserve, Lintwa from the Gwanda Reserve, Govu from the Gwaai 
Reserve and Joseph from the Samokwe Reserve. One defect of this 
report is that it does not state the surnames of the above 
students. And this state of affairs could easily create confusion 
in the minds of the readers since there were several people known 
as "John", "Joseph" and so forth in the 1920s, 1930s. 
Mbuso was taken as a person who came from the Bubi Reserve. But 
there was no reserve by that name. All other written and oral 
· sources concur that Mbuso was one of the inhabitants of the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve, which is a part of the Bubi District. 
33. Ibid., p. 1. 
34. I R Phimister, "Peasant Differentiation in Southern Rhodesia 1898 
- 1938". p. 12. 
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into the reserves 11 .35 
But Alvord declared that 11 People showed much interest in the coming of 
the Demonstrator (Mbuso). 11 36 There is neither oral nor written evidence 
that supports this conclusion. In fact, it could be argued that the 
Ntabazinduna African peasant producers like those of the Belingwe area 
and other reserves offered resistance to change in the field of 
agriculture in the years 1897 - 1930. This argument is strengthened by 
the fact that there was low attendance at meetings convened in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve by Alvord between 1927 and 1930. 
However, Mbuso appeared to have been a suitable Government agent to help 
Africans bring about an agricultural change in the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
in the inter-war period. For instance, he was the right man to effect 
agricultural changes in this area on the grounds that he was equipped 
with both academic and vocational skills. Since he was brought up in the 
above Reserve, it is plausible to conclude that he knew the language, 
attitudes , capacities, problems and needs of the people he was expected 
to serve. In that way he was in a better position to intergrate his 
early experiences and the knowledge he acquired from his teachers while 
he was at Tsholotsho Training Centre. 
But the success of the agricultural experi~ents he introduced in the 
Reserve depended to a larger degree on his ability as well as 
35. C N Mahonde, 'The Role of Domboshawa Government Industrial School 
in African Development with particular reference to Agriculture 
1920 - 1942'. University of Zimbabwe, unpub. B.A. Honours 
dissertation, consisting of 30 pages. 
36. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner 17 May 
1927, pp. 6 - 7. 
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willingness to direct and control the economic activities of the African 
Community he served. 
Assessing Mbuso•s achievements, the Agriculturalist pointed out that 
this Demonstrator had not made the progress he anticipated in May 1927.37 
Since this report was written six months after the Agriculturalist•s 
visit to the Ntabazinduna Reserve, it could be argued that this was 
rather too early for him to assess Mbuso•s achievements. Obviously, 
there were forces that impeded economic progress in this Reserve. One of 
these factors was the shortage of rainfall. Throwing more light on this 
conclusion, an annual report of the Department of Agriculture stated 
that :"In Matabeleland generally the conditions are particularly severe 
for cattle during winter, as grazing was poor and water supplies 
deficient. 11 38 The Bubi Native Commissioner also voiced that grazing and 
water were scarce in the Ntabazinduna Reserve and Fingo Location in 1927 
and 1928. He recommended that cattle be removed from the Reserve, where 
the situation was becoming serious, to the Lower Bembes;.39 According to 
one hydrographic Report the amount of rainfall in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve and other parts of the Bubi District was 17.61 inches for 1927 -
1928. Since the normal rainfall was 23.32 inches per year, there was a 
great deficiency. As a result of this severe drought, there was scarcity 
of grass. }n his report the Agriculturalist mentioned that the 
37. NAZ, S138/72 Ntabazinduna Reserve: Progress of Native Farming 
Demonstrator, 24 October 1927, p. 1. 
38. Meteorological Report for the year ended 30 June 1927 together 
with Hydrographic Report for the two years ended September 1927 
(Salisbury: Government Printer 1928) p. 2; See also NAZ, S235/505 
Report of the Native Commissioner for the Bubi District, 1927, 
P· 4 • 
39. NAZ, S235/521 Native Commissioner's Report on the Bubi Native 
Commissioner, May 1927, p. 58. 
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I 
Demonstrator in the Ntabazinduna Reserve 11 was greatly handicapped 11 
because African people's oxen were so thin and weak that they could no 
longer pull ploughs.40 It could also be argued that Mbuso did not make 
good progress as expected by Alvord because the occupants of the 
Ntabazinduna Reser~e w~re probably hostile to agents of agricultural 
change. 
'~ 
Although Mbuso encountered these and other difficulties, he did not give 
up what he had set out to do in 1927. For instance, when the 
Agriculturalist visited the Ntabazinduna Reserve, he found out that 
Mbuso had already taken over plots from four African cultivators for 
demonstration purposes. According to his report, all these plots were 
winter-ploughed by the beginning of October 1927. 41 One of these plots 
belonged to Madhlelonyeni whose homestead was near the Chief's Kraal. 
The area of the plot was two acres. 42 Since the soil was isibomvu, 
light red sandy loam, it was fertile: Any agricultural experiment 
carried out on such a piece of land was likely to be successful. The 
Demonstrator was instructed by the Agriculturalist to cross-plough one 
of these two acres in order to show clearly the advantage of winter-
ploughing and cross-ploughing over winter-ploughing. A few miles due 
north east of the Demonstrator's homestead there was a kraal built by 
Ntongana. The Agriculturalist's report stated that the Demonstrator took 
over a one ~ere-plot from this man. 43 In this area the soil was 
--------------------
40. NAZ, Sl38/72 Progress of Native Farming Demonstrator by 
ED Alvord, 24 October 1927, p. 58. 
41. Ibid.,p. 1. 
42. Ibid., p. 1. See also a copy of N.R. 30: Survey and map compiled 
by E D Alvord, between pages 121 and 122. 




gravelly loam with a shale near the surface places. 
The Demonstrator was instructed to cross-plough and manure this plot in 
order to show the value of such methods. At Mkhontshwana's place where 
the soil was isidaka again the Demonstrator worked on one acre. This 
plot was winter-ploughed, maQured and cross-ploughed in order to make it 
different from the way it was dealt with before. 44 The fourth 
demonstration plot was at Job's place whose soil was inggolwane, a 
brownish clay loam. Again, this plot was winter-ploughed by Mbuso. It 
was also manured.45 
The site of the above demonstration plots was well chosen on the grounds 
that in the same vicinity there 1 ived African peasant farmers who sti 11 
adhered to their old, agricultural methods~ Since the demonstration 
plots were near African fields, these peasant producers could observe 
what Mbuso did., They could then compare their own methods of farming 
with the new, agricultural technology unveiled to the community by the 
Demonstrator. After that they could choose the better of the two 
agricultural technologies. Apart from winter-ploughing, cross-ploughing, 
manuring, the Demonstrator also harrowed his plots at least two weeks 
before planting time. He did this in order to demonstrate to the peasant 
producers t~at it was necessary for them to destroy all weeds before 
-
planting seeds in order to promote rapid growth of crops. Since the 
Agriculturalist's statements concur with those made by my informants in 
connection with Mbuso•s economic activities in 1927, it seems that this 
man was a hard working Demonstrator. In addition to the above 
44. Ibid. p. 2. 
45. Ibid., p. 2. 
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agricultural experiments Mbuso was requested by the Agriculturalist to 
conduct another demonstration plot for the Chief of the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve. Alvords intention, evidently, was to persuade the bulk of 
African cultivators through the example of their chief. (Whether this 
appeal to tribal authority would necessarily have worked is a complex 
issue• Alvord appears simply to have assumed that it would.) 
The Demonstrator was expected to unveil the method and value of crop-
rotation to the African producers as he worked on a two-acre plot at the 
Chief's place. 46 He was instructed to begin with a four-year crop-
rotation. The two-acre plot was to be divided into four equal portions. 
And then, the agricultural ex~eriment was to be carried out as 
illustrated in the diagrams below:47 
Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre 
Season Umumbu Amabele Indumba Umumbu 
1927 - 1928 mealies kaf fir beans mealies 
heavily corn without 
manured manure 
1 2 3 4 
Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre 
Season Umumbu Umumbu Amabele Indumba 
1928 - 1929 mealies mealies kaf fir beans, 
without heavily corn 
manure manured 
1 2 3 4 
46. NAZ, 5138/72 Progress of Native Farming Demonstrator 
E D Alvord, 24 October 1927 pp. 2 - 3. The name of the Chief 
was Bholoho Ndiweni, Senator Chief Kayisa Ndiweni's predecessor. 
47. Ibid., pp. 2 - 3. 
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Half Acre Half Acre· Half Acre Half Acre 
Season Indumba ·umumbu Umumbu Amabele 
' 
1929 - 1930 . beans mealies mealies · kaf fir 
without heavily . corn 
manure manured 
, 
1 2 3 4 
Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre 
Season Amabele Indumba Umumbu Umumbu 
1930 - 1931 kaf fir beans mealies mealies 
corn without heavily 
manure manured 
1 2 3 4 
Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre Half Acre 
Season Umumbu Amabele Indumba Umumbu 
1931 - 1932 mealies . kaffir beans mealies 
heavily corn without 
manured manure 
1 2 3 4 
The main purpose of the above crop-rotation was to unfold principles of 
good farming to the African producers in the Ntabazinduna ~eserve. It 
was hoped that after these people had seen how far adva_ntageous it was 
to .rotate their crops they·would probably follow the footsteps of their 
- master farmer, Mbuso and hence increase their agricultural output. In 
this report the agriculturalist emphasized that Mbuso did considerable 
work on the seed selection.at various kraals. 48 The Demonstrator 
-highlighted the importance of seedselection. When the time for planting 
48. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 30 
October 1927, p. 2. 
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came, the Demonstrator and the owners of the above plots sowed their 
seeds in rows. But other African producers continued for some time to 
broadcast their seeds in the adjacent fields. Seeds germinated in both 
the demonstration plots and the adjacent fields. According to oral 
testimony the Demonstrator cultivated his plots frequently even if there 
were no weeds. But the owners of the adjacent lands cultivated their 
fields only when there were weeds.49 Then, it remained to be seen as to 
which was the better of the two agricultural technologies. Obviously, 
those cultivators who used traditional methods had poor harvests. 
According to one informant the average yield was less than a bag of 
maize per acre in 1928.50 It could be argued that the poor harvests were 
due to an excessive drought. That the drought was severe is borne out by 
statistical evidence. For instance, according to the Bubi Native 
' 
Commissioner's report the total rainfall for the main part of 1927 -
1928 was 9.79 inches.51 But it could also equally be argued that this 
severe drought was not the only chief factor that contributed to the 
poor harvests in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the inter-war years. In one 
of his reports Alvord mentioned that when he took forty Africans to the 
demonstration plot at Madhlelonyeni's place, they were 11 impressed by the 
large healthy plants with big, fine cobs 11 .52 This suggests that the 
plants at Madhlelonyeni's place were slightly affected by drought 
because Mbuso used new, scientific agricultural methods. Conservatism 
and rejection of these new ways of farming by the peasant producers were 
49. M Nyathi was interviewed in the Ntabazinduna Reserve on 7 January 
1985. 
50. Ibid. 
51. NAZ, 5235/505 District Annual Report for the year ending on 31 
December 1927, pp. 3.4. 
52. NAZ, 5138/72 E D Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner on 
Ntabazinduna Reserve Meeting, 19 March 1928, p. 1. 
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certainly chief contributory factors to poor harvests and starvation in 
this African area. 
In his report the Agriculturalist emphasized that Mbuso's work was much 
better than that of his counterparts in the other African reserves in 
Southern Rhodesia. According to his assessment Mbuso was the only 
Demonstrator who did proper cultivation.53 Alvord's judgment was based 
on the fact that mealies were 11 nearer maturity in the Ntabazinduna area 
than on the most advanced plots on Selukwe Reserve 11 .54 Mbuso did not 
only stage agricultural demonstrations but he also delivered lectures on 
modern methods of farming. For instance, in one of his lectures he dealt 
with the subject of cultivation. The Agriculturalist stated in his 
report that he saw the peasant producers 11 in their fields, cultivating 
with hoes, not weeding but cultivating the soil 11 • 55 This extract implies 
that Mbuso's message to the people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve was very 
clear and convincing. It was not only the Agriculturalist who felt that 
the Demonstrator's work was commendable but also Rev. Noble of the 
Presbyterian Mission. Quoting Noble, the Agriculturalist said that the 
former declared that he was going to discontinue with Agricultural 
instruction in his Mission on the grounds that Mbuso had taught the 
Africans more in one year practical lessons than he hoped to teach them 
in ten years by instruction.56 
53. NAZ, 8138/72 ED Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 7 
February 1928, p. 1. 
54. Ibid., p. 1. 
55. Ibid., p. 1. 
56. NAZ, 8138/72 E D Alvord the Chief Native Commissioner 28 December 
1928, p. 1. See 8235/505 District Annual Report, 1927, pp. 3 - 5. 
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In his annual report th-e Bubi District Commissioner was echoing the 
achie.vements of Mbuso when he said that his (Demonstrator's) work was 
11 very much appreciated by natives 11 in the Ntabazinduna Reserve.57 In 
addition to that he ·pointed out that 11 large numbers of applications for 
his services were received. u 58 When these off i c i a 1 reports are checked 
against oral testimony, it can be established that they are in 
agreement.59 Therefore it is plausible to conclude that Mbuso Ndiweni 
did an exce 11 ent job as an agr i cu ltura 1 demonstrator in the Ntabaz i nduna 
Reserve in 1927 - 1928. 
In his thesis Gert van Vulpen suggests that in every African reserve the 
+ .. 4 
..... c:.~· ••.• , 
cultivators could be divided into two main groups in Southern Rhodesia 
during_the inter-war years. One of these groups was that of 
plotholders.60 This group of people was expected to supply oxen for 
ploughing and give any other assistance required by the agricultural 
demonstrator. Then the demonstrator, using modern, agricultural 
techniques, worked on the lands belonging to the above group. But the 
agricultural produce from these plots was given to the owners of the 
fields. The second group of people consisted of men who had an interest 
in the methods used by the Demonstrator. The members of this group did 
not give the Demonstrator their lands, oxen and other help~ They 
\ 
observed the Demonstrator's agricultural experiments and tried to 
--------------------
57. NAZ, 5235/505 District Annual Report, 1927, p. 4. 
58. Ibid., p. 4. 
59. A Khumalo and K Ndiweni were interviewed at their homes in the 
Ntabazinduna area on 18 December 1983 and 27 February 1984 
respectively. 
60. Gert van Vulpen, "The Political Economy of the African Peasant 
Agriculture in Marondera District 1930 - 1950", Amsterdam, unpub. 
Phd thesis 1982/83, p. 26. 
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implement the new techniques on their lands. These people were called 
cooperators.61 But it is rather strange that his thesis does not mention 
the third group of African peasant farmers. ·And yet this class appears 
to have been the largest of the three. It consisted of peasant producers 
who were neither the plotholders whose lands were taken over by the 
demonstrators nor cooperators. In the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
there were already three groups of peasant farmers by 1929. For 
instance, according to one of the Agriculturist's reports, Mbuso worked 
on eight demonstration plots in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the season 
1928 - 1929. These plots were stumped, winter-ploughed, cross-ploughed 
and manured. This implies that there was a small number of plotholders 
in the Reserve. Above that the Agricultural Demonstrator had thirteen 
African peasant farmers lined up as cooperators on their lands.62 
This second group of African peasant producers was bigger than that of 
the plotholders. In the light of the fact that the Ntabazinduna area was 
already densely populated by 1929 it is plausible to conclude that the 
number of cooperators was very small. These figures show that the 
largest group of the peasant farmers consisted of people who were 
neither the plotholders nor cooperators. This was the group that did not 
emulate Mbuso's agricultural experiments. 
Despite the efforts made by Mbuso, the level of acceptability of his 
message remained limited. However, his performance in the field of 
agriculture was undoubtedly better than that of his counterparts who 
61. Ibid., p. 26. 
62. Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1928, Chart 
~. p. 21. See also Sl38/72 ED Alvord to the Annual report to the 
Chief Native Commissioner, 28 December 1928, p. 1. 
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were stationed particularly in the Gwanda, Belingwe, Mutema and Chibi 
areas. According to some statistical evidence the agricultural 
demonstrators working in these areas had no cooperators in the season 
1928 - 1929. 63 And this suggests that African cultivators in these areas 
were more hostile to demonstrators than those peasants who lived in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve. 
The agriculturalist and the Bubi District Commissioner continued to 
assess the Demonstrator's work. According to their assessment Mbuso 1 s 
achievements were remarkable. For instance, in his annual report the 
Chief Native Commissioner declared, 11 The Demonstration plots on 
Ntabazinduna, Semokwe, Victoria, Chikwakwa, Mangwendi and Chiduku 
Reserves are better this year than during the two previous years 11 .64 
That Mbuso made progress in the late 1920s is borne out by statistical 
evidence. It would be remembered that at the end of the season 1927 -
1928 the average yields in bags of maize per acre on his demonstration 
plots was 3.7. At the end of the season 1929 - 1930 the average yield in 
bags of maize per acre on his demonstration plots was 5.7. This means 
that the average yield in bags of maize on his plots increased by 
54.05%. His best plot gave him 6.6 bags of maize at the end of 1927 -
1928. One of Agriculturalist's papers alleges that some of Mbuso's 
11 demonstration plots yielded over 20 bags of maize to the acre. 11 65 
63. Ibid., Chart B. p. 21. 
64. Report of the Directors of Native Development for the year 1929, 
p. 83. 
65. E D Alvord, Department of Native Development, Occasional Paper No. 
1,, "Agricultural Demonstrators in Native Reserves" November 1930, 
p. 28. 
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According to these reports that are also supported by oral testimony 
Mbuso Ndiweni continued to do commendable work as a conscientiou~ 
agricultural demonstrator in the period 1927 - 1934. As he worked on his 
plots day by day, he unveiled to the African peasant producers t~ose 
techniques that could help them increase their agricultural output and 
improve the quality of their livestock. Since he was undoubtedly a great 
pioneer in the province of African peasant agriculture in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve between the two World Wars, it is reasonable to 
assume that his contemporaries will never forget the light that he 
brought to this area under the chieftainship of Bhuloho Ndiweni and his 
successors. 
Mbuso 1 s successor was Mabhada Maphosa. While Mabhada was not a son of 
the Chief of the Ntabazinduna area, he was a son of a headman. Mabhada 
trained as agricultural demonstrator at Tsholotsho Industrial School. 
The written sources which I have consulted have said very little about 
his economic activities in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the years 1935 -
1939. In his reports the Bubi District Commissioner stated that the 
Native Demonstrator did very well in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 
period 1935 - 1939. In one of these reports he alleged that by degrees 
his (Mabhada 1 s) Agricultural ~ethods were being adopted "with most 
encouraging~results."66 The report, however, is not specific and it does 
not identify the new agricultural techniques that were adopted and 
implemented by the African peasant producers in the Reserve. Futhermore, 
the District Commissioner did not explain what he meant by the phrase 
"with most encouraging results". 
66. NAZ, 5235/513 Report of the Native CoIIUilissioner, Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1935, p. 4. 
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Apart from the District Commissioner's sketchy reports, oral testimony 
emphasized that Mabhada did a splendid piece of work in the years 1935 -
1939. For instance, according to one informant, Mabhada's performance 
was so good that some of the people who followed his footsteps used to 
reap ten bags of maize from an acre.67 But this informant was unable to 
cite the names and groups of people who adopted and carried out 
Mabhanda's agricultural experiments. He could not even state the number 
of people who increased thefr agricultural production after Mabhada had 
staged his demonstration lessons in the Ntabazinduna Reserve. Although 
written sources do not say much about his economic activities in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve, several informants concur that he was a hard, 
devoted worker like his predecessor.68 Both Mbuso and Mabhada helped the 
peasant producers to bring about agricultural change in the Ntabazinduna 
Reserve in the inter-war period. The next chapter will throw more light 
on these men's achievements. 
67. M Nyathi was interviewed at his home in the Ntabazinduna Reserve, 
on 7 January 1985. 
68. K Ndiweni, M Nyathi, M Khumalo, Rev. Ndebele and M Nxumalo were 
interviewed in the Ntabazinduna Reserve at different times. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE RESPONSES OF THE PEASANT FARMERS TO THE ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURALIST FOR INSTRUCTION OF 
NATIVES AND HIS DEMONSTRATOR IN THE NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE 
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS 
Chapters five and six of this dissertation have tried to provide a 
balanced, comprehensive account of the main economic activities of the 
Agriculturalist and his Demonstrator in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 
period 1927 - 1939. 
In an assessment made in 1962, Kana declared: "Agricultural Service 
started some thirty years ago by Alvord has failed to raise the African 
Purchase Area·or Reserve ~bove a subsistence economy. 11 1 Is he correct 
in implying that Alvord's agricultural experiments carried out by his 
demonstrators in African areas including the Ntabazinduna Reserve were a 
fruitless exercise? 
Explaining why he believed that the experiments were unsuccessful, Kana 
said, "Demonstrators resorted to intimidation and dictatorship and thus 
1. W H Kona, "The Human Factor in Rural Development in the 
Federation: The Impact of Historical events on the Afr.ican People 
of Southern Rhodesia", Memorandum Agriculture: Agricultural Union, 
Seminar Papers, 1962, Salisbury, 28 February - 1 March 1962, p.6 
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drove away the_ cooperation they needed from the people. 11 2 This 
dissertation ch~~lenges Kona's conclusions, which are - in any case -
not clearly supported by evidence. Use has been made here of both oral 
and written sources not used by Kana. 
Gert van Vulpen's reasons for the failures of Alvord's agricultural 
experiments are different from those stated by Kona. In his doctoral 
thesis van Vulpen emphasized that 11 Lack of marketing facilities, price 
regulations, lack of agricultural demonstrators and difficulties with 
the supply of manure, all contributed to the failure of the 
demonstration work. 11 3 In their article Leys and Ross gave rather a 
' 
different kind of explanation for the poor responses by Africans to the 
colonial Government economic policy. They argued, 11 Government is not 
their government. In their (the Africans') view everything it does, the 
tax, labour regulations and all else, is done for the benefit of 
Europeans 11 • 4 
But in~11 The Gospel of the Plow 11 Alvord was citing a different reason for 
poor African cultivators' responses to the agricultural demonstration 
work when he said, 11 All over the country (Southern Rhodesia) natives 
asked with wisdom: What is the use of adopting better methods and 
2. Ibid., p. 6. See also P Mosley, "Agricultural Development and 
Government Policy in Settler Economies: The Case of Kenya and 
Southern Rhodesia, 1900 - 1960", Economic History Review, 35, 
1982, p. 397. 
3. Gert van Vulpen, "The Political Economy of the African Peasant 
Agriculture in the Marondera District, 1930 - 1950", p. 34. 
4. D Birmingham et al "White presence and power in Africa: The 
Colonial State in Xenya, 1885 - 1914, The Journal of African 
History, vol. 20; No. 4, 1979 p. 492. 
producing more crops, when there is no market?"5 Ranger's claim that 
"African cultivators were everywhere anxious and able to respond to 
early market opportunity" overlooks regional obstacles to such 
. · responses.6 For instance, in the case of the Ntabazinduna Reserve, there 
is no adequate oral or written evidence to suggest that sufficient 
market opportunities existed to meet the needs of the local African 
population in the early colonial days. According to oral testimony only 
one small store with a· narrow range of goods existed in this Reserve 
during the colonial era.7 One informant alleged that commodities such 
as sweets and sugar were freely given to those African who sneaked 
around the store building.a It could be argued that this was done in 
order to stimulate peasant producers' interest in purchasing goods from 
the store. The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the responses 
of the African producers to the western, agricultural technology in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve in the periods 1920 - 1926; 1927 - 1930; 1930 -
1934 and 1935 - 1939. 
There was no agricultural demonstrator stationed in this Reserve before 
1927. As a result, the majority of the African peasant farmers used 
their own agricultural methods during the first period. The iron hoe was 
still used as the chief agricultural implement. In his annual report for 
the years 1~23, 1924, 1925 and 1926 the Native Commissioner in charge of 
the Bubi District emphasized that Africans had not made improvements in 
5. NAZ, Alvord, "The Gospel of the Plow", unnumbered pages. 
6. T Ranger. 'Growing from the Roots: Reflection on Peasant Research 
~n Central and Southern Africa', Journal of Southern Af~ican 
Studies, (5) 1, 1978, p. 99 
7. Khumalo, Nyathi, Ndiweni; DOTB Map NR 30: "Ntabazinduna Reserve". 
8. Ndiweni. 
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the province of agriculture.9 As a result, harvests in the 
Ntabazinduna, Inyathi and the Shangani Reserves were generally poor 
before 1927. 
In his PhD thesis, Steele maintains the view that hoeing was the 
preserve for African women while ploughing was men's duty.IO Thomas also 
stated in his reports that it was a woman's duty to break the ground.11 
No historian .disputes the fact that there was a division of labour 
particularly among the Ndebele or Shona during the colonial days. But 
Farrer seemed to brush aside the idea of the division of labour when he 
told chiefs and headmen that the African agricultural production was 
lower than that of the Europeans because "they left their ploughing and 
cultivating to their women and children who had not learned from the 
white man how to do 'it properly 1 ike you have 11 .12 
. The idea that ploughing was solely done by women in the Inyathi, 
Ntabazinduna.and Shangani Reserves is open to question on the grounds 
that it is not supported by oral and other written sources which I have 
9. Report of the Native Commissioner, Bubi District for the year 
ended 31 December 1923, p. 244; NAZ, S235/502 Report of the Native 
Commissioner, Bubi District, 1924, p.2. 
10. Murray Cairns Steele, nThe Foundations of a Native Policy in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1923 - 1933", Simon Fraser University, unpub. 
PhD thesis, 1972, p. 362. 
11. MG Reid, "The early Agriculture of Matabeieland and Mashonaland", 
Rhodesia Agriculture Journal, 77 vols. 73 - 74, 1976, p. 98. MG 
Reid was a Provincial Agricultural Officer stationed in Gwelo, now 
calied 'Gweru•, during the Colonial days. 
12. NAZ, S1561/10 vol. 7 Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen, Inyathi, 22 
June 1925, p. 2. This report was compiled by Farrer, the Native 
Commissioner of the Bubi District. The meeting was attended by 44 
Kraalheads, Chiefs and Headmean from the above Reserves. 
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consulted. The above Native Commissioner argued forcefully that unlike 
the African cultivators the wh~te commercial farmers cultivated more 
particularly in a drought season and reaped a little. He alleged that 
Africans "reaped nothing when there was drought because they did not 
cultivate their crops. 111 3 It was not only the Bubi Native Commissioner 
who urged the Africans to cultivate their crops in order to increase 
agricultural production in the Reserves but also the Agriculturalist. As 
far as the Agriculturalist was concerned cultivation was as important as 
application of manure. 14 Strengthening his argument he outlined the 
yields of four demonstration plots planted to maize. In accordance with 
one of his reports the first plot was neither manured nor cultivated. It 
was only weeded as the occupants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve used to do 
before 1927. 
The yield per acre was four and a half bags of maize. 15 The second plot 
unlike the first one was ''well cultivated frequently". According to the 
report the yield per acre was seventeen and a half bags of maize. 16 The 
yield per acre of the third plot which was weeded and manured was 
eighteen bags of maize. 17 Adding more weight to this conclusi~n one oral 
source says that four trained agricultural demonstrators who used manure 
13. Ibid., p. 2. 
14. NAZ, S 138/72 Ntabazinduna Reserve; No. 5746 ED Alvord's Circular 
Letter No .. D.C./3 ED Alvord in Salisbury, to the Chief Native 





obtained twenty-one bags of maize per acre in the African reserves. 18 
According to the above informant Africans 11 knew nothing about planting 
in rows and about the application of manure. 111 9 Another informant said 
that the inhabitants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve had a lot of Kraal _ 
manure particularly before 1927. He stressed that these people did not 
use it because they did not know its value. 20 This again helps to 
explain why agricultural production was low in the Reserve in the 1920s. 
The last plot 11 was manured and well cultivated frequently 11 . 21 And the 
results were very good. The yield per acre was thirty-two bags of 
maize.22 Obviously, this last plot was 7.11 times better than the first 
one which was neither cultivated nor manured. In the light of the above 
statistical evidence it is plausible to conclude that the use of manure 
was as important as cultivation. 
In his paper Weinmann was emphasiz1ng the poor quality of seeds sowed by 
African peasant producers in their fields when he concluded, 11 Maize was 
an established crop amongst the natives of Rhodesia at the time of 
occupation, a deteriorated, low yielding, but hardy type of round maize 
being grown 11 .23 In his view this type of maize 11 was well suited to the 
18. NAZ, AOH/41 M S Chibvongodze was interviewed by Dawson Munjeri at 
Farm No. 4. Muda Purchase Area, 14 July 1978, pp. 19 - 21. M S 
Chibvongodze trained as an agricultural demonstrator at Domboshawa 
in 1929. 
19. Ibid., p. 21. 
20. M Nya thi. 
21. NAZ, S138/72 Circular Letter No. D.C./3: ED Alvord in Salisbury 
to the Chief Native Commissioner in Salisbury, 21 Decmeber 1927. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Weinmann, Occasional Paper No. 4 1972, p. 17. 
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primitive condition~ of native cultivation, in which as a rule a mixture 
of different cro~s such as maize, ~affir corn, pearl millet, groundnuts, 
beans and other crops ~ere sowed in the same field 11 • 24 These quotations 
suggest that the traditional maize and methods used by Africans in 
colonial times contributed to low crop-production particularly in the 
Ntabazinduna area and other reserves. 
Throwing light on the agricultural methods used in the reserves in the 
Bubi area at that time, the Native Commissioner pointed out that the 
African peasant farmers did not rotate their crops. Again he was 
accounting for low agricultural production in the reserves when he said, 
"this soil gets tired of growing the same crop every year". 25 The fact 
that the African cultivators did not make use of the above and other 
related techniques in the Ntabazinduria area and other reserves before 
1927 should not be taken as a clear demonstration of their ignorance in 
the province of new, western agricultural technology. In the view of the 
Bubi Native Commissioner all labour on European, commercial farms was 
done by African men throughout Southern Rhodesia. 26 This conclusion is 
not only supported by written data but also by oral testimony. 27 For 
these African men experience was their best teacher. Both oral and 
written sources make it abundantly clear that some of these Africans 
shifted fr~m white, commercial farms in the Insiza District to the 
-
Ntabazinduna- Reserve in the 1920s. Oral evidence also indicates that 
some of the Africans worked on the European farms surrounding the 
------~-------------
24. .1Qi4., p. 17. 
25. NAZ, 51561/10 vol. 7. Report of the Native Commissioner, Inyathi, 
1925, -p. 5. 
26. Ibid., p. 1. 





Reserve. 28 Despite the absence of detailed evidence, it seems natural to 
assume that they made use of skills learned while working on farms owned 
by whites. Addressing kraalheads, headmen and chiefs from the three 
reserves in the Bubi District, the Native Commissioner stated that 
harvests were frequently poor in the above area because African men 
were lazy. 29 But the first page of this report gives the readers the 
impression that African men were hard workers when Farrer declared, " 
All the work on the farms in Rhodesia is performed by your people".30 
It seems he was contradicting himself when he alleged that African men 
were lazy. Therefore this allegation which has not been substantiated 
should not be taken seriously. In fact it could be argued that as a 
result of black mens' hard work, the white settler community made a 
giant stride forward in the economic sector in Southern Rhodesia during 
the colonial period. It was not only in the field of crop-production in 
which the African peasant cultivators failed to compete with the white 
farmers but also in the province of stock-breeding. For instance, in the 
period 1920 - 1926 the Native Commissioner of the Bubi District pointed 
out in his annual reports that Africans did not make any serious effort 
to improve the breed of their cattle.31 In his article Nobbs mentioned 
the types of cattle the Ndebele possessed in the pre-colonial days. 
These cattle included the Zulu types; imofu, red, heavy Dutch beasts 
28. F Tshuma. 
29. NAZ, S1561/10, vol. 7. Report by the Native Commissioner on 
Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 22 June 1925, p. 2. 
30. Ibid. p. 1 
31. NAZ, S235/501 Report of the NC, Bubi District, 31 December 1923, 
p. 296. NAZ, S235/502 Report of the NC, Bubi District, 31 December 
1924, p. 3. NAZ, S235/503 Report of the NC, Bubi District for the 
year ended 31 December 1925, p. 4; NAZ, S235/504 Report of the 
Native Commissioner, Bubi District for the year ended 31 December 
1926, p. 4. 
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with small horns; amabula, red, Dutch animals with white faces and long 
horns; Tswana cattle and amanjaja, Shona scrub breed.32 These and other 
African cattle were inferior to those which belonged to the European 
farmers during the colonial days. But one informant rejected this 
conclusion when he argued that the occupants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
bought cattle from the white settlers and reared them.33 There is 
neither oral nor written evidence that suggests that the European cattle 
formed the foundation stock in the above Reserve in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In fact the African producers were interested in quantity rather than 
quality. In the period 1913 - 1930, the number of their cattle increased 
by 190%. Since the area set aside as grazing land was approximately 7 
000 acres, the Ntabazinduna area was overstocked. But these producers 
were not prepared in principle either to destock or improve the quality 
of their livestock in the years 1897 - 1926. The African cultivators 
probably feared that the white people would take away the peasant cattle 
as the B.S.A.Co. did soon after the fall of Lobhengula. 
In the light of the situation that prevailed in the Ntabazinduna Reserve 
in the period 1897 - 1926 it could be concluded that African peasant 
farmers did not make great progress in the fields of crop-production and 
stock-breed_ing. 
But the year 1927 was a landmark in the development of the agricultural 
history of the Ntabazinduna Reserve. It will be remembered that in this 
32. EA Nobbs, "The Native Cattle of Southern Rhodesia", South African 
- Journal and Monopolies": "Beef Cattle in Southern Rhodesia 1890 -
1938", Journal of African History, XIX, 3(1978) p. 396. 
33. M Nyathi. 
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year Alvord and his Demonstrator, Mbuso Ndiweni started their 
agricultural experiments in the Reserve. This move was designed to bring 
about a meaningful agricultural change in the area. As a faithful 
servant of his colonial masters Mbuso was expected to bring home to his 
people by precept and example the advantages of intensive cultivation. 
In the years 1927 - 1930 the number of African peasant farmers who 
attended Alvord's 'Lantern Lectures' in the Ntabazinduna_Reserve ranged 
from sixty to three hundred men. This statistical evidence indicates 
beyond any reasonable doubt that the majority of the occupant~ of this 
Reserve were reluctant to change their own ways of farming. They were 
probably suspicious of the intentions of the Government's agents of 
agricultural change. The African cultivators might have feared that once 
they accepted intensive cultivation some of their lands would probably 
be confiscated by the Colonial Government. 
Despite the poor attendance at the above meetings the Agriculturalist 
wrote that his lectures "were .attended by large numbers of people who 
listened attentively and earnestly 11 .34 In addition to that he emphasized 
that 11 a number of natives winter-ploughed and manured their lands 11 • 35 A 
defect of this report lies in the fact that it does not state the number 
of African peasant producers who also winter-ploughed and manured their 
-
fields in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in 1928. It could be argued that 
Alvord wrote the words in quotation marks in order to create in the 
minds of the Chief Native Commissioner and other officials the 
impression that African cultivators accepted agricultural change. And if 
34. NAZ, 8235/506 Report of the Native Conunissioner, Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1928, p. 5. 
35. Ibid., p. 5. 
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they did, it could be thought that Alvord had achieved his goals. This 
conclusion is also supported by Alvord 1 s statement that read, "Crops 
improved wonderfully" in the Ntabazinduna Reserve.36 Again this 
quotation sounds vague on the grounds that it does not tell the reader 
the number of bags of maize that were reaped by the inhabitants of the 
Reserve in 1927 and 1928. When a reader is given this information only, 
he is likely to find it difficult to compare the harvests of 1927 - 1928 
with those of the previous years. 
In his letter to the Secretary to the Prime Minister the Chief Native 
Commissioner stated that he learnt "with much interest the competition 
between the Demonstrator (Mbuso) and the four natives in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve mentioned by Mr Alvord".37 
According to Alvord 1 s report one of the four men "ploughed, manured and 
planted in exactly the same way as did Mbuso 11 .38 Although this peasant 
farmer put a lot of effort into his work, he found out that the 
Demonstrator 1 s plot was still much better than his. He attributed the 
Demon s tr at or 1 s s u cc es s to the u s e of i s i k of o 1 o , the 11 mac h i n e 
cultivator".39 As a result this man showed a keen interest in buying a 
cultivator. The agriculturalist alleged that the other three men who 
competed with the Demonstrator said that they had nothing to learn from 
36. Alvord, Occasional Paper No. 3, November 1930, p. 28. 
37. NAZ, 8138/72 Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary to the 
premier, 9 February 1928: "On Demonstration Work: Ntabazinduna and 
Semokwe Reserves". 
38. NAZ, 8138/72 Alvord to the Chief Native Commissioner, 7 February 
1928, p. 1. 
39. Ibid., p. 1. 
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Mbuso. 40 This implies that they adopted and implemented Mbuso 1 s 
! agricultural methods. But again Mbuso won the race. 
All the oral sources that I have consulted do not give the impression 
that there were men who competed with the Demonstrator in the province 
of agriculture in the Ntabazinduna Reserve between the two World Wars. 
A defect of the above reports is that competitors• names, are not 
mentioned. Another weakness of these reports is that they do not explain 
why the four men decided to compete with Mbuso, the master farmer. 
' 
However, these reports throw some light on the responses of the African 
peasants to the econ6mic activities of the Agri~ulturalist and the 
Demonstrator. The competition between the four men, and the Demonstrator 
shows that African people did not respond to Mbuso•s agricultural 
experiments as a big group but as individuals. This argument is 
, 
strengthened by the fact that the number of cooperators was thirteen in 
the Ntabazinduna Reserve in 1927. 41 By 1930 the .number of cooperators 
was 26.42 This means that the number of cooperators doubled itself in a 
period of three years. These figures suggest that perhaps a few rich 
men emulated Mbuso•s agricultural experiments in the period 1927 - 1934. 
These might have been a few African m.en who possessed large herds of 
cattle and could afford to buy agricultural implements from white 
traders. 
40. Ibid., p.l. 
41. NAZ, 5138/72 Alvord to the CNC, 28 February 1928, p. 1. See also. 
NAZ, S323I16891 Report· of the CNC for the year ,1928, Chart B. 
p. 8. 
42. NAZ, 5323/16891 Report of the CNC for the year 1928, p. 8. 
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But the Native Commissioner's report emphasized that he noticed that 
there was improvement in methods of agriculture in 1931. Adding details 
to his general statement, he said, 11 European white seed maize is almost 
universally used. 1143 This quotation implies that this type of maize seed 
was not commonly u~ed in the Ntabazinduna Reserve before 1927. In 1931 
he noticed improvements particularly in methods and class of grain in 
the Reserve. 44 Again this conclusion 'suggests that many people rather 
than a handful changed their old ways of farming. He also declared, 
11 Superior quality of grain is universally sown and has replaced Kaffir 
corn as the staple food crop. 1145 The conclusion that Kaffir corn used to 
be the staple food crop in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 1920s is 
confirmed by oral testimony.46 It is believed that mealie meal was not 
widely used in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in the 1920s. The peasant 
farmers' responses to the new agricultural technology went beyond the 
sma 11 numbers of cooperators: 11 Through his efforts (Mbuso 1 s efforts) the 
majority of the natives have been persuaded to stump their lands and 
plough them properly. 1147 The Native Commissioner also said that the 
results were remarkable on the grounds that the African cultivators 
winter-ploughed and manured their fields.48 
43. NAZ, 8Z35/508 Report of the Bubi NC for the year ended 31 December 
1930, pp. 2 - 3. 
44. NAZ, 8235/509 Report of the Bubi NC, 1931, p. 2. 
45. Ibid., p. 2. 
46. M. Nyathi. 
47. NAZ, 8235/509 Report of the Native Commissioner Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1931, p. 2. 
48. Ibid., p. 2. 
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We are left unclear as to the precise number of people-who .implemented 
the above agricultural methods in the _1930s. If the reports had 
furnished the reading audience with adeq~ate, statistical evidence, it 
would probably have been much easier for historians to conclude whether 
peasants_responded to Mbuso•s economic activities as a whole or as 
individuals. In his annual report of 1932 the Native Commissioner 
asserted that there were "improvements in methods of cultivation in all 
directions". 49 He went on to say that people planted maize in rows.so 
This suggests that the African producers had learnt that the advantages 
of broadcasting seeds were outweighed by the disadvantages. 
Above that the report also stated that "Several Natives have bought 
harrows, cultivators and planters".5l - These implements were possessed 
by the few people with many cattle. These agricultural implements were 
not used by African producers in the Reserve before the arrival of the 
Demonstrator in the Reserve.52 Again, there is no detailed eviden~e of 
the number of people who purchased these agricultural implements. In one 
of his papers Alvord mentioned that there were 230 ploughs in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserv~ by 1930.53 The people of the Inyathi Reserve had 60 
ploughs.54 This paper does not cite figures for other agricultural 
implements such as harrows, planters and cultivators which were 
49. NAZ, Sl35/510 Report of the Native Commissioner Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1932, p. 3. 
50. Ibid., pp. 3 - 4. 
51. Ibid., pp. 3 4. 
' 52. NAZ, AOH/41 M S Chibvongodze was interviewed by D Munjeri at Farm 
No. 4 Muda Purchase Area, 14 July 1978, pp. 22 - 33. 
53. E D Alvord, "Agricultural Demonstration Work on Native Reserves• 
Occasional Paper No. 3 November 1930, pp. 6 - 9. 
54. Ibid. , Table 1. -
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purchased and used in the Ntabazinduna area in the inter-war period. 
The above figures indicate that less than ten per cent of the African 
cultivators had ploughs in this Reserve by 1930. Again, this statistical 
evidence implies that the majority of the African population in this 
area were poor and could not afford to buy ploughs. They did not have 
many cattle and they continued to use the traditional hoe as their 
agricultural tool. Although this was so, it is evident that the 
economic activities of Mbuso, Alvord and Mabhada were not a fruitless 
exercise. For instance, at the end of the season 1927 - 1928 the 
recorded average yield on lands owned by peasant who continued to use 
old agricultural methods in the Reserve was 0.8 bag per acre. 55 But in 
1930 2 000 acres of land were brought under cultivation by the Africans 
in the same area. At the end of the season 4 050 bags of grain were 
reaped.56 This implies that the average yield per acre was 2.02 bags 
whereas in the Lundi it was 1.9 bags p~r acre.57 In the light of the 
above and other statistical evidence the Agriculturalist described the 
people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve as •progressive• in the 1930s.58 
In the period 1934 - 1939 the peasant farmers seemed to show a keen 
interest in the Demonstrator's economic activities. In one of his 
reports th~ Agriculturalist emphasized that winter-ploughing was 
"practiced e;tensively 11 in the Reserve. 59 As a result of the adoption of 
55. NAZ, 5138/72 Chart A. 
56. NAZ, Table No. 1, "Agricultural Status of Reserve Natives". 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
59. NAZ, 5235/513 Report of the Native Counnissioner Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1935, p. 3. 
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Mabhada's agricultural methods there was a good harvest at the end of 
the season, 1934 -·1935. He alleged that "maize of good quality was 
being produced".60 Again, he said that "excellent crops were reaped" and 
"Kaffir corn harvest was bountiful 11 • 61 He did not provide exact figures 
in connection ~ith acreage under cultivation and numbers of bags of 
grain reaped in that year. Therefore Alvord's remarks were rather 
genera 1. 
Although the African peasant producers showed a few signs of improvement 
in the field of agriculture, they did not make an effort to improve the 
quality of their cattle and other livestock between the two World Wars. 
Farrer urged the inhabitants of the Ntabazinduna, Inyathi and Shangani 
Reserves to breed better cattle in 1925. He suggested that they buy 
better bulls. Furthermore, he persuaded them to castrate all their bulls 
which were inferior to those of the white commercial farmers.62 
In response to this appeal Chief Sikobokobo Nxumalo from the Shangani 
Reserve said that he did not think that traders would give them 
(Africans) more money for "better class cattle".63 This quotation 
suggests that there was no strong incentive for the African peasant 
producers to improve the quality of their cattle in the Inyathi, the 
Ntabazinduna and Shangani Reserves, particularly in the 1920's. The 
prices for African cattle which -were obviously inferior to those of the 
60. Ibid., pp. 3 - 4. 
61. NAZ, 8235/515 Report of the Native Commissioner Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1936, pp. 3 - 5. 
62. NAZ, 81561/10 vol. 7, Meeting of Chiefs and Headmen at Inyathi on 
22 June 1925, pp. 1 - 6. 
63. Ibid., p. 7. 
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white commer~ial farmers were undoubtedly very low in the 1920's. 
Kosmin was reinforcing this conclusion when he said: 
"The cattle and hide trade was still Jewish dominated from 
the itinerant cattle buyers in the Reserves like the 
Greenspan brothers up to the exporters and processors. Max 
and Louis Greenspan bought cattle for 7s 6d a head in the 
Filabusi area in 1923 but could not find a buyer in Bulawayo 
even at this price."64 
After the completion of his training at Tsholotsho Industrial School, 
Mbuso tried to show his people how to improve the quality of their 
cattle. For instance according to one written source, he made 520 
castrations in the Ntabazinduna Reserve in 1928.65 But all these and 
other efforts he made appear to have been a fruitless exercise. 
Confirming this conclusion in his report written in 1933, the Native 
Commissioner of the Bubi District declared, 11 Natives still cherish the 
idea that cattle mean wealth and no effort is made to reduce or weed out 
the unsaleable type of animal. 11 66 In the reports covering the period 
1934 - 1939, the Native Commissioner of the Bubi District emphasized 
that there was no improvement in the class of African cattle.67 This 
conclusion is also borne out by oral testimony.68 
64. B A Kosmin, Majuta: A Historv of the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe 
(Gweloi Mambo Press, 1980) pp. 60 - 61. 
65. NAZ, 5323/16891 Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the 
year 1928, p. 8. 
66. NAZ, 5235/511 Report of the Native Commissioner, Bubi District for 
the year ended 31 December 1933, p. 4. 
67. NAZ, 5235/513 Report of the Bubi Native Commissioner, 1935, p. 6. 
NAZ, 5235/515 Report of the Bubi Native Commissioner, 1936, 
NAZ, 5235/517 Report of the NC, Bubi, 1939. 
68. Ndiweni, M Nyathi, F Tshuma. 
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In the li~ht of oral testimony ~nd written evidence whi~h I have 
consulted it cou.ld be concluded that the ~ast majority of the African 
peasant producers resisted change particularly in the fields of animal 
husbandry and crop-production in the Ntabazinduna Reserve between the 
two World Wars. C6nse~vatism and a hostile attitude adopted by the 
African population towards the Colonial Government seemed to have been 
the chief obstacles that retarded economic progress in the Ntabazinduna 
area and other reserves. Although a small group of men welcomed 
agricultural change, it is clear that the above and other related forces 
at work, frustrated the ambitions and expectations of the agents of 




This dissertation has achieved several goals. In the first place, it has 
established the fact that the vast majority of the African peasant 
producers did not make •noticeable improvements in the methods of 
agriculture• in the Ntabazinduna, Inyathi and the Shangani Reserves in 
the years 1897 - 1926. Oral testimony and written evidence concur that 
most occupants of the Ntabazinduna Reserve used the traditional iron hoe 
as their main agricultural equipment for breaking the ground, as late as 
1926. Instead of sowing their seeds in rows as done on European 
commercial farms surrounding the Reserve, the African cultivators used· 
to broadcast them. As a result their crops were often overcrowded and 
thin. Since the peasant farmers neither manured their fields nor 
practiced crop-rotation, the soil was impoverished. Poor tillage was 
undoubtedly one of the chief factors that contributed to a low 
agricultural output in the Ntabazinduni Reserve before 1927. Confirming 
this conclusion, several informants stated that many Africans used to 
reap a few buckets of grain per acre in this Reserve during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. But according to Palmer's Table I-II 
the annual, average yield per acre on European farms ranged from 3.08 to 
6.80 bags of maize between 1913 and 1926.1 It could be argued that this 
higher agrifultural production per acre was due to the fact that these 
white areas were usually more fertile than the African reserves. Another 
chief reason for better yields on these farms than in the reserves was 
that the white producers used new scientific agricultural methods. 
1. R Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, Table III. See 
also Weinmann, Occasional Paper 4, 1972, p. 40. 
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Secondly, this thesis considers 1927 as a turning-point in the 
development of the agricultural history of the Ntabazinduna Reserv~. 
Before 1927 the Settler Government did not intervene in the province of 
African agriculture in this area. But as from 1927 the Colonial State, 
through its agents of change including the Agriculturalist for 
Instruction of Natives, the African Demonstrator and the Native 
Commissioner, began to play an active role in the development of African 
agriculture for various reasons. 
Thirdly, this work has tried to show that the African peasant producers' 
responses to the agricultural experiments carried out by the agents of 
change were mixed. They were never as uniform as Alvord claimed: he 
alleged that there were 11 improvements in methods of cultivation in all 
directions 11 in the period 1928 - 1939. This sweeping claim hardly 
accords with the available evidence. 
Statistical evidence (with all its limitations for this period) suggests 
that very few African cultivators welcomed agricultural change in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve. These were perhaps the rich ones who could buy new 
agricultural implements. For instance, in 1930 there were 230 ploughs 
in use in the Ntabazinduna Reserve as has already been mentioned in the 
previous ch~pters. Since the African population of this area was 3 485 
by 1939, it is right to conclude that the majority of the inhabitants of 
the Reserve had no ploughs, harrows, planters and cultivators. 2 In 
addition to that, Alvord's reports mention that only four African 
peasant farmers presumably members of a small number of wealthier men, 
tried hard to compete with Mbuso, the Demonstrator, in the agrarian 
--------------------
2. NAZ, 5235/517 Bubi, Native Commissioner's report for the year 
1929, p. 1. 
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sector. Besides that, the number of cooperators was small in the sense 
that it ranged from 13 to 26 in this Reserve in the years 1927 - 1930. 
Again, these fi~ures show clearly that the vast majority of the African 
peasant producers were poor and unable to buy ploughs, harrows as well 
as cultivators. As a ·result, agricultural methods remained little 
changed. The other strong reason why most African peasant producers 
resisted change in the province of agriculture was that they were often 
suspicious of the underlying motives of the White Settler Government. 
This thesis rejects the hyperbole of the "Underdevelopment" School that 
"the agricultural economy of the Shona and the Ndebele ..•. had been 
destroyed" by the Settler Government policies in the first forty years 
of the twentieth century. The picture in the Ntabazinduna Reserve is 
essentially one of survival by the majority, with clear-cut responses by 
a small minority. 
Fourthly, this thesis has unveiled to the reader some of the defects of 
the oral and written sources dealing with the subject of agricultural 
change in Southern Rhodesia's colonial past. 
For instance, the reports which were compiled by the Agriculturalist, 
the Chief ~ative Commissioner and the Bubi Native Commissioner with 
-
regard to African reserves from time to time, lack essential details 
such as exact names of prominent black producers who responded 
positively to the Demonstrator's agricultural experiments, numbers of 
people who rejected or accepted the modern agricultural methods and 
those of bags of maize as well as other grain(s) that were reaped by 
cultivators at the end of every summer season. These sources do not 
even divide the African cultivators into various classes, such as the 
rich, the average and the poor. 
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It is unfo\tunate that Mbuso and Mabhada did not leave behind their own 
written records, throwing light on their demonstration work in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve between 1927 and 1939. 
Statements that were made by African informants were also of a general 
nature. Individual's memories do not normally yield to statistics 
. pertaining to Af~ican population, harvest, livestock, agricultural 
implements, acreage and so forth in the Reserve year after year. 
Although these consulted sources could not possibly answer all questions 
the reader might have in mind, they have at least tried to shed light on 
the subject of agricultural change in the Ntabazinduna Reserve during 
the colonial period. Obviously, most of these oral and written sources 
concur that there was no large scale agricultural change in the 
Ntabazinduna Reserve in the years 1923 - 1939. 
Therefore it is hoped that this case-study will stimulate scholars• 
interest in the field of African agricultural past in Southern Rhodesia 
in the first half of the twentieth century. As scholars delve into the 
agricultural history of every African reserve in Southern Rhodesia, it 
would proba~ly be possible for modern historians to compare and contrast 
these findings. In that way historians might be in a better position to 
make sound conclusions with regard to the issue of the totality of the 
past of Rhodesia's African agricultural change in the.first fifty years 
of the twentieth century. In that way this case-study of the 
' Ntabazinduna Reserve, like other similar local studies, has contributed 
in a small way to the advancement of historical knowledge. 
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APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE 
AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE NTABAZINDUNA RESERVE: 
I Informant's historical background: 




Interviewee's date of birth: 
Interviewee's place of birth: 
Interviewee's academic 
qualification(s): 
. . . . I . ... /19 . ... 
e) Interviewee's professional 
qualification(s): ......................... . 
f) School(s) atterided: ............................. . 
g) · Occupation ( s ) : ................................. . 
h) Place of abode since birth: .................... . 
II Historical background of the Ntabazinduna Reserve: 
1. Who were.the earliest occupants of the 
-
Ntabazinduna area? .............................. . 
1 
2. When was the Ntabazinduna Reserve established? 
................ 
3 . Why was this Reserve formed? 
4. Why was this area called Ntabazinduna? 




































................ •· ............................ . 
• • • • ti ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
a) What were 
African people 
econom~c activities 









b) What were the 
of the peasant 
chief agricultural 
producers in · 
implements 
(i) 1897 1926 ............................ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(ii) 1927 1939 
........................................ 
c) What crops did these people grow? 
(i) 1897 1926 ............... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(ii) 1927 - -1939 ............................ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
d) Estimate the average yield of grain per acre 
in 
(i) 1900 1925 ........................ 
(ii) 1927 1939 ............................ 
e) State the reasons for low crop production: 
............................................. 
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What animals did the people rear? 





the average number of cattle 




e) What problems' were faced by stock-breeders? 
.................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
II The Ntabazinduna Reserve and the neighbouring Farms: 
a) Name all the farms that surrounded your Reserve: 
.................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
b) To whom did all these farms belong? 
.................................................. 
c) Who worked on these farms? ....................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
d) Where did these labourers come from? 
.................................................. 
e) State a few reasons why some inhabitants of the 
Reserve worked on the surrounding farms: 
.................................................. 
f) Explain when and why relations between the Reserve 
and the farms were harmonious: 
................................................... 
g) _Say when and why relations between the above 
=communities were strained: 
.................................................. 
4 
III The Government Policy and the Ntabazinduna Reserve: 
a) Say when and why the Colonial Government ~as not 
interested in the economic affairs of the 
occupants of the Reserve: ....................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
b) State when and why the Government showed interest 
in the problems facing the Ntabazinduna Reserve: 
.................................................. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
IV Alvord and the Ntabazinduna Reserve: 
a) Did a white missionary called Emory Alvord visit 
this Reserve? ................................... . 
b) When did Alvord visit the Ntabazinduna area? ..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
c ) Why did he come here? ........................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
d) How many meetings did he hold per year? ......... . 
e) How many peasant cultivators attended each of the 
meetings you have mentioned? ......•............... 
f) Account for poor or good attendance at these 
meetings? 
5 
V The Demonstrator and the Reserve: 
a) Name the first African agricultural demonstrator 
to serve the people of the Ntabazinduna Reserve: 
.................................................. 
b) Where was he trained? ........................... . 
c) Who was his father? ............................. . 
d) Did people welcome this demonstrator? ........... . 
e) If yes or no, why? ............................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
f) What agricultural methods did he introduce to the 
people? 
.................................................. 
q) Did he achieve his aims? ........................ . 
h) Who was Mbuso's successor? ...................... . 
i) What agricultural experiments were carried 
out by Mabhada in 1935 - 1939? 
................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
VI Peasant farmers' responses to agents of change: 
a) What new agricultural methods were adopted by the 
African peasant producers in 1927 - 1939? 
.................................................. 
b) Did the majority of these African producers accept 
or reject agricultural change in 1927 - 1939? 
.................................................. 
c) Explain why. . ................................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Any other comments on this topic? ............... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6 
I would like to thank you for answering my questions. The 
information you have given me will shed light on the 
agricultural history of the Ntabazinduna Reserve before t~e 
outbreak of the Second World War. 
Questionnaire prepared by: F Masuku 
Interviewer : Fuller Masuku 
Venue(s) : Ntabazinduna Reserve; 
Bulawayo 
The mother tongue of the interviewees and interviewer is 
Ndebele. Therefore the above questions were translated into 
Ndebele first. Informants answered these questions in 
Ndebele. I recorded the answers because some of the 
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APPENDIX 2 
----- --- .. 
TABLE Ill 
------· ---~ "'"------• I 
- -
Production, Exports, and Yields of European-grown Maize, 1900-65 
Production E:cpons Yield 
Year (201 lb bags) (200/b bags) (bags per acre) 
1899-1900 c.17JX1J n.a. n.a. 
1903--04 45,815 n.a. n.a. 
1906--07 c. 180.000 n.a. n.a. 
1908--09 n.a. 11,442 n.a. 
1909-10 n.a. 19,555 n.a. 
191(}-ll 393,166 23.378 n.a. 
1911-12 n.a. 6,796 
. 
n.a. 
1912-13 n.a. 38,963 n.a. 
1913-14 634,133 202.105 3-93 
1914-15 914.926 346,855 5·47 
191~16 680,2i5 51,259 3·88 
1916-17 938,130 222,218 4·62 
1917-18 591,722 214,257 3·08 
1918-19 889,969 333,001 5·13 
1919-10 . 1,120,548 488,665 6-45 
192(}-21 1,2W,i68 346,556 6-55 
1921-22 662.636 32,556 l64 
1922-23 1,505.580 789,411 6-80 
1923-24 1,080.084 313,585 4·66 
1924-25 1,068.904 383,338 4·47 
192~26 1.393.654 434,592 ' 5·81 
1926-27 1,659,597 547,156 6·20 
1927-28 1,268.100 597,834 4·29 
1928-29 1,826..345 582,675 5·61 
1929-30 
-
1.917.252 745,010 6-04 
193(}-31 1,436,644 636,194 5·15 
1931-32 1,882,856 1,136,140 - 7·44 
1932-33 l,156.321 644.251 4·66 
1933-34 = 1.728,065 333,603 . 7·01 . 
1934-35 1.269.185 311,822 4·76 
193~36 1,985,848 934,086 7·45 
1936-37 2,039,341 1,426,355 7·35 
1937-38 1,432,003 396,336 5·18 
1938-39 l.209,818 43,238 4·55 
1939-40 1.625,292 387,550 6-49 
1943-44 1,673,459 246,539 6·85 
1946-47 885,030 3,370 3·51 
1947-48 1,912,005 70 5·91 
1954-55 2,734,920 nil 7·51 
~: 
1956--57 3,777,000 2,520,000 10-20 
1960-61 5,951,600 3,810,000 14·60 
1964-65 s.201,900 50,000 12·00 I 
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